

THE LIVING AGE

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—De Groene Amsterdammer

THE LIVING AGE

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In 1844



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The World Over

DESPITE their non-aggression treaty of last August, which precipitated hostilities, and their friendship treaty of last September, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia are not displaying the conventional signs of mutual trust and endearment. The new Russo-German frontier that bisects onetime Poland is massed with troops in numbers that would suggest, if one had not read the non-aggression pact, that all is not sweetness and light between Hitler and Stalin—that indeed what exists today is more an armed truce than an *entente cordiale*. The Polish consul in New York, Jerzy Wendelowski, declares that information of his government at Paris is that the Germans are in mortal fear of Communist propaganda seeping into the Reich now that the country has a common frontier with the U.S.S.R. For their part, the Red Army command is hold-


ing tens of thousands of troops on the new frontier, particularly along its southern extremity, because Stalin evidently doesn't believe for a moment that Hitler has lost his acquisitive interest in the Ukraine, non-aggression pact or no pact.

The leaders of the U.S.S.R. also are aware that the blockade of Germany is beginning to pinch. Where is that increasing flow of wheat, fodder, oil and other commodities that Germany was to receive from her eastern neighbor? This was the supply that, in the reiterated statements of Hitler, Göring, Goebbels and Colonel General von Brauchitsch, would nullify the Allied blockade, now extended to include German exports which means severe curtailment in the ability of the Reich to produce foreign exchange in payment for Russian or other imports. One may weigh all the difficulties of transport between the two countries,

as well as the state of disrepair of the German railroads, yet the war is about to enter its sixth month and German trade papers do not disguise the absence of these imports.

The question that inevitably arises, then, is whether the war is entering a second stage, in which Stalin begins to turn the screws. There is much that supports such a conclusion. If the Russo-German pact was a marriage of convenience, as most patently it was, the period during which it was a convenience for the U.S.S.R. is at an end. The marriage dowry for Stalin was, roughly, one half of Poland. For the rest, it has proved a

headache. Finland has refused to fall in line, and instead of a minor scuffle or a perfunctory military exercise in that country, the dictator of the Soviet Union finds he has a major war on his hands: the man-supply available to Marshal Voroshilov is almost limitless, but replacements of such vital war material as tanks, trucks, machine guns and even rifles is something else again. At this moment the U.S.S.R. cannot afford to divert food supplies to Germany—unless, perhaps, the Reich will send north a small army of technicians to pull the Red divisions out of their morass. But Stalin may not even re-



gard this as necessary, and feel he can ignore Germany altogether.

We believe this is the situation, and that Stalin's position is far stronger than is Hitler's. The Russians have outsmarted the Germans. Whether he likes it or not, Hitler's generals are holding Britain and France at bay while Stalin proceeds with the sovietization of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—for unquestionably that is coming once he has resolved his Finnish adventure, victoriously or otherwise. Hitler doubtless knows he cannot get anything substantial from the U. S. S. R., and that somehow he must increase his supplies from the Balkans.

Nevertheless, Germany is almost certainly better off than the cables suggest. She could probably continue this sort of war for a year, even two, without facing domestic revolution. But the ultimate outcome of that kind of struggle of attrition is plain enough. Abandoned by the Soviet Union to the east and effectively blockaded by the Allies to the west, Hitler has no alternative but a grand-scale offensive, unprecedented in the extent of human and material destruction, and probably due in a matter of weeks.

Propaganda Dearth

HISTORIANS of the contemporaneous world unite in saying that war today is fought as much with the weapons of propaganda as with armies and navies. That is true, but only to a degree. It is astonishing how difficult it often is to secure propaganda, clearly labelled as such, of course. This magazine realizes fully that the effect of the British and French censorship, bolstered by the blockade, is to give the American

press a tone that is far too pro-Allied for intelligent reading by neutrals. But the reason for this dearth of informative German propaganda lies not altogether in the censors, as an article in this issue of *The Living Age* suggests. A calmly and carefully reasoned exposition of the German case is very nearly impossible to find in the German press or to hear in broadcasts from the Reich. Much of the German material available to editors wanting both sides of the argument is purely negative in character—it consists, much of it, merely in saying that the other fellow is a congenital liar. After the 101st reading of this inadequate rebuttal, the effect on us is that of an effective remedy for insomnia.

Japan's "Evolutionary"

Acceptance of the premiership of Japan by Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai in mid-month has special significance for Americans for more reasons than one. In the first place, his surprise appointment is considered by foreign observers as a gesture toward "toning down" the impetuous Army clique which has run rampant over China, resulting in the filing of more than 600 complaints against Nippon's Army by United States interests. Secondly, Yonai has been credited with scotching the plans of the militarists when they clamored for an outright military alliance last summer with Rome and Berlin, expressing his fears then of a European war in which he saw nothing but grief for the Japanese Navy, which would be called upon—as in the last war, when Japan did yeoman service for Great Britain—for distasteful duty for the sake of purely European feuds. Thus, he

was undoubtedly siding with the democracies, and especially keeping a weather-eye toward the United States with whom relations were growing from cool to cold.

When General Noboyuke Abe was named Premier last August, his was considered a stop-gap government, and few expected him to remain at the head of the cabinet for more than a month. Nevertheless, Abe had accomplished, in his short term of office, phenomenal results: a truce, on Japan's terms, with the Soviets; conversations were begun with the United States for a new trade treaty, and the new Central Chinese Government in Nanking, under Wang Ching-wei, was well underway toward actual establishment. When Japanese politicians representing the Seiyukai, majority party in the Diet, last month warned General Abe that his domestic demands were irritating to the public and advised him to resign, few believed that he would find it necessary to do so. But that Japan's Diet, despite the fact that no party leaders have controlled the Government for several years, was well oiled and still functioning, there was no doubt, and Abe force stepped out, convinced that the more the Government extracted from the people to carry on the China campaign, the more the prestige of the Diet, representing millions of voters, was increasing.

Primarily, that was a signal to General Abe that the Japanese people were growing weary of the "China Incident" and were disillusioned by the dawdling Army tactics in bringing Wang Ching-wei to heel, inasmuch as Wang had promised, several months ago, to hatch out a full-fledged and prosperous China. In addition there

was the hovering threat that the United States would not agree to a new trade treaty and time was growing short, the old treaty of 1911 being due to expire before the month's end. Although Japan was fairly certain that the United States would not deliberately sever all relations with her third-best customer, Japanese commercial and financial interests began to grow panicky at the thought that Japan might lose *her* first-best customer, the United States. As Japan's economy is built on the balancing of imports with exports, this would prove a serious hardship, as America is the only market left open for raw materials required by Japanese industries.

Although Admiral Yonai had served in three cabinets, two under Premier Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma and a third under Prince Konoye, his appointment came as a complete surprise, for he was not mentioned among the list of possible candidates for the Premier's portfolio. His selection, however, gives considerable promise that American-Japanese relations will run more smoothly henceforth, while the "China Incident" will be quickly liquidated for the reason that, by command of the Emperor—in an unprecedented move—Shunroku Hata, Minister of War in the Abe Cabinet, has been retained to serve as a bridge between the Army clique and the new Navy Premier. Hachiro Arita, veteran diplomat well-versed in the ways of Western chancelleries, will serve as Foreign Minister and will continue conversations already under way with American Ambassador Grew.

Although the Japanese Constitution guarantees freedom of speech in the Diet, few members of the Legis-

lature saw fit to speak their minds until they returned to Tokyo in December and the leaders told General Abe that the voters were growing more to believe that Abe's increasing economic-control laws smacked too much of the totalitarian nations—Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy—and that, while they were willing to submit to whatever control was necessary for achieving the projected new order in Asia, they were afraid it might develop into control merely for control.

Curiously, this same complaint had been voiced against the cabinet of Baron Hiranuma, which took office in January 1939, and when this misgiving was expressed in the hearings of the budget committee of the House of Representatives, Admiral (now Premier) Yonai, then Minister of the Navy, had this to say:

"The Navy has its own ideas about national defense in the narrower sense of the term. But when it comes to State affairs that have to do with the whole nation, the Navy claims

no exclusive voice in them. Nor do I think the Army alone has any such voice. In my opinion, such matters ought to be handled by the Government as a whole,

with due attention paid to internal conditions and international relations. Apart from that, I have been asked if we have in mind anything that we want to be carried out resolutely in reforming the economic structure or in effecting other reforms, but I must confess that, being a naval officer, I am not well-versed in matters concerning economy.

"To be brief, I think there must be a limit to what is known as controlled economy. If control were to be applied to everything, production would have to be controlled, first of all, and then distribution. If it came finally to control of consumption, I am afraid that the nation as likely as not would be doomed. There-

fore, I think there must be a certain limit somewhere in the matter of control. The same is true, I think, in the matter of free economy, and I do not believe that there can ever

Next Month

THE NEUTRAL PRESS IN WORLD WAR II

Compiled by Stephen Naft
A round-up of excerpts from European newspapers, dealing with war sympathies, and untouched by the belligerents' censors.

WHAT'S LEFT OF GENEVA?

Dr. J. William Terry

While "Federation" and "Union" are being discussed, it is informing to learn precisely what machinery remains in efficient condition at the League of Nations.

THE HULL TRADE PROGRAM

Ray Tucker

Since it is to be the biggest target in Congress this session, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act—the least understood legislation in the country today—should be seen in its realistic components.

GENESIS OF THE ENTENTE

Neville Lytton

German efforts to alienate the French from the British are futile, in one Englishman's view.

exist freedom entirely unattended by control. Then something must be sought between what the people call free economy and what they term controlled economy.

"Examining the existing economic structure with this in mind, I wonder if there is not a little more room for reform, though radical reform would be like killing an ox by mistake in attempting to refashion its horns. I think we shall have to follow a course that is evolutionary, not radical or revolutionary."

Those words may be a guide stick for gauging future internal conditions in Japan, as well as Japanese-American relations.

Underground Railway

IF you are a Pole, and if you don't want to spend the remainder of your life in the domain of Josef Stalin, it seems all you need is fifty dollars plus a little nerve and ability to impersonate. One of those so-called "tunnels"—analogous to those used to smuggle slaves to the North before the Civil War—has been established on the Polish-Hungarian frontier, and there are reports of another leading to Rumanian soil. Agents of the *de jure* Polish Government at Paris travel back and forth by this means, but the "tunnels" are available to anyone with the cash and the histrionic ability to use a forged passport.

The ingenuity of mankind to destroy mankind seems about matched by his inventiveness in devising means to escape destruction. That is, provided it is something complicated, dangerous and melodramatic, and nothing so dull and elementary as a disarmament conference.

Polish "Newspapers"

WHILE on the subject of Poland, a word about the unhappy metamorphosis of its press. The *Kurjer Warszawski*, for many years a pro-Government organ which used to thunder in the grand manner against Germany, retains today its old format under German occupation, but it sings another tune as the official mouthpiece of the Reichswehr in occupied Poland. The *Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny*, an anti-Nazi German daily that was established in pre-Versailles days, now becomes a Goebbels organ, text in Polish. The advertisements are either of the admonitory "Learn German!" variety, or pathetic boxes asking the whereabouts of parents, sons and daughters, husbands or wives, even children—after *Blitzkrieg*. For the rest, the *Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny* is devoted to informing the Poles that (1) Britain has been defeated and the demoralized English are suing for peace at any price, (2) as in 1870, famine grips Paris, (3) the Soviet Union is about to declare war on the Allies, (4) the inevitable Jewish philippic and (5) the United States does not dare repeal the arms embargo.

To make the black-out of news complete, the German authorities recently commandeered all radios that were owned by Poles.

Crocodile Tears

UNTIL the outbreak of war, and for at least a decade before, Hollywood encountered increasing difficulty selling its product in Europe. There was no lack of demand for American films, but almost every na-

tion on the Continent demanded that exhibitors show from three to six or more domestic pictures for every Hollywood opus. But the war has changed the situation in a highly profitable way for our colossal art. The neutral nations fear to show a preponderant number of pictures produced by the belligerents lest they be regarded as unneutral; in any event, film production in Britain, France and Germany has virtually ceased for the duration of war. The film production by neutrals—the United States excepted—is negligible. *L'Europe Nouvelle* of Paris publishes a survey showing that American films today are leading all others at Zurich (which generally prefers German pictures), Geneva, Stockholm (where there were eleven American pictures to four French, two English and one German), Lisbon, Copenhagen, Oslo, Athens and Budapest. Accordingly, the wail of Hollywood producers that the industry is in a bad way because of the constricting effect of war upon foreign markets sounds considerably less than the whole truth.

Tovarish

IN THE make-up of their pages, newspaper editors of the Soviet Union interpret the totalitarian scene with a vengeance. In the latest issue at hand of the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of Moscow, consisting of six pages, there is a total of sixteen articles. All sixteen deal with Stalin; and the majority has Stalin's name in the heads carried over the stories. As an ex-

ample of magnificent redundancy, we list a few of these titles in this one six-page issue: "Stalin," "Comrade Stalin," "Dear Comrade Stalin!" "Stalin as the Successor to the Work of Lenin," "Stalin as the Leader of the U.S.S.R.," "Stalin My Beloved!" and other bright variations. The editors, on the other hand, show more feeling for understatement in the use of Stalin's photograph, which appears only six times—once for each page.

If this is unbelievable, consider the issue of *Izvestia* (the official Kremlin organ) of, say, December 21 last. It consists of four pages. Heads on Page I include "Our Stalin!" (with three-column picture), "Stalin—Hero of Socialist Labor!" "Tovarish Stalin!" "Dear Comrade Stalin," another "Dear-Comrade-etc.;" on Page II, "Dear Comrade Josef Vissarionovich," "To the Leader and Teacher of the Workers, the Great Stalin!" (beneath a two-column photograph); Page III, "Stalin and the Creator of the Red Army," and Page IV, "The Sixtieth Birthday of Tovarish Stalin."

On this last page the reader, with strength remaining, will find slightly more than one column of brief despatches from abroad. *Pravda* (the Moscow organ of the Party) of the same date carries seventy-two columns, of which one only is devoted to news, while the other seventy-one columns deal with "Stalin: The Greatest Man of the Present Time," "Stalin: The Teacher and Friend of Humanity" and—well, you know the rest of them.

THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding Littell's *Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world: so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

Mr. Villard repeats his 1914 exploit
and gets inside the warring nations

German-British Propaganda Duel

By OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

From the *New Statesman and Nation*, London Independent Weekly of the Left

AS MY train was slowly moving into the station at Hanover, the German standing beside me said: "You'd hardly notice the war here in Germany; there's scarcely any sign of it. But you will find that the German people stand behind the Führer as one man. How foolish it is of the British to think that by their stupid leaflets they can separate the German people from their Führer!" "Has there been a wide distribution of those leaflets?" I asked innocently. "Very wide," he said. "All over this part of Germany. I know because it is my business to deal with them." He then added that some of them were naïve and badly done in his opinion. Later I was disappointed to find that no one I met in Berlin had come across any leaflets. Still I am convinced that this method of getting information over to the German people is well worth while. Why else should the Germans be dropping propaganda over the Allied troops in France?

I have seen one excellent British

leaflet entitled "Der Führer spricht," which shows how Hitler contradicted himself in regard to the Czechs and the Poles. The very fact that these documents are forbidden enhances the appetite for them, and the same is true of the British radio broadcasts. I have been asked many times since my return from Germany whether those broadcasts were effective, and whether they were being heard by many people. It is, of course, impossible to form any estimate of the number of people who venture to "listen in" to London. But Americans who have important connections told me in Berlin and other cities that they felt sure that the number was increasing, however great the risk. It is the old story of forbidden fruit. But more than that is the fact that the German newspapers are no longer newspapers, but merely the organs of Dr. Goebbels' vile propaganda. News of the world, outside of war news, is practically no longer obtainable unless people can get their hands on foreign

newspapers, and that is more difficult since the coming of the war.

With any other than the German mentality, the Goebbels type of propaganda would react unfavorably upon its creators. With some Germans it undoubtedly does. Working-men told me that they did not believe anything in the papers they were forced to subscribe to, but with the middle class, that is not versed in foreign affairs and has not travelled much abroad, there is no doubt that the German propaganda is telling. It is hard to resist such an outpouring of abuse and denunciation, when you hear it all day long over the wireless and in the press. I have noticed this with the anti-Jewish propaganda. For example, one woman who, at the outset of the Hitler regime, wrote me that she wished to stand on the street-corners and denounce what was going on, and would do so were she not old in years and if she did not know in advance that it would be ineffective, now accuses me of having a "pro-Jewish complex," and asked me not to see too much of them lest I take on some of their attributes!

SO FAR AS German propaganda in the neutral states is concerned, I am sure that it is in the main ineffective, and that it is more than offset by the fear of themselves which the Nazis have engendered. The Dutch papers, for example, are outspokenly against the Germans, even though they have doubtless been asked by their government to avoid giving offence to Germany. It would pay the British well to cultivate the press of these adjacent states, and to utilize their advertising columns for the publication in German of matters of special importance.

The use of the advertising columns for political propaganda purposes is frequent in the United States and on the Continent, but seems to be little used in Britain outside election times. In spite of the difficulties, the press of the neutral states adjacent to Germany does get over the boundaries, and would doubtless be resorted to more frequently if dissenting Germans knew that there were regular factual British and French statements to be found in these dailies. Undoubtedly this would cost quite a sum, but from what I hear very large amounts have been spent on far less valuable propaganda.

Particularly is it advisable that this should be done with the Allied peace-aims. Their statement and restatement would have the most beneficial effect upon public opinion in the neutral countries as well as in Germany, where their wide distribution is of the utmost importance, for I can think of no more effective way to undermine the anti-British propaganda than to convince the German people that England is not hostile to them, and has no intention of subordinating them to the British Empire.

In view of the great and growing unrest and unhappiness in the Low Countries and in Scandinavia, because of the British blockade, if I were the head of the British Ministry of Propaganda I should take a great deal of advertising space in the newspapers of those countries to set forth quietly and factually the reasons for the blockade and the necessity of it, and do it without bitter recrimination, or name-calling. That would make friends—if it were properly done—where the Allies need friends; there can be no doubt that the plight of

these little neutral countries is getting progressively worse, and will continue to do so. They might just as well be in the war, except that there is no fighting on their soil. They deserve every attention, if only because of the increasing pressure on them by the Germans and Hitler's threats that if they do not actively resent the British blockade measures they will be deemed to be unneutral and therefore open to attack. It is all very well for Englishmen to say individually that they are sorry that the fate of the neutral states is that of the innocent bystander, but the British Government would be very well-advised if it went out of its way to express sympathy, to show a recognition of the hardships being inflicted upon the neutrals, and to explain the necessity *now* of the blockade. If the war goes on a long time the suffering and the exasperation of these countries that are being ground between the upper millstone of England and the nether one of Germany are certain to become dangerous.

As for the British wireless propaganda to Germany, while it has shown some improvement recently, it still has too much of a routine form to have much real appeal to those for whom it is doubtless intended. Terms and expressions are used which are absolutely out of date in Germany, as when the "*Nazi-Bonzen*" are referred to; frequently the language is too academic and sounds too much like translation. I suggest that in the German broadcasts the B.B.C. should consider interpolating from time to time some German poem or song that is universally known to Germans; that they should take more advantage of the presence here of distinguished Aryan

Germans whose names are well-known in Germany, and Englishmen of prominence who know Germany and can speak good German, to give information as to conditions here, and also to preach sound democratic doctrine. A little more emotion, and a little less routinized speaking would, I am told, be more helpful. It should also be borne in mind that an appeal which might be effective to the workers of Hamburg should be entirely different for Prussia or Bavaria.

As for the British attitude toward America, while I have been on this side of the Atlantic since the beginning of the war, I am assured that both the Ministry of Information and the Propaganda Department are avoiding the mistakes of the last war, and that they are not responsible for the many lecturers in the United States at present, whose presence has called forth considerable press criticism. Here the correct policy is to let the facts speak for themselves, and to tell the exact truth, even if the events are unfavorable. The day that either the British or the American public feel that the Chamberlain Government has not been absolutely frank with them will be the blackest one of the war for England. The American public has not forgotten the false and misleading propaganda which was deliberately sent to the United States from Crewe House and other sources during the last war, for that has been set forth at length in a number of books. The slightest breath of suspicion that anything of the kind is happening now would chill the overwhelming American adherence to the Allied cause.

When I was in Berlin an official of the Foreign Office, nettled by my

criticisms of Germany, said: "You have a very poor opinion of the German people." My answer was: "I have a far higher opinion of the German people than your Government has." "How so?" "Because I think so well of the German people that I am willing to believe that they can be trusted with the truth, and your Government does not." When he challenged me to prove my statement I reminded him of some of the lies

about British naval losses, and to this he could make no rejoinder except to say that there was always lying on both sides in every war. Some lying is inevitable and, perhaps, necessary if one makes war. But in this struggle it will be an enormous moral advantage to the Allies if they differ from the German Government in fully trusting their peoples, upon whose courage and endurance depends the ultimate outcome of the war.



Sicily's Underground Autonomy Struggle

By CHARLES NOUAILLE

Translated from *De Groene Amsterdammer*
Amsterdam Progressive Weekly

SICILY'S long history has been one continuous fight against foreign domination. The liberty-loving Sicilians have always protested against incorporation in the Italian Kingdom. Their feelings toward Italy have not improved since the famous March on Rome, and especially not since the Ethiopian adventure and the subsequent intervention of the Italian Government in the Spanish Civil War.

The underground Sicilian autonomist movement, which has been in existence for many years, is not directed so much against the Italian people as casual observers might believe. The autonomists may be compared to Gandhi who declares that he does not hate the English but only their domination in India.

The Sicilians do not want to be ruled by the Italians. In fact, they do

not want to be ruled by anybody. If they were ruled by a non-Italian nation, the Sicilians would still have started their movement. The point is that fascism in general, and Mussolini's fascism particularly, is not liked by the Sicilians. This is chiefly because fascism has not done much for Sicily. The harbors are in poorer condition than any others of the Peninsula. Roads are in bad repair, and the railroad service is inadequate. The great irrigation plans which Mussolini had announced with such fanfare, still remain on paper, and most Sicilians expect they will remain there.

Besides this, Sicily's agricultural problem demands a sweeping solution. The abolition of feudalism in 1812 left the great estates intact. Fascism followed the same line. Consequently there are at present in Sicily still more



than one thousand *latifundia*, or great landed properties. The products of the country are sold to the advantage of the owners of these vast estates, while the agricultural workers must be satisfied with black bread and onions. Extensive tracts remain uncultivated because they are reserved as hunting preserves for the wealthy landlords.

ALL these circumstances have furthered the growth of a separatist movement. Its leader today is Vanni Rosa, who was born in Pozzano. His father and mother belonged to old Sicilian families. On his fifteenth birthday he regarded himself as old enough to assume voluntarily the duties and dangers of autonomist leader. He went to the Argentine to visit an uncle, an exiled militant socialist, who lived in Buenos Aires. Four years later, when he was nineteen, Vanni Rosa went to New York. In 1931, when Dino Grandi visited the United States in quest of a loan, anti-fascists launched a demonstration which resulted in Vanni Rosa being expelled by the immigration authorities. He took refuge in France where, together with some Sicilian friends, he started his autonomist movement.

Vanni Rosa, who now is 32, still lives in Paris whence he directs operations. His separatist movement has been received with great enthusiasm by the Sicilians. Sicilian refugees and descendants of Sicilians have combined to fight for the liberty of the island. It is at present impossible to estimate the real strength of the movement as the Italian press carefully avoids any mention of it, and of course the police suppress any dem-

onstrations. However, the movement must have some significance to judge by the pains taken by the authorities to stamp it out.

Bocchini, the powerful head of the OVRA and personal friend of Mussolini, has sent a special official to Sicily to report on the underground activities of the autonomists. Spada, a former revolutionary, has been ordered to watch the activities of Sicilians in Tunis, where the autonomist movement has many friends. He supplies the police with reports about suspect individuals and their activities. Despite all these measures, the movement grows steadily.

The peasants, workers in the sulphur mines, and the fishermen are Rosa's most enthusiastic partisans. But intellectual circles in Sicily have also begun to show interest in a nationalist future. This is a future to be based on human rights, on liberation of a people who do not deny the Semitic blood in their veins.

When Mussolini paid a visit to Sicily, he was protected by an army of 150,000 troops and police. Before his arrival the island was invaded by a squad of officials, armed with irons and pots of tar, to remove autonomist stickers and posters from walls.

These posters showed many inflammatory slogans. In Palermo they read: "Long live the Sicilian Republic"; in Messina, "The gap between Sicily and fascism cannot be bridged"; in Ragusa, "Down with the Italian Empire! Long live autonomous Sicily"; in Syracuse, "Rome murdered Archimedes." The last is to remind Sicilians that the Sicilian genius destroyed the Roman fleet by means of incendiary reflectors.

There was much more behind the battle
in December than a naval engagement

Intrigue Behind the Graf Spee

By BRYCE OLIVER

FOR those who have followed with realistic objectivity the seemingly crazy-quilt pattern of Western Hemisphere diplomacy of late years, there was no great mystery in the scuttling of the Admiral Graf Spee last December, nor even in the subsequent suicide of the pocket battleship's commander, Captain Hans Langsdorff. Both were due to one of those tragic failures of German intelligence which have time and again marked the course of Germany's international relations.

It is obvious, of course, that in sending the Admiral Graf Spee to operate off the mouth of the River Plate, the German Admiralty had reason to believe that the problem of provisioning the warship would not be made too difficult. Subsequent disclosures of the activities of German merchant ships, including the *Tacoma*, now interned by Uruguay, show how justified was this belief. Up to a point, the Germans were accurately informed with regard to unadvertised

but nevertheless basic policies of the Argentine and Uruguayan governments, which would make a sortie in the waters of these Republics a feasibility. But only up to a point! Where the information went wrong was on a touchstone of Argentine national policy which is even now becoming a key to the future of that "bright new world" which the idealists hope will emerge from the fire of war.

One of the reasons for sending the pocket battleship to the River Plate—there to be joined later, quite possibly, by other units of the German fleet—was German information regarding strong sentiment in Argentina in favor of using Great Britain's present war crisis as an opportunity to regain the Falkland Islands (historically Argentine territory) from the British. Berlin had excellent reason to believe that, if the worst should come to the worst and the Admiral Graf Spee should be forced to intern, it would be necessary only to reach an Argentine port and there lay up against the time

when Argentina would force the issue of the Falklands. The presence, then, of the Graf Spee in Argentine waters might be a determining factor in the loss to Britain of this strategically important base in the South Atlantic.

However, for the Admiral Graf Spee to act as an influence for driving Argentina into an effort at a final settlement of the Falklands dispute there would have to be one all-important favorable condition. The internment in an Argentine port would have to be benevolent. She would have to be kept in fighting trim, with a full complement aboard. If Argentina would coöperate properly, the British would be forced to separate important units from home waters in order to guard against surprise, and the very presence of an augmented British fleet at the Falklands base would serve to increase the irritation in Argentina, where the press was already angered by the recruiting of British residents (in violation of Argentine neutrality) for the Falkland Islands guard.

THE German Government felt fairly confident of its position in Argentina. The preparations had been as nearly perfect as it was possible to make them. In Argentina there were more than one hundred thousand Germans, mostly substantial and with great political influence, who were better organized as Germans than any other German group in any other Western-Hemisphere nation. German-language schools had been established in every town in Argentina. According to an official report by the Buenos Aires Department of Education, the schools were—and are—controlled by the Liga Cultural Alemana "with its headquarters in Buenos

Aires which functions under the German Embassy in Argentina."

The German Labor Front also operated in Argentina with an imposing headquarters on Alsina Street in Buenos Aires, where thousands of semi-militarized members were enrolled, with dues payments compulsory just as though the members were still living in Germany. Other Nazi organizations were the German Nationalist Marine Union, the German-Argentine Union and the Imperial Federation for Physical Culture. All of these organizations were knit together by the German Volks Bund für Argentinien. Unlike the Volks Bund in the United States, the Argentine organization is directly and officially connected with the Volks Bund für das Deutschtum in Ausland, the supreme central organization in Berlin which corresponds to the Soviet Union's Comintern. The Volks Bund für Argentinien has college sections, a library, a Nazi literature section and an economic section.

This is a broad outline of the Nazi "set-up" in Argentina when the German Admiralty sent the Admiral Graf Spee to operate in Argentine waters. The English were also powerful in Argentina, but they were unorganized and there was always that agitation about the Falklands to counteract their influence on the government. Also, now that the Germans were out of the Argentine trade, the British were attempting to drive a hard bargain in the purchase of Argentine supplies. Because of this, wheat for export was piled up for a distance of a half mile at Mar del Plata, and Argentine wheat growers were enraged. There was still another consideration, also economic, which would tend to

favor the Nazis. Germany owed Argentina a vast amount of needed manufactures when war broke out. This was to be in payment for produce previously shipped to Germany in the barter trade. Now, the only hope of receiving deliveries was through the German breaking of the British blockade, made effective in the South Atlantic by the Falkland Islands base.

Such was the simple triangle of Anglo-German-Argentine relations. The Germans had all the better of the situation. However, the relations were by no means a simple triangle. Other important considerations were the influence of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine, the Declaration of Lima, in which Argentina had bound itself with the other Americas to resist foreign ideologies, and the recent Declaration of Panama, in which Argentina upheld (with a notable reservation) the Pan-American neutrality zone at sea.

Every one of these considerations may have impelled Berlin still further to the conclusion that the time was ripe to use Argentina as a foil against the British. It was known in Berlin, as it was—and is—known in Washington, that Argentina, having come of age, is ambitious to displace the United States as the bellwether of Hispanic-America.

It is unfortunate that the people of the United States, traditionally uninformed on the realities of international relations, and particularly with regard to relations within the Western Hemisphere, cannot yet appreciate the extent of the menace to the United States' position which is inherent in the opportunities now open to Argentina.

A few lines to explain this menace may help to create an understanding of the deeper significance of the Admiral Graf Spee incident. To begin with, young Argentinos are brought up to regard the Monroe Doctrine as hypocritical. School histories emphasize the failure of the United States to apply the Monroe Doctrine to the Falkland Islands, which were transferred to the British by Spain, not by Argentina. Argentine history also emphasizes the failure of Washington to respect the Drago Doctrine, which is best described as a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. The Drago Doctrine carries the Monroe Doctrine a step farther; it advances the principle that debts to foreign nations are uncollectible by force of arms. As a matter of fact, all international contracts with Argentina provide that the foreign contractor shall not seek diplomatic intervention in case of a dispute. The United States has offered empty sympathy toward this doctrine, but never has honored it officially, and the friction over Washington's aloofness has been growing more intense as Argentina has grown in economic and diplomatic power.

SINCE 1914, Argentina has been slowly but clearly drawing away from United States hegemony in the hemisphere. The first open revolt was in 1917, when the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. President Wilson then virtually demanded that Argentina follow in line, and United States agents (propagandists) were charged in Buenos Aires with responsibility for pro-war rioting that broke out, especially among the Italians of the city. In the face of tremendous pressure,

supported by Brazil (which also declared war), President Irigoyen and his cabinet stood firm for neutrality. It was the first challenge to North American paternalism, and the success of Irigoyen's stand, which was recognized after the war, stirred all of Argentina to the belief that the way to end the hegemony of the United States was along the path of selective opposition to Washington's world policies.

Time and again, since then, Argentine administrations have stressed the differences between the interests of South Americans and North Americans. The spread of nazi, fascist and communist movements—all nationalist in character—through South America has been used with great astuteness to isolate the United States and advance the leadership of Argentina. At the Lima Pan-American conference in 1938, the Argentine Government gave quiet but effective support to the governments which balked at the signing of a pact which was intended to cut foreign influence out of the internal affairs of South American Republics. By doing so, Argentina drew Uruguay partially out of the U. S. orbit, because Uruguay had economic reasons for permitting immigrants to maintain dual citizenship and allegiance—to Uruguay and to the country of origin. In the end, all of the Republics signed the pact, but only after the United States, by inference, threatened to help build a Brazilian navy superior to any floating power in South America.

Again, at Panama last October it was Argentina that inspired the resistance to a clear-cut Pan-American neutrality pact. At Panama, Washington suffered another diplomatic

set-back through this quiet opposition because the Declaration of Panama, which finally emerged, was in no wise as strong as desired by the U. S. Department of State. The terms of the Panama Declaration, establishing a wide neutrality zone, are so ambiguous, due to Argentine leadership in opposition to Washington's policies, that the zone can be violated by any belligerent without establishing any apparent guilt. In signing this Panama Declaration, the Argentine delegation made the notable reservation referred to earlier in this article. The Declaration itself, as drafted by the Government of Panama with U. S. inspiration, was directed against German operations; but the Argentina reservation, in line with the policy of cautiously checking North American hegemony, was pointed in the opposite direction. The reservation was as follows:

"The Argentine delegation declares that in waters adjacent to the South American continent, in that territorial extent of coast which, in the zone defined as free from any hostile act, corresponds to the Argentine Republic, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries, and adds that it specifically reserves and maintains intact the legitimate titles and rights of the Argentine Republic to islands such as the Malvinas [the Argentine name for the Falkland Islands] as well as to any other Argentine territory located within or beyond the said zone."

In other words, in this bold reservation to an international declaration in wartime, Argentina offered a suave humiliation to the United States, which, despite the Monroe Doctrine, had never supported Argentina's

claim to these Argentine islands, the Falklands (Malvinas). The reservation was scarcely mentioned in the United States, but it was important news in Hispanic-America, because it served notice that, with or without the help of the United States, Argentina, big enough now to act as an independent power, was determined to have a show-down with Great Britain.

It was also big news in Germany, and undoubtedly precipitated the ordering of the Admiral Graf Spee to Argentine-Uruguayan waters. Quite evidently, Argentina was prepared to act without regard for U. S. sentiments or interests. The pushing nationalism of Argentina became all the more apparent shortly before the Graf Spee incident when Argentina, single-handed, forced the League of Nations at Geneva to take rough action against the U. S. S. R.

And so, with nazism thoroughly organized in Argentina, with Buenos Aires irritated and planning to seize the Falklands, and with Argentina seeking leadership in Hispanic-American affairs, the German Admiralty was fairly confident of benevolent internment for the Admiral Graf Spee in case internment should be necessary. The mistake, which led to the scuttling of the ship and the suicide of Captain Langsdorff, lay in the failure of the German Foreign Office to appreciate the underlying quality of Pan-Americanism. It failed to appreciate the fact that while Argentina seeks leadership in Hispanic-America at the expense of any and all other interests, Argentina is eager to maintain and improve Latin-American unity. The United States also desires this unity for one set of selfish reasons; Argentina desires it

for another set of reasons. Argentina, while making her reservation to the Declaration of Panama, was nevertheless careful to subscribe in full to the unity provisions of the Declaration.

IF GERMAN observers could have been present last October 4th in the second-floor dining-room of a leading hotel in Panama City, the Admiral Graf Spee might not have been forced into the particular corner it was finally driven into. On that day, the only occupants of the room were seated around a half-dozen tables near the center, and a swarthy little man in a white suit was speaking. He was Don Eduardo Hay, Foreign Secretary of Mexico, and those at the tables were the newspaper correspondents from the United States. Don Eduardo, speaking excellent English, raised his right hand, palm upward, and spread his fingers apart. "That," he said, "*was* America." Then he slowly drew his fingers together. "This, *Señores, is* America." He held his hand in that position and waited, as though to make sure that everyone saw exactly the position of his hand. And it was noticeable that the hand, while curved, with the fingers held tightly together, was not doubled up into a pugnacious fist. It was as though the hand were holding something—quite possibly precious. And the correspondents in the room understood what the Foreign Secretary of Mexico meant by the gesture. It was that by the Declaration of Panama, something very dear was held firmly by all—not belligerently, but forcefully. It was this that the Germans failed to understand. Don Eduardo's words clarified the gesture.

"This acknowledged spiritual unity presupposes common and solidary attitudes with reference to situations of force which, as in the case of the present European war, may threaten the security of the sovereign rights of the American republics."

There was diplomatic meaning even in the choice of the spokesman to clarify the pact. Logically, the explanation should have been given by Sumner Welles of the U. S. State Department or by the President of Panama. However, the Mexican Foreign Minister was chosen and this created an inference of its own. Mexico leaned toward Germany in the last war and there had been rumors that Mexico was leaning in the same direction once again. Furthermore, there was friction between Mexico City and Washington. Yet, the delegates chose the Mexican Foreign Minister to clarify Pan-American unity. The only possible inference was that in spite of any possible inter-American differences, even the most recalcitrant governments adhered to the principle of American solidarity. An effective "American Front" had at last been forged, but Berlin failed to understand.

It was this "American Front" which caused the collapse of Germany's supreme effort to use Argentina's ambitions as a weapon against the British Navy. It was not Uruguay's cool reception of the Admiral Graf Spee that brought the order from Berlin to scuttle the ship (the position of little Uruguay, snuggled up against powerful and strongly pro-Washington Brazil, had been discounted in advance), but the eleventh-hour admission of the German Embassy in Buenos Aires that the plot

was a failure. Likewise, the frantic German appeals for more time from Uruguay were not, as so many believed, due to any wish to prepare the Graf Spee for another fight with the British cruisers; the Germans wanted that extra time in which to bring pressure, through the Nazi organizations, on the Argentine Government.

The center of the diplomatic battle was in Buenos Aires, not in Montevideo. While the world watched this struggle in Montevideo, enormous internal pressure was being brought upon President Ortiz of Argentina for the purpose of influencing a benevolent internment for the warship—an internment which would continue the menace of the Admiral Graf Spee. At the same time, Washington, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro and Caracas were bringing counter-pressure in Buenos Aires against the German proposals.

Buenos Aires made a virtue of necessity in deciding, at the eleventh hour, against benevolent internment, but it cannot be said that the Argentine Government bowed in this case to the wishes of either the United States or the British Empire. The victor was a combine of 21 nations in the "American Front."

It was a bigger defeat for the Nazi Government than the mere loss of a warship. A plan of grandiose proportions had fallen through, and Capt. Langsdorff must have felt that he had lost far more than a battleship; he had lost an entire campaign to cripple the British Empire in the South Atlantic. Military and naval leaders have committed suicide before now after disappointments as great as this must have been.

But what of Argentina's hope to seize her Malvinas? This hope has probably gone aglimmering now, at least until the final war settlements, and who knows what those may be. Nevertheless, by throwing a scare into the entire Western Hemisphere, she has shown her capacity to act as a world power. In time, she inevitably will force a reorientation of Pan-American policies.

The only real winners of the Battle of the Plate are the thousand German sailors of the Admiral Graf Spee.

For them the war is over and they will not even be kept in internment camps. On the contrary, Argentina is finding jobs for them, and so it is doubtful that more than a handful will ever return to Germany. Why should they? By the time the peace is written they will be rooted and established in a land where the future is bright Too bright, say the votaries of the "Spread Eagle" who view with alarm the southern republic's occasional excursions into extra-American adventures.



From the *Japan Times*

The Netherlands were not invaded
because Belgium was ready to fight

Blitzkrieg in Abeyance

Adapted from the Neue Tage-Buch, Paris, German Emigré Weekly

IT APPEARS that the entire world was mistaken about that threatened invasion of The Netherlands last November. In effect, Berlin and The Hague both have protested that it was all a misunderstanding, and accordingly when, as recently as this January, The Netherlands warned the world that the full impact of its army will fall upon any invader, this should not be accepted literally or taken to mean that Queen Wilhelmina's ministers are apprehensive. Of course not.

As a matter of fact, didn't the *D. N. B.*, the official Nazi news agency, state without qualification last November 13 that all this chatter about invasion was "conscienceless propaganda by our enemies"? Moreover, didn't The Hague Government itself deride reports abroad that a German thrust was imminent?

Perhaps the Reich communiqué on this subject was more convincing than its Dutch equivalent, and it is worth a reëxamination in view of the resur-

rection of the threat to The Netherlands explicit in the renewed concentration of Reichswehr divisions near the smaller nation's frontier. Germany howled last November that she had not even dreamed of an invasion of The Netherlands—but there were two reservations: one, Germany would not violate that country's neutrality, or indeed that of Belgium, if its neutrality were also scrupulously observed by Britain and France; and two, the Reich could have no motive for any unneutral act so long as The Netherlands and Belgium showed themselves capable of preserving their neutrality.

Now, these reservations appear disarmingly reasonable and simple. The opposite is the case. Since November, the German press has fulminated against the "servile attitude" of the two countries vis-a-vis the British export-import blockade, demanding that the ships of these nations fire upon any British or French destroyer or other craft that halts them. Unless they

adopt such a firm policy, the argument of the German Government is that they are not maintaining their neutrality but supinely capitulating to the Allies and thus harming Germany. The fact is, of course, that The Netherlands and Belgium, caught in the middle, are unable effectively to counter the Allied seizures, and that to that extent they are unneutral because they cannot help it. Nevertheless, the German case is a strong one, and the aforementioned second reservation by the Reich is more than sufficient reason for apprehension in The Netherlands.

Why hasn't the Reich, given these violations of its second reservation, proceeded to march into Holland? Its indignant denials that anything of the sort was ever intended may be dismissed as nonsense. The burden of circumstantial evidence available since the "Dutch panic" of more than two months ago is that the thrust into The Netherlands was called off at the last minute when it was determined that, in such an event, Belgium would not remain neutral. (Of considerable interest is the acceptance today in diplomatically knowledgeable quarters that this decision by the Brussels Government was not conveyed to the Wilhelmstrasse in the usual way but through the offices of the American ambassador—an oblique approach that may have given it more force.)

ADDED to this, it is now disclosed, were warnings from Italy and Spain that Germany would sacrifice a good deal of her "ideological support" if she undertook to invade The Netherlands at that time. The upshot of these several *démarches* was that the scheduled invasion, which

would have greatly strengthened Germany's position militarily, was called off.

Forever? Precedent would argue otherwise. The Reich, be it recalled, using the same tactics of troop concentration near frontiers of countries it wanted to intimidate, brought relations with Czechoslovakia to the boiling-point of May 21, 1938, let them simmer some five months, and then Hitler ordered the Reichswehr to take possession; with regard to Poland, the Danzig and related disputes were brought almost to the explosion-point on March 26, 1939, then relaxed very slightly for five months and a few days—after which *Blitzkrieg*. The psychological technique employed in the case of Austria differed in degree only.

May it not be persuasively argued, then, that this German thrust into The Netherlands, scheduled for last November but then suddenly abandoned, is merely another postponement? Note that The Netherlands are again becoming restive—just as the Czechs did, as the Poles did—unquestionably due in large part to the work of *agents-provocateurs*. The Nazi technique long since was obvious: intimidate, terrorize, threaten up to a point when either a victim collapses from nervous uncertainty or its military machine is demoralized and can offer no serious defence.

There is serious discussion in Paris of a German plan to continue, for a matter of weeks, to keep The Netherlands dancing with uncertainty—as a diversion—then to strike directly at Belgium. There may be a mutual-guarantee pact existing between The Hague and Brussels, but most military opinion on the Continent agrees

that even were that true, the Reichswehr would have no great qualms over an attack from the rear.

Editor's Note: In elaboration of the foregoing article, an interesting explanation, "Why Hitler Did Not Attack The Netherlands," is offered by the *Berlingske Tidende* of Copenhagen. The writer cites a *Havas News Agency* dispatch stating that the thrust into Holland was scheduled for 6 P. M. on November 12. *Havas*, of course, is more than a semi-official news agency, and any such assertion from French sources must be taken with reserve. But, according to the Copenhagen newspaper, three days before, on November 9, Hitler had summoned his general staff, and at this conference General Walter von Reichenau persisted in dwelling on the danger of a declaration of war by Belgium should The Netherlands be invaded. To permit time for discreet inquiries in this

direction, further discussion was postponed to November 11. At this meeting, Hitler was presented with strong evidence that Belgium would not remain neutral, but he reportedly stuck to his original plan and demanded that his staff launch the invasion the following day. Colonel General Walther von Brauchitsch, chief of command, flatly refused to act upon the Führer's order, although he has generally sided with the Chancellor against the Reichswehr. The session was stormy, according to the *Berlingske Tidende*, with the Führer haranguing his generals. He would not retract the command, and all was in order for its obeyance when, two hours before the "zero hour" on the twelfth, Hitler called off the invasion. Tactically speaking, the plan was to pin the French armies on the Western front by heavy artillery attack and slight advances, so that troops could not be rushed north in defense of The Netherlands.

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JOURNALIST'S DECATLOGUE

1. Thou shalt honor thy dear censor, that thou may continue to write.
2. Thou shalt always obey his orders, however inept they may appear.
3. Thou shalt cultivate commonplaces to flatter his gifts of comprehension.
4. Thou shalt soften the truth, with respect to his temperament.
5. Thou shalt abstain from any opinion with which he does not agree.
6. Thou shalt avoid protesting too loudly thy attachment to the republic.
7. Morning and evening thou shalt raise voice and sing in praise of thy government.
8. Obediently thou shalt dispute in one direction only.
9. To slander thou shalt restrain from answering, and keep thy trap closed.
10. And patiently thou shalt rely on hope to avert garbling of thy copy.

—*Lumière*, Paris

One Englishwoman fears that Union or Federation after this war asks too much of Europeans in these times

In Search of Peace

By THE DUCHESS OF ATHOLL

From the *Fortnightly*, London Independent Monthly

THE bid for peace made in Herr Hitler's speech of last fall is not surprising. In spite of all talk about British "warmongers," he knows well our peace-loving temper, and he must have hoped for a conference that would leave him in effect, if not in name, master of all Poland west of the Russian occupation. And for him it was an urgent matter to secure agreement on a conference before the American Neutrality Act could be amended.

Nor is it surprising that more recently the sovereigns of Holland and Belgium, with German troops massing on their frontiers, should make a fresh offer of mediation. But what evidence has either the German Chancellor or his Foreign Minister given us of any change of heart which might lead us to hope that methods of brute force in international relations would be dropped? Until some tangible proof of this can be given,

conference would be not only useless but dangerous. It is heartening to find that, in spite of controversy as to future status, the Indian Congress press is reported as saying that it would be a betrayal bordering on treachery for the Allies to lay down their arms while Hitler enjoys the fruits of his aggression.

Meanwhile, there is much to encourage us. The Neutrality Act has been amended, throwing open to the Allies the vast industrial resources of the United States; the U-boat menace is being steadily countered; our Air Force, including men of the Auxiliary Force, have successfully repelled all attempts so far made at raids; and our Expeditionary Force begins its campaign under very much more favorable circumstances than its predecessor did in 1914. It has had time to take up a strong position and "dig itself in," well camouflaged. Last but not least the Führer must have found scant comfort in the Com-

intern's recent manifesto inciting the German working classes against their rulers.

The delay, however, in launching any big offensive and the passionate desire that neutral opinion, more especially American, should fully realize for what we are fighting, have led to pressure on the Government to formulate their war aims more precisely than hitherto. They are right, I think, to limit themselves at this stage to stating them in general terms, without defining the methods by which they hope to bring them into effect. That we have no selfish or revengeful aims has been made clear in the Prime Minister's statement that we have no territorial ambitions for ourselves, that we seek no vindictive peace and that we hope for a peace settlement reached through negotiation and agreement, but that we are determined, so far as it is humanly possible, to see to it that Europe shall not again be subjected to a repetition of the tragedy of war.

In view of the recent appalling revelations of brutality in German concentration camps, Lord Halifax, in his recent broadcast, has done well to add that we are fighting not only to maintain freedom and the rule of law, but "the quality of mercy in dealings between man and man and in the great society of civilized states."

But there is much discussion of "peace aims" by others, and some important facts tend to be forgotten. Many, for instance, accept at its face value Hitler's charge that the Allies broke a promise to Germany to disarm, and therefore seem to desire that at the peace there should be

simultaneous disarmament of both sides. But the Treaty of Versailles contained no such promise on the part of the Allies—on the contrary, a promise on the part of Germany "strictly to observe" the clauses providing for her disarmament "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." Everyone remembers that these clauses were repudiated by Hitler in March 1935, but how many realize that the work of the Allied Commission appointed in 1919 to control German disarmament had been brought to an end by the Treaty of Locarno in 1925, and before it had been completed?

Yet Mr. J. H. Morgan, K.C., a senior member of the Commission, has told us that the disarmament which, under the terms of the Treaty, should have been carried out within six months, was still incomplete after nearly five years. Even a Socialist Government had endeavored to "scrap" the military clauses of the Treaty. But, as Mr. Wickham Steed reminds us, the final Report of the Commission, which would have made clear how much still remained to be done, was never published.

The conditions, therefore, which under the Peace Treaty were "to render possible" the initiation of general disarmament were never fulfilled. Herr Hitler's charge consequently falls to the ground.

Though one must hope for a general reduction of arms at the earliest possible moment compatible with security, security must come before everything. No fear of Communism must be allowed to interfere with German disarmament. It was used as an argument for obstruction in 1920,

but did not prevent the signature of Rapallo in 1922.

And in this matter of disarmament, surely we may hope for some help from the fact that the armed forces of Germany since 1933 have been the instrument of a terror unknown in 1914. Disarmament should be welcomed by those who have suffered from the terror. In any case, is the question of disarmament one on which the ordinary householder has strong feelings? The German working class twenty years ago showed no hostility to the work of the Allied Disarmament Commission. Workers at Krupps indeed readily helped to break down guns and smash shell presses. Is not rather the important matter, if we wish to secure the co-operation of the German people in building up a safe Europe, to avoid demanding reparations which involve a crushing burden of taxation?

THE burden of preventing further aggression in a continent containing powerful elements cherishing nationalistic ambitions, is one in which all European nations, at least, who value freedom, must share. Unprovoked aggressive warfare is so clearly a crime against all that civilized nations most value that for a European people to stand aside and "keep out of it" is, as has been well said, shirking a country's share of the burden of humanity. It increases the danger for others whom it leaves to fight a more difficult battle without help. Yet neutrality may be no guarantee of safety. It may ultimately involve the would-be neutral in a struggle all the more desperate because of its former neutrality, and which, had all made clear beforehand,

their united resistance to aggression might never have taken place.

But effective collective defence implies collective arms sufficient to deter a potential aggressor, and members of the League too long allowed themselves to forget that the Covenant only asked its members to disarm within the limits of national security. Hence preparation for a disarmament conference began at Geneva in 1925, though the representatives of France and Britain, anyhow, must have known that Germany had not fully carried out the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. And the movement for the conference, backed as it was by powerful opinion in this country and supplemented by the signature of the London Naval Treaty in 1930, assumed so much momentum that it went on without interruption, though in the years of preparation for the conference there was considerable evidence of German rearmament. Even when Hitler, after eight months of dictatorial rule, withdrew his delegates from the conference and announced his intention of leaving the League, a British National Government was not prepared to take the responsibility of breaking up the conference by embarking on a policy of rearmament.

Had they done so, the course of the next few years might have been very different. Would Laval have made his agreement with Mussolini in January 1935 if we had shown that we clearly recognized the danger of Nazi Germany and were preparing to meet it? If there had been no Franco-Italian Pact, and we had not been as weak as we revealed ourselves to be at the General Election of October 1935, would we or the French

have hesitated to add an oil sanction to the others imposed on Italy? If not, would the Italians have won the day in Abyssinia, or the Germans have reoccupied the Rhineland? It is needless to mention the further tragedies which might have been avoided had we begun to rearm in 1933 instead of in 1935, and had declared our firm adherence to the principle of collective defence against aggression. We could have kept loyal to that principle and to rearmament, with many countries now leading an uneasy existence as neutrals. But it was a failure for which all political parties must share the blame.

HITLER himself has given us convincing proof of his recognition of how the principle of collective defence can interfere with his ambitions. Recollections of Nazi efforts to create prejudice against the Franco-Soviet Pact, and to prevent any pact between ourselves and Russia and among ourselves, France and Turkey, are fresh in our minds.

Neutrality, then, is what we must seek to end, in Europe anyhow, and those who join in collective defence of peace must recognize a common duty to maintain sufficient arms to deter any potential aggressor. But through what machinery can collective security best be achieved? Mr. Lionel Curtis and Mr. Clarence Streit both tell us that the League has failed because its members would not renounce their national sovereignty. Granted that most were not prepared to renounce their sovereignty to the extent necessary to insure an effective collective defence, both writers ignore that signing the Covenant implies renunciation of con-

siderable sovereign powers. The articles requiring members to devote a certain time to negotiation before proceeding to war, demand very definite limitation of sovereignty. So even more does Article 16, and over fifty nations complied at least with that part of it which required the imposition of economic and financial sanctions on Italy.

Both Mr. Curtis and Mr. Streit further overlook the weakening of the League's position due to the too prolonged disarmament, though Mr. Curtis tells us that by February 1932, the secret rearmament of Germany was well known. Mr. Streit actually makes light of this rearmament, estimating German military expenditure at not more than the French, declaring that all countries had been secretly rearming.

Both, therefore, conclude that the League is useless and propose, instead, a Federal Union—a step which obviously demands a much greater abrogation of sovereignty than the League. Mr. Streit would commence with uniting the European democracies, the British Dominions and the United States, and to the Federal Government of these fifteen states he would transfer all powers in regard to foreign policy, defence, currency, tariffs and communications.

There is no need to dwell on the enormous deterrent power which could be exercised by such a Union, but it is disappointing to find Mr. Streit, none the less, revealing doubts as to whether even so powerful a body would be willing to shoulder the burden necessary to prevent aggression in Europe. For though he includes Finland in his fifteen states, he fears that other countries might

hesitate to join the Union on account of Finland's common frontier with Russia. An article, moreover, in his draft constitution for the Union, which gives each state the right to maintain a militia and a police force but allows them to engage in war only "if actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will admit of no delay," suggests that he fears that states in exposed positions may feel uncertain of getting immediate help if attacked, and may therefore be obliged to raise their own military forces in addition to contributing to the support of the Union's. There may indeed be others besides Mr. Streit who will doubt whether a Union mainly directed by the United States, as his proposed one would be, would find it easy to deal sufficiently promptly with the problems which might arise for small exposed European states if any of their more powerful neighbors still harbored aggressive aims.

On the other hand, if the United States could enter a union with the European and British democracies, it should give a real hope for curbing aggression in the Far East.

But does Mr. Streit fully realize the magnitude of the task he envisages? To cite the success of the Federation of the thirteen original American States as an argument for his Federation is to leave out of account the many differences of race, of language and of tradition involved—difficulties which only existed to a very minor extent among the American States. He stresses that the Union must be one of citizens, not of governments. But will it be easier to secure a genuine sense of common citizenship between the untravelled

masses of the democracies than friendly coöperation between their statesmen?

Nor does he seem to realize the difficulty of British men and women, accustomed to government by Ministers directly responsible to Parliament, accepting a federal rule under which, as he proposes, the Federal Prime Minister and Cabinet would be merely assistants to a Board of five members, three of whom would be elected by the electorate, and the other two by the Federal Parliament, the three first holding office for varying periods, as determined by the vote of the Board? How should we ever get the clear association of a member of the Board or the Prime Minister with a policy, and be able to fix responsibility, as we are accustomed to do in this country?

Or how does Mr. Streit hope to secure French acquiescence in the prospect he foresees of the French manufacture of motor cars being killed by the influx of American ones, as a result of the complete free trade which he desires within the Union? This part of his proposals obviously bristles with difficulties.

Mr. Curtis shows himself much more alive to the magnitude of the problem. He evidently realizes the barriers caused by difference in language, and holds that any Federation would have to begin with Australia and New Zealand, and if possible, Great Britain. But he does not visualize this coming into existence "for a few generations," and perhaps not extending beyond it, for another two. Obviously, therefore, he sees no help in federation for our present troubles.

Mr. Steed also desires federation

or federal union, but on a very different basis. Writing, as the other authors do not, since the outbreak of war, he urges the formation, if possible during the war, "of the beginnings of a federation or federal union between all the peoples allied or associated with the present enemies of Hitlerism." This obviously would be an organism aimed at dealing directly with the future maintenance of peace in the most troubled parts of Europe, and it could rely on links both of fellowship and of machinery forged on the terrible anvil of common effort and suffering. It would not be likely to ignore the needs of exposed members.

On the other hand it means beginning with the federation of two countries of very different languages, traditions and temperament. There may be a vast difference between the relationship of those who stand shoulder to shoulder in a common danger and those who set up a joint household. Union must give many opportunities for friction which coöperation through a League does not offer, and if prematurely brought about may well be harmful to the friendship we all desire to strengthen. But Mr. Steed no doubt is alive to these dangers, and many people will be anxious to see further details of his scheme.

Meanwhile, it is important to note that he does not regard the League as being so useless as do Mr. Curtis and Mr. Streit. He wishes its Covenant and its institutions reorganized and amended "so that they may become instruments of intercourse between nations within the federation and those that may remain outside it, on condition that war be not only renounced by all League members

but that all undertake to treat it as a felony depriving those who engage in it of intercourse with civilized peoples." That Mr. Steed should find room in Europe for both Federation and League is to the good, for nothing could more surely hamper clear understanding of the questions at issue than that those who desire closer coöperation in Europe should be split into warring camps.

A League, however, whose members were not actually pledged to collective defence could not be as powerful an instrument for peace as one so pledged, and if by the end of the war Federation would probably only comprise one or two states, might not the friends of peace get further if they worked from the first for the strengthening of the League? This could be done by speeding up the procedure for dealing with aggression, by abolishing the unanimity rule, by making disarmament strictly conform to general security, by making military sanctions obligatory if economic ones had not proved sufficient. This is really required in an interpretation of Article 16 in Annex F of the Locarno Treaty and would therefore only mean making the whole of the article binding—a step which would involve much less limitation of sovereignty than any form of Federation.

But, as Sir Walter Layton points out, if France and Britain and any other Great Power are willing to accept a definite obligation of collective defence, they have the right to require that smaller states should federate in groups according to geographical propinquity. This should greatly increase their capacity to resist sudden attack, and should insure

a fairer balance of influence in the League's counsels. The Scandinavian states might form one such group, with or without Holland and Belgium. Another group might usefully be formed in Central Europe to include a future Czechoslovakia, perhaps a Poland, and states in the Danubian basin.

Again, it may be inquired whether it might not be easier for Germany to enter a League rather than a Federal Union, and does not the same doubt apply to Russia? In spite of the many and vital respects in which her system of government differs from that of the democracies, she showed herself for five years a loyal member of the League. But would the democracies find it easy to admit her to citizenship of a Union? If not, is it advisable to set up an organization which would not be open to all who were ready to take their share in the collective defence of peace?

Finally, Mr. Steed, while opposed to any "bartering" with Germany about colonies, desires all colonial possessions ultimately placed under a federal trusteeship for the welfare of their inhabitants and in order to secure equality of access to raw materials for members of the federation. Such a trusteeship has long been the declared basis of British administration, but should we find it easy to combine our methods with those, for instance, even of our great Ally? Her aim is to make her colonial subjects citizens of France; ours to make them good citizens of their own country. Would backward peoples benefit from conflicting purposes in administration?

Again, in the case of colonies held under mandates A or B (i. e., those in

which preferential trade is forbidden) or those to which the Congo Basin treaties apply, Mr. Steed's proposal would mean the introduction of a preferential trade system where there is now free trade. In other cases his proposal might cut across trade agreements made by the colonies themselves. The West Indies, for example, and Mauritius have a system of preferential trade with Canada on which their prosperity mainly depends. This agreement would lapse under Mr. Steed's proposal, if Canada had not joined the Federation. In the event of all colonies being put under mandate, as others suggest, it would certainly be lost, unless the mandate were of type C, under which there is no restriction of preference. This is the type of mandate held by the Dominions.

Nor could the extension of mandates be safely applied to colonies such as Gibraltar, or to the Straits Settlements, with their special strategic importance. But once the principle of collective defence was fully established, it would become evident that such bases were held in trust for others as well as ourselves—for all who were ready to undertake obligations for the preservation of peace.

Annual reports, moreover, could well be made to the League on all colonies, as in the case of mandates. This procedure, exposing colonial administration to international examination and inevitably engendering a healthy spirit of emulation between the officials of the different mandatory powers, is, I believe, a surer method of securing that colonies are administered first and foremost in the interests of their people, than hurling them into a maelstrom of conflicting systems.

Industrialization is rapidly overtaking the regions southeast of Asia

Fight for the Indies

By WILLIAM DANGAIX ALLEN

AMERICA was first bumped into by a man impatient to reach the Spice Islands. Today, once again, from under the smoke-screen of world war, the agricultural and mineral riches of southeastern Asia have leapt into our headlines. After centuries of colonial somnolence, the region that Columbus and his generation of explorers were seeking is back with us as a land of promise for which the powers of East and West are struggling, as a potential buyer of American goods, as a new civilization to be reckoned with in world affairs.

Take any map of Asia and draw a horn of plenty downward from India and China, tapering off into the Pacific Ocean just north of Australia. Although it is broken up politically into the Chinese province of Yunnan, Indo-China ruled by France, independent Siam or Thailand, the British colonies of the Malay peninsula, and the East Indies which are mainly Dutch but include British and ex-German territories, this area is really a

unit, a subcontinent with a personality of its own. Its native peoples belong to the *café-au-lait* race whose cultural parents are India and China. The spirit of these people is something you do not find elsewhere in the older worlds—a cheerfulness, a non-aggressive exuberance, a sort of latent democracy. One cause of this New-Worldish atmosphere is perhaps the great independence of womankind as compared to other regions of Asia. More fundamentally still, the spirit of hope and opportunity southeast of Asia is based on knowledge that there is space around you, scope for progress with plow, coal-pick or oil-drill, and for the pioneering, mechanically inventive mind.

With a population totalling just about the hundred and thirty millions of this country, this Asian Horn of Plenty is capable of feeding eight or ten times as many mouths. Kept in hermit-isolation and simplicity for centuries, it is now beginning an industrial revolution which inevitably

pushes ahead its standards of living and political activity at a surprising rate. The value of this vast territory is consequently growing—and just at a time when the "have" nations, France, The Netherlands and England, can least afford to surrender to the "have nots" of whom Japan is the most aggressive in Asia. To the most powerful will go the victory for control of these markets and resources. Not necessarily to the most powerful in a military sense. The economically virile, the racially most eager, are just as likely to win as the bomb-throwers. Maybe domination of this region whose riches are epitomized by its tiny, almost legendary Spice Islands will be won by its own native peoples. Or by the door-closing battleships of Japan. Or by China's shrewd merchants and swarming emigrants. Maybe they will continue to be held by the present rulers, the "have" nations of Europe. This far-off fight for the Indies may, in the light of future history, stand out as one of the main aspects of the present struggle going on in Europe. Meanwhile, America is wondering how wise it is to relinquish the Philippines, gateway to this great Milky Way of an industrialized Orient, to which we have promised to give complete independence by 1946.

CHINA and Japan are both competing for the rubber, tin, oil and markets of the Indies. Japan's invasion of China these past few years, as a matter of fact, has the Indies among its stakes. Japanese policies toward the United States and other nations are deeply influenced by her expansionist equivalents to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Nothing could be

more logical than that Japan should wish to take over regions which financially weak or timid Holland has held, dog-in-the-manger style, for centuries.

Time is pressing and Japan finds that she cannot even wait politely for America to move out of the way five years hence. It would have been much safer from a Japanese viewpoint to have avoided any risk that American opinion change from an isolationist mood to one of concern for the welfare of the Filipinos and against the contagious spread of Closed Doors. Before routine affairs can lead to the withdrawal of the United States from southern Asia, Japan must move, not only because she is hard pressed for the quick returns a direct grab at the Indies offers, but because of the rapidity of China's own trek southward. Already, China's government has shifted the heart of Chinese political and economic activity from the Yangtze River down into the hitherto unexploited province of Yunnan, which is in direct contact with the outside world through French and British possessions.

To combat this Chinese move, the Japanese have been extending their naval and air offensives. A year ago their forces went south of Hong Kong and captured Hainan Island. Last fall they took the port of Pakhoi from which to send out planes to bomb the truck roads and railway that carry vital war materials from French Indo-China into this new center of Chinese resistance, Yunnan, whose name "South of the Clouds" no longer means "out of sight."

Yunnan is not merely of strategic importance. Japan strikes at this province whose extent is as great as

Japan herself not as if it were a temporary camping-ground or simply a communication line through which to bring in guns to Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese realize that in this mountainous, fertile area rich in mines and water-power the Chinese are creating with great speed and daring a new nation economically able to resist military force for many years. And if that were not in itself danger enough for Japanese plans, the effect of this shift southward is to strengthen the hand of China in all of southeastern Asia, stimulating the ties between China and her southern neighbors.

THE opening up of Yunnan, previously a barrier shutting off China from the south, has made of it a link binding China's life more intimately to the Indies, particularly to the large, economically powerful colonies of Chinese race settled throughout the region, from Siam and Indo-China through the Malay Peninsula and Singapore to Java, Bali, Borneo and the Spice Islands.

The Chinese trek south has a long, romantic history. In the age when the Spice Islands lured Europeans round the world, the Chinese merchantmen were exploring these islands, charting these southern seas. Arab traders exchanged occidental merchandise in the Indies for Far-Eastern fineries as well as for local spices. The Emperors of China for a thousand years considered the petty kings of Siam, Indo-China and the Islands to be vassals.

Since the First World War, China's contact with the Indies has been even more significant. It has constituted one of the greatest racial migrations in history, a third of a million Chinese emigrating sometimes in

a single year. This racial march of the simple Chinese laboring class toward the equator may some day turn the tables on the trek of Japan even if the present European rulers (who appear to count on American aid if ever in extreme need) cannot repel the military forces of Germany.

For the present, however, the Chinese merchants settled in the Indies have a much more direct influence than the millions of coolies in the plantations and mines. These merchants dominate the retail trade in most cities of this vast region. They are the money-lenders, the pioneers in tin mining and in the promotion of smaller local ventures neglected by the big European capitalists. Their banks have a stranglehold on the finances of Siam. Industrial activity in Indo-China, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies owes more to their initiative than to either native or European enterprise.

To these well-informed, well-fed, pugnacious patriots of Chinese race who play such an influential role in the economic life of the Indies, Japan's drive against their motherland and Japan's drive toward the Indies are one and the same thing. Their fierce opposition to Japanese expansion is not a sentimental chauvinism. Through long contact with such great ports as Manila, Hong Kong and Singapore, they have come to believe in the permanent, universal soundness of international interdependence. And in their well-founded judgment, Japan is heading toward a domination mortal to all trade not directly helpful to the great trusts and cartels of Nippon.

WATCHING the Japanese and Chinese fight for the Indies, the

natives of the countries being fought for are developing nationalistic notions of their own. Quite naturally, to them the only just rule for the Indies would be by and for the benefit of the permanent native populations. They have become somewhat reconciled to their old enemy, the white man. The European (and American) ruler has been forced to democratize things in most places. For instance, the Indo-Chinese formerly hated the French conqueror with a consuming bitterness. But, some eight years ago, after terrorists murdered an impressive list of petty officials, 48 in one month, and incited native regiments to mutiny, the French began fulfilling some of their promises and putting through excellent, obviously needed agrarian and judiciary reforms. In Malaya the British at last feel safe in admitting Malay natives (but definitely not the domiciled Chinese or Japanese) to the armed defenders of Singapore. Until Japan showed her cards in China there was likelihood of native sympathy for a Japanese invasion which would oust, for instance, the Dutch. But today nationalism, while rapidly crystallizing in southeastern Asia, is less directed against the white man than against militaristic Japan and socially, financially aggressive China.

Native nationalism in the Indies expresses itself against the Chinese wherever the latter have become overwhelmingly powerful in numbers or in local finance. Indo-China has laws to reduce their trading powers. Malaya until recent months would not permit anyone of Chinese race to cultivate rice. The Philippines have new immigration laws clamping down as much on Japanese as on Chinese. Na-

tive nationalism is swerving away from this suspicion of the Chinese nowadays for two reasons—relatively greater fear of Japanese militarism, and the discovery that development of local industries can mean amiable co-operation between the moneyed Chinese and the native worker.

THEN at long last, awakened to the need for drastic defensive methods to prevent loss of their possessions to Japan or other Orientals, the white rulers of the Indies hustled ahead. Beautifully timed to be completed by September 1, 1939, the naval base at Singapore represents a strength believed capable of retarding any exclusively military conquest of the Indies provided the attacker does not have active support from the native population. The old British, French and Dutch colonizers not only spent last year in a frantic, lavishly financed arming of their centers of defense but made such efforts to become efficient as to suggest a real rejuvenation.


The British have fortified not only Singapore but Penang, halfway up the Malay Peninsula. They have brought troops from India, increased the local air-force and modernized the soldiers' equipment to put them on a par with the best troops of any country. Able administrators in these areas have been ordered to continue on duty indefinitely and previously jealous home governments have given them dictatorial powers for speedy autonomous action. Strongest of all indications of the European will to survive in the Indies is the careful coöordination between military forces worked out by previously inharmonious leaders last summer. These military plans

were formulated openly by the British together with the French, but there is excellent reason to believe that not only the Dutch but the Americans were included in ultimate plans if not in the official parleys. Whether or not they have any basis for it, the British, French and Dutch holders of possessions in southeastern Asia appear confident of American support against Japanese or other attack south of the Philippines, at least if such an attack should occur before 1946 when the United States is pledged to withdraw from her control of those islands.

The region's peace-loving masses of the *café au lait* and Chinese races are experiencing as deep-rooted an industrial revolution as we in the western worlds went through two centuries ago, as startling as the transformation Japan went through three generations ago. Even from the viewpoint of far-off America, such a change in the life of a hundred and thirty million souls

can be considered as significant as the discovery of a continent.

These peoples of the Indies have some important advantages to help them through this usually very painful and chaotic change in ways and standards. When compared with the rest of the world, they have gotten along splendidly as neighbors. In many senses they have been developing along democratic lines, with enlightened tendencies suggesting peaceful sharing of powers and riches in the future. For instance, the peoples of Siam and Indo-China have become accustomed to the coöperative idea not only in ancient forms common throughout Asia, but in the form of coöperative credit-banks and farmer coöperatives sponsored by governments. Too, all these lands of the Horn of Plenty have worked together for years in harmony under quota arrangements regulating the exporting of such products as rubber and tin.



Italy Views the Nazi Position

By MAURIZIO CLAREMORIS

From *Regime Fascista*, Cremona Fascist Daily

OUR READERS must draw intelligent conclusions on the factors at play in today's war in Europe, and not compare it (as do the puerile French) with the war of 1914-18. The situation now is entirely different.

After liquidating Poland in twenty days, the Germans only face the Anglo-French front in the West, and the Germans are in the dominant position for several reasons. One is that the Reich is greatly superior on land and in the air; another is that, since Poland has been destroyed, Germany has no war-aims, no territorial objectives to attain, in the West. Protected by the invulnerable armor of its land, sea and air defences, Germany whenever she pleases can inflict blows upon her enemies, in any form and at any time desired without the least risk. Moreover, eventually Germany can undertake a general and decisive offensive, with the advantage that the Reich can select the moment for that offensive without need to consider the activities of the enemy.

In compensation for the dominance of the German position today—an advantage that will endure unless the war-front is greatly extended—the Allies have one small advantage, but it is one in which they place excessive hope. This is the blockade. But Ger-

many, enjoying free traffic with north-eastern and southeastern Europe, and with access also to the enormous wealth of Russia (and thus virtually with all of Asia) is not blockaded in any comprehensive sense. The Reich, moreover, continues in some degree its trade with the United States as well as with a certain neutral country [Italy] with whose ships even Britain does not dare to interfere—unless she wants to risk the most dangerous reprisals. While it is true that Germany's considerable trade with France and Britain has come to a standstill, that loss is mutual and of somewhat greater cost to the Allies than to their enemy.

With respect again to supplies, Germany foresaw the potential danger of blockade a long time ago and, with characteristic efficiency, made her preparations. Her line of communications for food-stuffs and certain raw materials is a much safer one than England's, which is entirely by way of the exposed sea. Allied and neutral shipping losses to date illustrate how precarious that line of communication is. The German rovers of the sea will certainly not diminish their activity in the months to come. Contrary to Allied propaganda, the factor of time operates in Germany's favor, and not *vice versa*.

Persons and Personages

The Preposterous Trebitsch

Adapted from *Vu*, Paris Topical Weekly



and Chao Kung, has again made the front pages of the world press. Now he is threatening that unless the rulers of Britain, France, Germany and Soviet Russia resign immediately, he is prepared to "unchain forces and powers whose very existence is unknown and against whose operations they are consequently helpless."

Possibly Trebitsch Lincoln's latest malediction will be taken lightly by the governments he addresses, and they may risk refusing to withdraw as he demands. But this Hungarian Jew cannot altogether be dismissed. Newspaper editors get weary of his adventures, and resolutely decide to condemn the spy-missionary-monk to perpetual obscurity. The authorities of half a dozen countries or more have booted him from their soil. He has suffered enough reverses, humiliation and sorrow to down a regiment of men.

Yet Trebitsch invariably comes to life again, in one or another bizarre guise. His current performance is that of Buddhist monk, and it was hoped a few years ago that he might remain in this decent role of retired

priest until the end of his allotted time. But he is no ordinary mortal, and it is not absurd to believe that Trebitsch is destined to prolong his international vaudeville-act until the end of time.

World War II has evidently proved too powerful an allure for Trebitsch to ignore. He will bob up in a few weeks or months in another burlesque role and with some fantastic plan that will contain just enough sense and color to make the front pages again. Rewrite men once again (as ourselves) will be sent to the newspaper-morgues to thumb over the well-worn clips on Trebitsch Lincoln, and wish that this one-time M.P. would remain decently obscure in some excessively remote and inaccessible part of the globe; and preferably beneath its surface.

Shuffling the newspaper clips before you on Trebitsch's life—and some of them go back more than half a century and are in half a dozen languages—it is difficult to sift out the truth. For in his case the truth is a relative and elusive thing. First, there is the life that Trebitsch has actually lived. Then, there is the life that people think Trebitsch has lived, and this in size and overtones is something of a saga. Finally, there is the life that Trebitsch himself thinks he has lived, and this last is an epic of appalling dimensions and to tell it in its bizarre entirety one would need access

to the police files of Occident and Orient. But it is still possible to review this life in its main outlines and recall at least some part of the grotesque truth.

This genius in skullduggery asserts he was born in 1872, which would make him 68, but it may be safely assumed that he is about a decade older, or nearing 80. His birthplace was Pecs, a small village in Hungary where his father was a grain dealer. He showed up in London, at the age of 20, and impressed some gullible old ladies with his "conversion" to the Presbyterian faith. His transformation to the role of Anglican curate was rapid.

He returned to Pecs for a brief visit, believing his orthodox father would be amused by his reversed collar and clean-shaven face, but that parent chased him out of the village with a skillet in his hand and sulphureous Hebrew oaths on his tongue.

Back in England, he ingratiated himself into the confidence of B. S. Rowntree, of the cocoa dynasty, served as his secretary, and used this respectable (Quaker) patron as a springboard for election to Parliament for Darlington. Trebitsch always had a feeling for religion and a catholic interest therein. In 1899 he had tired of Presbyterianism, the Anglican Church and Quakerism, and he took a fling at Lutheranism, which led him to visit Hamburg. But there he turned apostate. The rabbi of that city welcomed the prodigal son, and gave him an assignment as a Hebrew missionary to Canada, which solved the tiresome problem of raising fare to the New World which, in Trebitsch's eyes, was in a bad way at the turn of the century and in crying

need of his special religious talents.

Economically speaking, the existence of a Hebrew missionary in eastern Canada is not the most remunerative and, sensitive to the ebb and flow of cash in this world, Trebitsch decided to flop over again to Anglicanism. (Don't ask how this is spiritually or professionally feasible.) Early in this century he acted the part of curate once more in a brief road engagement in an English parish, and here his superior was the Archbishop of Canterbury. At this time there appear to have arisen two disputes with the Archbishop. The one difference was over Trebitsch's feeling that he was better qualified to serve as Archbishop than the current incumbent of that high office; and the other quarrel was over what Trebitsch had done with a matter of several hundred pounds belonging to the parish till. The expulsion order of the ecclesiastical authorities and the unfrocked curate's written resignation made a photo-finish. On top of this, the London authorities suddenly grew querulous over the use of three thousand dollars belonging to Mr. Rowntree, his former employer, and to forget these vexatious irrelevancies Trebitsch stooped to journalism.

ONLY to the few is it permitted to make money in Fleet Street, and our protagonist had the economic wisdom to abandon this blind alley, and to retrace his steps across Europe to Rumania. There, so the story goes, he managed an oil company with such enormous efficiency that Trebitsch got his hands on some really important money and the company obligingly went out of existence. Trebitsch now looked about him. What

new fields to victimize? Happily, the Balkan Wars intervened at this moment, and the Jew-Quaker-Lutheran-Jew-Anglican saw where his real genius rested: he took up espionage in a large way, with the same relish that he had embraced half a dozen religions.

It was inevitable, of course, that anyone as flexible as Trebitsch would not work for one master, and during these comic-opera battles he labored impartially in the vineyards of the Bulgars, the Turks and the Germans. The Bulgars sent him to jail for life, but Colonel Nicolai, chief of the German espionage service, arranged his escape, since it was obviously unjust to keep a man of Trebitsch's gifts in durance tile death brought release. He got away to England, was almost certainly at that time in the employ of Germany, and when the World War began he found himself a job with the British Intelligence and an assignment to Rotterdam. He was recalled to London, ostensibly for new instructions, but in reality to be told that he had 48 hours to leave England: the Intelligence did not want to create a scandal by hanging a former M.P. Trebitsch had not covered up his tracks as well as he might in Rotterdam.

Despite this rebuff, Trebitsch determined to try again. He got into the United States by some dodge, and graciously offered his services to Franz von Papen, then attaché at the German Embassy, who knew a valuable man of no scruples when he saw one.

But this transfer of allegiance was too raw for the British, and they negotiated Trebitsch's extradition on

an old charge of fraud and swindling lodged by the disillusioned Mr. Rowntree. Trebitsch holed up for the duration of the war in a British penitentiary, condemned to hard labor for three years, but doubtless this was a less arduous or dangerous assignment than his turn on the fire-step of the Western Front. It also removed the possibility of his becoming commander-in-chief of the Allied forces, which was not too fabulous a prospect—given one of Trebitsch's transcendental crust and gall.

After the Armistice, the ex-convict, member of parliament, missionary, oil-well promoter and wartime spy found a man to his liking in the mildly insane Ludendorff. From the flop-house obscurity of Vienna he dragged forth one Adolf Schickelgruber-Hitler, whom he was perceptive enough to realize had something more than an ordinary gift of gab. Trebitsch, who like Hitler has a penchant for violence, participated in the abortive Kapp *putsch* of 1920, had a hand in Hitler's beer-cellar revolt, and topped this by digging up Heinrich Himmler as a lieutenant for the Nazi leader. But the police of Weimar Germany were wise to him, and in 1923 they conducted him unceremoniously to the Austrian frontier.

Then he dropped from sight for two years. Trebitsch's explanation for his absence from the front pages is that he was being pursued by two sirens of royalty and that it took him two years to decide not to bestow his affections upon either of them. It is fully in character with Trebitsch's own account of his life that he fancied himself as a great lover, and regarded Casanova as an insufferable amateur. But he came up for publicity in 1925

as one of the right hands of Marshal Wu Pei-fu, engaged in plotting a Pan-Asiatic revolution. At this time he received a letter from his son, John Lincoln, in a London jail, explaining that he was to be hanged in a few weeks and that he would like to say *au revoir* to his parent before he went to wherever he was going. In a glare of publicity, the elder Lincoln raced back to England, whose authorities consented to let him enter the country only for such time as these farewells required. (The son had carelessly murdered a brewer's assistant.) Arrived at Marseilles, Trebitsch learned that the seed of his loins had swung the day before.

So he returned to China, and began to gather followers pledged to deliver Asia from the unholy British. He was in his element when hailed by thousands in Peking, not so long ago, as the reincarnation of Buddha.

In his Tibetan regalia he went back to Berlin (where he was briefly jailed for overlooking a hotel bill), raised some tens of thousands of marks by profitably "teaching the way of perfection by the truths of the Orient," erected several temples, returned to Lhasa, travelled as a missionary to Japan, there was ejected, and went to Shanghai to organize a band of terrorists, whose work was to eliminate troublesome Europeans from the scene. (The expulsion by the Japanese had been merely a blind for, when they entered Tientsin, Trebitsch led the attacks on foreigners, for which the Japanese could disclaim responsibility.)

Now he is calling upon Messrs. Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier and Stalin to step down—and make way for Trebitsch. If they don't, he threatens to exercise some Oriental hex. If you don't think he can, ask Trebitsch.

SHEIK OF STANDARD OIL

By MARJORIE McFARLAND

IN PART, Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul-Rahman Ibn Faisal Ibn Saud, commonly called Ibn Saud, might have been created by Ethel M. Dell. He also has much of Saladin about him and, when last August he sold complete oil rights in his kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Standard Oil Company of California, he established himself as one of the wiliest statesmen on the international stage. He needs to be.



The discovery of rich oil fields in Saudi Arabia was by no means an unmixed blessing to a small country surrounded by British, French and Italian protectorates and colonies, and lying in a strategic position on the modern short route to the East. The sale of his oil could make his country comparatively rich—and

otherwise it is economically poor, for agriculture in the desert is not wealth-producing and the only other industry, pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, finds more customers among the poor than the rich. He did not lack potential buyers, for all the Great Powers wanted oil—oil for war. So long as he could keep them bidding against each other and postpone a decision, he had no lack of friends, but he was well aware that a decision in favor of any one of them was very likely to bring a quick end to Saudi-Arabian autonomy and might have made Saudi Arabia instead of Poland the opening setting for the Second World War. The dilemma could not be shelved indefinitely.

The British courted him in the grand manner, sending Queen Mary's brother, the Earl of Athlone, and his wife as emissaries in 1938. Ibn Saud responded royally by giving a banquet to which the Princess Alice was invited and where, for the first time, he dined publicly with a woman—but he didn't give the British his oil. For awhile he seemed to be leaning toward Italy, but evidently Mussolini overplayed his hand. He called in Germany to reinforce his arguments and later Japan as well. The Japanese wanted oil badly for themselves, and in April 1939 the Japanese Minister to Egypt even went so far as to report that Ibn Saud had offered all oil concessions to the Japanese, though no agreement had been completed. The French too, of course, were after oil, but it is only recently that he has been very cordial toward them.

In Standard Oil of California, Ibn Saud found the only solution that offered any safety. This company had had certain limited concessions since

1913, but apparently it had not otherwise been in the running, competing commercially against the more urgent needs of the Powers. Ibn Saud himself stated that the Japanese had offered twice as much money for one-third as much as he gave the Americans. But he had more foresight than greed. He did get a \$1,500,000 gold down-payment and will receive \$750,000 a year while prospecting is going on and increasing royalties after production begins—sizeable sums in the budget of Saudi Arabia—and a guarantee of sufficient oil for the needs of his own country. And he evidently felt it would be worth more than gold to have Saudi-Arabian autonomy protected by the prestige of the United States; that he was right in counting on that prestige being behind Standard Oil, is indicated by the fact that immediately after the concession was announced, the American Minister to Egypt was accredited also to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, he need not fear, as might a South or Central-American ruler, that the United States will attempt to interfere politically. So Ibn Saud sold his oil and, if anything, strengthened his influential position in the Near-Eastern balance of power.

IBN SAUD looks as an Arab chieftain should. He is six feet, four inches tall, "aquiline-nosed" and "piercing-eyed." His kingdom was achieved by daring and romantic exploits, riding at the head of his own men and sleeping in hollows in the desert sands. He is also the most modern of rulers. His army now rides in automobiles specially built for desert travel and fights with up-to-date weapons, including tanks. And, with the practical sense

of the Prophet himself, he has installed electric lights and fans in Mecca and provided buses to transport pilgrims to the Holy City. As hereditary leader of the Wahhabis, the puritan sect of the Mohammedans, he adheres strictly to their ascetic rules. Though for political and other reasons he has been married 150 times—Mohammedan custom allowing for marriages of state without arousing conflicts between love and duty—he has followed the regulation of never having more than four wives at one time. For the mother of his two eldest sons, who died in 1919, he still cherishes a romantic affection.

Although Ibn Saud has seized and enlarged his kingdom by force, he is no upstart like Zog. Very important to Arabians, he is, though of a cadet branch, a fifth direct descendant of the great Emir Mohammed Ibn Saud, founder of the Al Saud dynasty and the sword of Wahhab himself. He achieved his throne in 1901, when he was 21, after the kingdom had fallen apart through the squabbling of his uncles, by creeping through the palaces of Riyahd by night, accompanied by only 15 men, conquering the city and proclaiming himself ruler of Nejd. The death in 1906 of Ibn Rashid, whose claims were supported by the Turks, left him in undisputed control.

He then set out to homogenize Arabia by abrogating the patriarchal tribal system in favor of a more stable nationalism. In order to do this, he created *Ikhwan*, agricultural colonies with a religious basis, to replace the old nomadic pastoralism governed by tribal law.

In 1913 he drove the Turks out of Eastern Arabia and in 1914 joined

the British in fighting against them. He has usually maintained good relations with the British, concluding a treaty of friendship with them in 1915, and has made close personal friends among the Empire Builders with whom he has dealt. But he learned early that it would be himself, not Great Britain, who would put his interests first. During the War years he saw with alarm the power of his enemy, King Hassein, built up in Hejaz, with the aid of Lawrence. In 1919, Lord Curzon, arbitrating between them, decided that Ibn Saud should vacate Khurma in favor of Hassein; Ibn Saud not only ignored this but proceeded to annihilate the Hashmite forces at Turaba. In the following years he added Asir and Hail to his territory and in 1924 invaded Hejaz, captured Taif and forced Hassein to abdicate. The same year he entered Mecca and, at the end of 1925, Medina also surrendered and he could proclaim himself King of the Hejaz. The combined territory was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. The British, he found, accepted *faits accomplis*.

Ibn Saud's oil flirtation with the former German-Italian-Japanese Axis may have been meant as a warning to the British not to go too far. Last summer he sent a very sharp message to France over the proposal to make the French protectorate of Syria a kingdom with Emir Abdullah of the British Trans-Jordan as King. (Abdullah is a member of the Hashmite family, Ibn Saud's old enemies.) The French themselves decided they were not enthusiastic about a British-controlled puppet-king in Syria, and the project was dropped. Ibn Saud is nobody's puppet.

Its provisions were drawn up not last fall but at least three years ago

Soviet-Nazi Pact Hatched in 1937

Translated from the *Berlingske Tidende*, Copenhagen Conservative Daily

RUSSIA has, since she entered the League of Nations, pursued a double policy, according to Paul Dubochet, the Geneva correspondent of the Paris newspaper *Le Petit Parisien*. One facet of Soviet policy was reserved for the League and the democratic Powers; Litvinov was its exponent. The other purpose was, according to Dubochet's information which emanated from the Kremlin, to find a way toward closer coöperation with Germany. The Communist Internationale regarded that country as its most dangerous enemy. This latter aim was pursued with strictest secrecy, by Stalin himself. In this work he was aided by Tukhatchevsky.

After negotiations between the German and the Russian general staffs, in which the Russian commercial representatives in Berlin played the role of middlemen, a pact was agreed upon in principle during the early months of 1937. This pact contained the following provisions:

1. The Soviet Union detaches herself from the Western powers, and resigns from the League of Nations.
2. The Soviet Union renounces all alliances with France.
3. In case of war between Germany and her neighbors, the Soviet Union will remain neutral.
4. Germany is to conclude a long-term non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
5. Germany takes it upon herself to bring about amicable relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.
- 6., 7. and 8. contain stipulations regarding the economic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. Finally, the pact obliges the two partners not to meddle in each other's internal affairs.

The only stipulation which has not been observed, is Russia's departure from the League of Nations, because the leaders of the Soviet Union found

out that the Geneva institution furnished a marvelous vehicle for propaganda. (Instead, the U.S.S.R. was expelled.) All other stipulations of the pact seem to have been faithfully observed.

Stalin accepted the pact without any reservations. Hitler, however, wanted the Russian dictators removed from their position. He, therefore, proposed to Marshal Tukhatchevsky the overthrow of the Soviet regime and substitution of a military regime. Hitler was told that such a revolution would lead to anarchy, and would also encourage separatist elements in the various Soviet Republics. The Führer, who was interested in a strong and unified Russia, promised to send military help from Germany. On the strength of this promise, Tukhatchevsky agreed to Hitler's demands. In order to win the Russian masses, the Marshal planned to put

Voroshilov, a generally respected soldier, at the head of the movement. The latter, at first, acted as if he were willing to go along with Tukhatchevsky. However, later he handed the conspirators over to Stalin. This was the signal for the blood purge of June 1937.

Impressed by the ruthless power of the purge, Hitler recognized Stalin's strong personality and tried to gain his coöperation.

Dubochet closes his report as follows: This information, which emanates from well-informed sources, brings into the open the causes of the terrible massacre in the Red Army. They also explain why Voroshilov occupies such a favored position. It also lays open the Kremlin's deceitfulness. Russia acted as if she intended to adhere to the Peace Front, while, for the last two years, she was already bound to Germany.

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A BOATING SONG

A boat built of sandalwood with oars of magnolia !
 At both ends sit musicians with their flutes of jade and pipes of gold.
 With pretty singing girls and countless flagons of exquisite wine,
 I let the waves carry me where they will.
 A fairy on earth, I am not in a hurry to ride away on the yellow crane.
 A roamer of the seas, I follow aimlessly the wayward trail of the white gulls.

The songs of Chu-ping are still shining like the sun and the moon :
 But the gorgeous palaces and towers of the King of Ch'u leave no trace
 among the empty hills.

When I burn with inspiration, the mountains shake under the strokes of my
 pen :

When my poem is done, I challenge the whole world and laugh it to scorn.
 If the glories and success of the world can last long,
 Then the River of Han would also flow north-westward back to its source !

Li Po in *T'ien Hsia*, Shanghai

Biography of a Soul

No columnist was better known to the American public, nor probably did any newspaper-writer affect the thinking of more people in this country, than Heywood Broun, who died suddenly in New York on December 18 of last year. In the course of that year he was converted to Catholicism, to the surprise of many of his friends and readers who found it difficult to believe that anyone of Mr. Broun's independent and sometimes extremist thought would want a close association with any formal denomination. There follows in part the words of the Right Reverend Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen, of Catholic University, at the services for the columnist at St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York, a eulogy that was called Biography of a Soul:

FOR ONE brief hour alone was it permitted this soul to labor in the vineyard of God. It may well be that his contribution to that kingdom will be posthumous; for that reason we here set down the biography of his soul: the motives which led him to seek the Truth, and the fears that he might not be admitted into the Church, as well as the reason that impelled him, and finally the effects of his conversion.

Like unto all in our modern world, this soul sought peace. Long ago he abandoned the philosophy that peace resides in the possession of what we have. Looking for peace on the inside, and dimly suspecting that it involved his soul, he tried a psychoanalyst. He confided to me that one psychoanalyst used to stretch him out on a couch, and while standing at his head ask him one question after another for an hour. First getting hold of some tiny little trivial incident in his past life, the psychoanalyst would magnify it into an infinity and an explanation of his present discords and conflicts. He told me that he would arise from that

couch completely exhausted from the questionings of this psychoanalyst but never once did he find peace.

Then, he said, it dawned upon him that peace was inseparable from moral responsibility. The unhappiness of a soul was due probably to a disproportion between truth and "oughtness," or as he put it: "What I am, and what I ought to be." Once convinced that peace involved justice, not only toward fellow man but also to the Creator, he sought out the consolations of religion.

In our first conversation this soul spent about forty-five minutes giving reasons why he thought the Church would not want him, and also reasons why he wanted to become a member. Finally he said:

"The Church might not want me on account of my presumed radicalism. I have been associated with radical movements, but I have never been a Communist and never will be a Communist. I think I have too much intelligence to be one.

"If I do go into the Church, I may be accused of wanting to cover up my

'pinkness,' or my alleged radicalism. But this I believe will be counterbalanced by those who will accuse me of joining the Church to undermine it from within.

"A second reason why the Church might not want me is because I have very often in the past been a strong defender of birth control. But that belongs to the past. I would no longer do it, for I have begun to see the spiritual significance of birth."

TURNING to the reasons why he wanted to become a Catholic:

"Firstly, a visit which I made to the shrine of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico brought home to me the great inspiration for womanhood there is in the devotion to Our Lady.

"Secondly, the election of Cardinal Pacelli as Pius XII convinced me that there is only one moral authority left in the world and that is the Papacy.

"Thirdly, a fear of death. I should dislike to appear before the judgment seat of God with my soul in the condition that I believe it is now.

"To me there is nothing more ridiculous than individualism in either economics, politics or religion. I can see no reason why I should have my own individual religion any more than I should have my own individual astronomy or mathematics. I cannot even see why Almighty God would be interested in my individual prayer or even my individual sacrifice, for to care for me apart from my fellow man is to offend against an elementary law of charity. I love my fellow man, and particularly the down-and-out, the socially disinherited and the economically dispossessed.

"I want thus a religion which has

a social aspect. If, therefore, I could take this individual prayer of mine and make it one with the prayer of millions of others who believed and prayed as I do, and if I could take this individual sacrifice of mine and tie it up with the sacrifice of millions of others, so as to form a great corporate prayer and corporate sacrifice and thus to influence those who are on the fringe of that corporation, then would I feel that my individual prayer and sacrifice were pleasing to God. That spiritual corporation I believe to be the Catholic Church."

There then followed about ninety hours of instruction over a period of two and one-half months, during which instructions this soul was always urged to ask questions, to express his doubts, if any, and to present his difficulties.

At the next to the last instruction I reminded him of the seriousness of the step which he was about to take. I told him it would be far better for him not to come into the Church, than to come into it and not live up to the treasures confided to him. I reminded him that one of the men who was doing most harm in the modern world was Hitler, who had been given the supernatural life but neglected to live according to its principles. When a foreign substance enters a stomach and is unassimilated to the physical life, the stomach revolts. So, too, when a man refuses to assimilate the supernatural life which is given to his soul, he becomes the worse for its reception.

Getting the point that I was making, he arose from his chair and said:

"Father, you're worried. You will never regret receiving me into the Church. I promise you that."

The following week, when the instructions were concluded, I asked him if he had any difficulties or doubts or questions, or anything. He said: "Just one thing." Then getting down on his knees before me, he said: "Your blessing."

A few days later, on the 23rd of May, he was baptized at St. Patrick's Cathedral. He asked me to give him a baptismal name, and I gave him the name of Matthew, since Matthew was the first evangelist of Christianity and therefore the first Christian newspaper man.

On Sunday, May 28, he received his first Communion in St. Patrick's Cathedral and also had the honor of being the first person confirmed by the new Archbishop of New York, in the Archbishop's private chapel.

A MONTH after his reception into the Church, I asked him his re-actions. He mentioned three. The first was great peace of soul and a feeling of being home at last; the second, a realization that much liberalism was extremely illiberal. Some of his friends, he said, who were loudest in shouting for freedom were also loudest in protesting against him because he acted freely.

Thirdly, "It has dawned upon me that the basis of unity in radicalism is not love, but hate. Many radicals love their cause much less than they hate those who oppose it.

"As regards radicalism, I have also discovered that no social philosophy is quite as revolutionary as that of the Church."

He who might have been a Chesterton for America, as he hoped a certain literary colleague of his would one day be its Belloc, was given only

one brief hour in the vineyard of the Church.

His last words were: "God love you, I want to receive Our Lord in Holy Communion."

Thus ends the biography of a soul as far as this world is concerned. To but few men of his profession has come the thrill of living as he has lived. But may God grant that to all will come the joy of dying in the Lord as he died.

The recognition of the incompleteness of human existence, apart from the Divine, was the secret of his soul. If the world would but examine the structure of its own heart, it would divine the mystery of its shape. No human heart is perfect in shape and contour like a Valentine heart. There seems to be a small piece missing out of the side of every human heart.

But I think the real meaning is that as God made each and every human heart, He kept a small sample of it in heaven and sent the rest of it into this world to be ever reminded by its shortcomings that not here alone is the fulfillment of its hopes and the satisfaction of its desires; and that the human heart can never be really happy, never be really peaceful, and never be able to love anyone with its whole heart on this earth, because it has not a whole heart with which to love. It can never be completely wholehearted until it goes back again to God to recover the piece that He had been keeping for it from eternity.

Such was the quest of the soul the last chapter of whose biography has just been written. Eternal rest grant unto him O Lord. May his soul and all the souls of the faithful departed, through the mercy of God, rest in peace.

A Manchu Emperor's Funeral

From *Oriental Affairs, Shanghai English-Language Monthly*

HM. KUANG HSU, last but one of the Manchu Emperors, died the day before the demise of his imperious aunt, Tzu Hsi, who had made the last ten years of his life a period of misery and degradation. The Hsi Ling, or Western tombs, where his ancestors Tao Kwan, Hsien Feng and Tung Chih had already been interred, was selected as his burial place; Tzu Hsi was buried in the Tung Ling, or Eastern Tombs, seventy-five miles north-east of Peking.

It was not until December 1913, nearly two years after the abdication of the Manchu Dynasty, that the last rites for the unhappy Kuang Hsu were performed. His remains and those of his favorite concubine, known as the "Pearl," who had been murdered by orders of the Empress Dowager just as the Court was fleeing from the capital, in August 1900, had been transported to the Hsi Ling some years previously, and deposited in what was called the "Temporary Royal Residence" to await the completion of their tombs. Kuang Hsu's widow, known as the Lung Yu Empress, who assumed the Regency during the Revolution, and signed the Abdication Edicts, did not long survive the establishment of the Republic, and her coffin, too, was sent to the Hsi Ling to await burial.

The actual site of Kuang Hsu's mausoleum was selected by geomancers, and by December 1913 it was ready to receive its occupants, nearly five years after the death of the Emperor. Although ornate enough in appearance, and costing a huge sum to construct, the mausoleum was shoddily constructed when compared with the Tombs of the other Emperors in this lovely park, probably because under the Republic corruption and "squeeze" became even more rampant than under the Empire. Owing to financial stringency, moreover, only a fraction of the sum usually spent upon the final obsequies of an Emperor was available. Even the number of bearers for each catafalque had to be cut down by forty-eight, and those available had to do double duty.

The Lung Yu Empress and the "Pearl" Concubine were survived by the Tuan Kang ("Lustrous") Concubine, who figured prominently in the Hsi Ling obsequies. The Western Tombs are reached by a spur-line from the Peking-Hankow Railway. The Tuan Kang Concubine left the Imperial Palace on a yellow sedan chair, borne by eight bearers, on December 10, 1913. Imperial guards, gendarmerie and police lined the entire route to the Chien Men railway station, and proceeded direct to the waiting train. She was accompanied

by a number of princesses and female attendants, who followed in mule carts with yellow bodies and red wheels, and escorted by a number of Manchu guards carrying spears and other ancient weapons. The Imperial princes had left for Hsi Ling the previous day.

At the station the Imperial Concubine, who wore a fur cap trimmed with long black ribbons, a black jacket and a black fur coat, and black shoes with high heels, was received by Ching Feng, the guardian of the Western Tombs, who had come up to the capital to meet her. The Band of the Imperial Guards struck up a tune when she arrived, and all troops and police on the platform saluted, repeating this courtesy as the train drew out of the station.

The Tuan Kang Concubine arrived at Liangkochuang, was immediately carried to the "Temporary Royal Residence" by chair. It had been expected that the youthful ex-Emperor would accompany her, but this plan was changed, and he deputed his father, the former regent, Prince Chun, to act in his stead.

A number of skilled artisans arrived at the Hsi Ling the next day to prepare the paper houses, etc., which were to be burnt on the supposition that they would follow the deceased to the other world. They must have done their work very quickly, for by early morning of the 12th, when these offerings were burnt, they had fashioned three three-floor paper houses (20 ft. long, 8 ft. high and 5 ft. wide), six paper store-houses, and numerous chairs, carriages, tables, flower-pots, and figures of attendants, etc. The cost of these articles was about \$20,000.

The burning of the paper-models was presided over by Prince Pu Lun, who represented the Emperor at this ceremony. It took place at 7 A. M. on the 12th and was witnessed by a large gathering of princes, officials, etc. The Manchus present knelt for the greater part of the time, while the Republicans contented themselves with formal bows. Among those attending were the Chang Chia Hutuktu, who had brought twenty-three Buddhist lamas at his own expense to recite Buddhist prayers. An eyewitness records that at the conclusion of the burning, a certain Liang Ting-feng, ex-Judicial Commission of Hupeh, wept bitterly and refused to rise for some time.

After the burning of the paper-models the Republican delegates and many of the Manchu officials proceeded by pony or ricksha to the new mausoleum to inspect the building. On their return they presented themselves before the Imperial coffins to perform a ceremony known as "the removal of the Palace."

WHILE these activities were proceeding a rehearsal of the funeral procession, which was to take place the following day, was carried out. Although the distance between the "Temporary Royal Residence" and the mausoleum was only some five *li*, considerations of *Feng Shui* made it necessary to adopt a circuitous route of some 20 *li*. Each bier was borne by eighty bearers (instead of the traditional 128), all of whom wore red "flower overcoats" of tawdry material, and official red hats, topped by a cock's feather. A Manchu prince sat on each bier, to superintend proceedings. As the bearers

were changed over seventeen times during the procession, there ought to have been 4,080 in all, but only half that number being available, each bearer had to take two turns. The thousand bearers brought from Peking were paid Tls. 10 each; locally engaged coolies received only \$6. The rehearsal took from 8.30 A.M. to 4 P.M.

The program for the next day was as follows:

The Imperial coffins would leave the mortuary at 6.30 A.M. They should reach the mausoleum about noon, and between 1 and 3 P.M. there would be sacrificial ceremonies, at the conclusion of which the coffins would be deposited in their last resting-places.

THE scene on the morning of the 13th is thus described by a Chinese who was present:

"On the 13th inst. before day broke, the place was alive with persons who were to take part in the funeral. The weather was clear and the moon was still in the midst of the sky. At 6.30 A.M. the three biers were placed in the open court yard in front of the mortuary. On the ground of the court yard there were rough carpets, on which were laid six long yellow benches to support the biers. The bearers came into the mortuary with the smaller carrying-poles; the larger poles and the palls were attached when the coffins had been carried out. When they appeared the Band of the Imperial Guards played a dirge. Three men in white robes knelt before the coffins, each holding a porcelain basin, which he smashed to pieces. These basins are known as 'funeral basins.' Owing to the dim

dawn light it was impossible to identify these three men. Some said they were princes, and others that they were eunuchs. Then the ex-Prince Regent, various other princes, ex-Manchu officials, and the Republican Delegation took part in the sacrifices, over which Prince Pu Lun presided. He initiated the ceremony by pouring out a libation of wine. The ex-Prince Regent and Liang Ting-feng were the most prominent among the mourners, and were seen to be weeping bitterly. Other Princes and high officials also indulged in lamentations, the sound of their weeping being audible for a considerable distance. Most of the spectators also wept because of the sadness and solemnity of the occasion. Immediately after the sacrifices and the lamentations the Imperial coffins started on their last journey, followed by the body of mourners who walked afoot toward the south, passing the railway, and reaching Chan An Chiao, about half a *li* from the mortuary. Here a pause was made for officials to offer more sacrifices and burn paper *sycee*. Then an attendant tossed white paper coins into the air, and the procession moved forward on its circuitous route to the mausoleum. The majority of the mourners, however, left it to take the shorter direct route, though it was reported that Shih Hsu and Liang Ting-feng preferred to accompany their former Emperor's coffin.

"The Tuan Kang Concubine, who had joined in the weeping and sacrificial ceremonies, rode to the mausoleum in a mule-cart which was draped with black cloth. She took the short cut, and had an escort of spear-carrying bodyguards. Prostrated by weeping, the ex-Prince Regent was

carried back to the mortuary, and later drove to the mausoleum in a carriage, arriving there just in time for the final ceremonies. The aged ex-Grand Secretary, Lu Jung-hsiang, made the journey by chair."

The entrance to the mausoleum was reached at 12.30 P.M. Here all the umbrellas, flags, etc., that had been carried were stacked up on either side of a bridge, over which the biers were carried to be stripped of the palls. The coffins, thus exposed, were seen to be draped with yellow silk and ribbons. Short poles were now substituted for the longer ones used in the cross-country journey, and the coffins were carried between rows of saluting Imperial Guards. At the second and steeper Imperial bridge, ropes were attached to the coffins and employed to assist in the ascent, and restrain the descent. The coffins were then placed on hand-carts to await the final ceremonies. These included more sacrifices and, most important of all, the so-called writing of the Imperial names upon their respective tablets. This was done by Hsu Shih-chang and Lu Jung-hsiang, both of whom were arrayed in full Manchu official robes. Actually the tablets had already been inscribed, with the exception of a single dot on each, which the two officials now added, one using a red and the other a black brush.

It was 3 P.M. when the coffins of the Emperor and his Empress were pushed into the arched tunnel constituting the tomb, and deposited on the stone beds prepared for them. The stone beds were supposed to have been so constructed that a stream of water would constantly flow be-

neath them. Various utensils containing water, food and other articles intended for the use of the deceased were placed in the tomb, as well as a huge lamp known as Wan-nien-teng, containing gallons of oil, and supposed to burn for 10,000 years. As soon as this lamp had been lit, and covered with its globe, the massive stone gates of the burial chamber, 16 feet high, and 3 feet thick, were closed. By some automatic contrivance, huge stone balls rolled down behind these gates as soon as they were closed, and supposedly sealed them permanently.

The rule being that an Imperial Concubine must not be buried with her spouse, the remains of the "Pearl" were interred in a similar manner, but in a less imposing tomb, on the opposite side of the valley. Her tomb contained a second stone bed, prepared for the Tuan Kang Concubine, when her turn arrived.

What the Kuang Hsu Mausoleum cost can only be guessed. In the Annexes to the Reorganization Loan Agreement of April 1913, a sum of \$4,611,537 was earmarked for the Imperial Tombs, and as Tzu Hsi had been buried prior to the Abdication, it must be assumed that most of this was supposed to have been spent on the Emperor's burial-place. As to the cost of the final funeral ceremonies at Hsi Ling, it is stated to have been cut down from an original estimate of \$500,000 to \$200,000, the Tuan Kang Concubine having ordained that the departed soul of Kuang Hsu could be satisfied if the chief ceremonies and sacrifices were well conducted, and all superfluous expenses eliminated.

Nazi Fissure in Hungary

By JEAN DUPONT

Translated from *Lumière*, Paris Leftist Weekly

THE SUDDEN reversal in nazi ideology, the pro-Soviet orientation of German policy, as well as the resolute resistance of the Western Powers against Hitler's aggression, have had disastrous repercussions on various national-socialist parties beyond the frontiers of Germany, which supported them more or less directly. After the annihilation of the Rumanian Fascist Iron Guards and the serious defeat suffered by the Dutch National Socialist Party, the collapse of the Hungarian nazi factions (the "Hungarists") is symptomatic.

Unlike other foreign countries, Hungary had no unified national-socialist movement, but a fair number of groups with nazi ideas. During the last election, they succeeded in obtaining 53 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and their power began to be regarded as dangerous by the peasants.

Even though, during the May elections, the nazi factions in Hungary used identical tactics and achieved a certain unity of action under the shadow of the swastika, they fought bitterly among themselves. Today the crisis affecting the German National Socialist Party has caused a virtual disintegration of the nazi movement in Hungary.

Budapest has been aware for a long time of the underground rivalry

among the different groups and also knows how difficult this situation has become now that Germany, which no longer can supply the Hungarian Nazis with funds for propaganda, pushes them to more energetic action. It is no longer a secret—but that a nazi organ should divulge these internecine struggles, which threatened the continued existence of the Hungarian movement of the extreme Right, is at least unexpected, and prophetic perhaps of what is forthcoming.

The *Magyar Ujság*, one of the leading organs of the Hungarist movement, recently described the collapse of Magyar nazism as follows: "During the last election, the Hungarian parties of the extreme Right had a tremendous success. Since then only a few months have passed, and what changes have occurred within the movement!

"The headquarters of the party, which once were crowded, are empty today. It is becoming increasingly difficult to collect dues and it is a rare occasion when a new member joins. The movement of the extreme Right, which for some time rolled forward like a strong wave, is now exhausted. And this is true not only of one faction, but of the whole movement.

"One of the principal reasons for this state of affairs is a tactical one.

Instead of preparing the masses for a long and persevering struggle, certain propagandists, lacking the most elementary scruples, promised four times within two years that their party was on the verge of assuming power. The seizure of power did not take place, and the masses, disillusioned, have lost all confidence and expect nothing from this quarter.

"The fourth and last defeat was particularly embarrassing because it raised serious problems for the patriotic conscience.

"Following recent events, the masses have understood how easily a country can become the dupe of foreign ambitions after it has put its faith in selfish propagandists. In the case of Hungary, foreign agents used patriotic slogans and nationalist formulas to reach a large audience among the masses."

The police recently arrested several leading Nazis for reasons which had nothing to do with politics. This did the movement no good. Certain leaders of the movement were charged with blackmail, and with extorting sums from Jewish businessmen under the pretext of financing their movement.

Others were unable to explain their possession of considerable amounts of cash, which allowed them

to live on a luxurious scale. It is true that the Hungarian nazi chiefs were only indifferent imitators of the blackmailers of the Reich, but they practised graft with the nonchalance of Hitler himself.

One of the principal objectives of Hungarian National Socialism, the one to which it owes a great part of its past success, was the redistribution of land. Here, particularly, the interests of Germany were opposed to those of the Hungarian peasant. What Germany chiefly wants from Hungary is a constant supply of agricultural products. But a distribution of the land would cause an immediate decline in agricultural exports to Germany, at least temporarily, because a certain time must inevitably elapse before the small farmers, having become independent, could attain the level of production of the highly organized large estates on which these farmers are today no more than farm laborers. Consequently, the national-socialist deputies at the Parliament in Budapest, although devoted to Germany, showed a somewhat ambiguous attitude during recent debates over agrarian reform. All these frictions and counter-forces, brought into the light of day, have finally disillusioned one of the most credulous and gullible of peoples.

A woman publicist wants Britain to regard the German people as the enemy

France Demands Realism of Her Ally

By ODETTE KEUN

From *Time & Tide*, London Independent Weekly

THREE is no satisfaction in being a Cassandra, and no exhilaration when the disasters of which one was certain, have come to pass, in saying to the world at large: "I told you so." British publishers said in 1935 that the public would ignore my book on Hitler and nazism or would feel that, being a Continental, I was pathologically suspicious of Germany and wildly exaggerated the danger of National-Socialism; so at last I made a gift of my manuscript to a printer, who lost money in bringing it out on his own. I remember that nothing I stated in all those earnest pages impressed anyone as an accurate estimate of events and their results.

Never did a cause for which I fought succeed in influencing even an infinitesimal portion of any public. Yet all the political tragedies that my horrified brain divined have, up to date, occurred. It is such a melancholy experience that I have turned superstitious, and will no longer al-

low myself to get hunches, for fear they should materialize in the future just as they did in the past.

In spite of all this, however, I find it impossible to refrain from a new—not prediction, but warning. It will indubitably go the way of all my other warnings, but it must be given, and given now. The necessity for it was driven home to me by the recent correspondence to British editors concerning peace-aims. I had been feeling very uneasily, for some time already, that in them lies the seed of what may become later on a major split between public opinion in France and public opinion in England, and these discussions brought my uneasiness to a head.

It appears more and more as though France and England will be, for several years at any rate, allies working so closely together on political, military and economic lines as to justify the hope of creating at least one basic "federal unit" in Europe. But it would be a redoubtable, even a

mortal mistake, to imagine that the two countries can fuse their national temperaments as successfully as their social and material interests. Their philosophy of life, their reactions to life, are immensely different. Their psychological values are not the same. Their experience, both of history and of *la vie quotidienne*, have little in common. The fundamental qualities of their intelligence are as the poles apart: realistic in the French, practical in the English. As soon as the cardinal question of peace-aims definitely arises, it is these dissimilarities which will inexorably come into play.

There are already signs that on this issue thought in France and England is not identical, and it would be wise to heed these signs. Above all, one must note the perfectly legitimate refusal of French public opinion to dissociate the bulk of the German people from the crimes of the regime they put in, and supported and fanatically acclaimed during the persecution of the Jews, the tortures in the concentration camps, the annexation of Czechoslovakia, the destruction of Poland, and for which they are now fighting. There is no scrap of evidence to show that the masses were ever shocked by any of the perfidious or bestial acts of their masters.

The English proclaim—they have, unfortunately, even proclaimed it officially—that one of their chief objectives is to “rescue” the German people from the tyranny of a Government that has “misled” them (though for ten years before that Government took power the unexpurgated *Mein Kampf* was there for all the Germans to read, informing them with the utmost contempt that they were to be ruled by force and lies, the only fit

way, revealed the book, to rule a people as imbecile as they) and that this war is a sort of crusade to win Germany Back to Democratic Civilization. The French, having had the Germans on their backs for centuries, and seen themselves invaded three times in less than seventy years, think that the Germans have not modified their nature since Froissart called them “a covetous people above all other, forever ferociously threatening and aggressive, who had no pity when they got the upper hand, and were hard and evil handlers of their prisoners.” Moreover, they cannot be Won Back to Democratic Civilization, for they never practised Democratic Civilization, and have not yet even begun to outgrow, as a nation, the mentality of the early medieval barbarians who put their faith in the Tribe, the autocratic Leader, might, arms, ruthless domination, and treachery whenever it seemed expedient. It is not possible, say the French, to educate forcibly a European race that organically loves to be savage; the thing to do is to reduce it to *military* impotence once and for all.

I DO not believe for a moment that France will wish to exact crushing penalties from Germany after victory, if only because the consequences of Versailles proved conclusively the futility of “Reparations”; but most certainly she feels that a system must be found by which German imperialism and the preponderant German vices will not have the slightest chance to function again. That system once established, and unassailably maintained, the Germans can evolve as they choose. There is no great hope

that they will all immediately become civilized—one has to reckon with their indisputable strains of perversity, their capacity for envy, their liking for brutality, and the foul education the young have lapped up during the last seven years—but savages progress if they do not die out, and so one day the Germans, too, may change.

Everything I come across bears me out in this summary of the extremely resolute French views—conversations, letters, the press, the articles of reputable writers, the comments of unbiased English observers who visit France. I present this summary to readers in the intention I have already stated: as a warning. It is vital that public opinion in this country should be acquainted, from the very outset of the war, with the inflexible aim of France, and check its chronic propensity to wander off among incoherent visions which the French cannot comprehend and that are becoming a source of perplexity, and of some irritation, to them. Identity of purpose with France is even more essential than political and economic coöperation, *for the plain truth is that the winning of this war depends more on France than on England*, since it is France, not England, who is being incessantly and ardently adjured by Germany to make a separate peace. There is a possibility of disgruntling the French by indulging overmuch in the speculations about peace-aims which are beginning to be current in England—and it is a possibility that contains grave eventual dangers.

Do the English seriously suppose that France, who has five million men under arms; several million women

struggling single-handed to raise their families, keep up trade, dig and sow the fields; a national economy infinitely more disrupted than England's; individual financial difficulties and emotional stresses incomparably more numerous (for everybody in France, not only a part of the population, is shatteringly affected by the mobilization), is going to ask from this war—and obtain—*anything short of complete physical security?* I repeat that she will insist upon, and carry out, whatever the method, such guarantees as will make a fourth aggression of Germany literally impossible. Impossible for good. Assuredly I do not say that the French reject the notion of a European Federation, but they are not making it a fetish as the English tend to do. Oh! Can nobody, can nothing, I wonder, prevent the English from striving perpetually to escape reality by taking refuge in sloppymindedness, a bathetic sentimentality, a maudlin Utopianism! Can they never foresee the ineluctable and cope with facts in time? Here they are again at their old tricks of mawkish and befuddled pity, of senseless wishful-thinking, exactly as when they grieved over Germany in 1918, blamed her self-made misfortunes on the Treaty of Versailles, sponsored the wickedly mischievous thesis that the latter (which freed some four-fifths of the oppressed minorities of Europe) was the most iniquitous machination of modern times, and discovered a spiritual affinity and kinship—eagerly exploited by the Germans, of course—with a nation of bullies, boasters, and slaves!

Often I ask myself whether there exists, in the world today, a people as naturally *good* as the English, and as

immeasurably stupid. I honestly believe there isn't—and I also believe that this same calamitous combination of goodness and stupidity is principally responsible for the mistakes committed since 1936 (the fatal year of the German reoccupation of the Rhineland, a move that England persuaded France to accept, and that made this war unavoidable), and of which we are now reaping the deadly harvest.

My prayer, therefore, to whatever democratic gods there be, is that the English may continue to be good, but should stop being stupid, and make a start in this much-to-be-lauded direc-

tion by looking the obvious, the factual, the inevitable in the face—and, instead of just resisting, at the very last minute, the catastrophes they call down upon themselves (and others) by their lazily optimistic, deliberate blindness, think out the future realistically, and not abstractedly in the vaguest and loosest of rambling verbal dreams. For the sake of the entire world, I urge them not to moon about trifling with those ineffectual arabesques they like to dub their peace-aims, and for which, until more concrete plans can be made, the French, very rightly, have not the faintest use.



—From *Chinese Writers*

Notes and Comments

Dog-Front Offensive

Students of the home front report a large-scale offensive in the dog sector. Fighting has broken out among dogs all along the line.

Anyway, animal dispensaries throughout the country have lately been treating a considerably increased number of dog-fight casualties.

The London depots of the People's Dispensary for Sick Animals, for instance, treated 198 dogs injured in fights in September and 410 in October.

Explaining this, Mr. Gaunt, technical expert of the Dispensary, said:

"Dogs are very sensitive to the state of mind of their owners. If you suffer from war nerves your dog will be snappy.

"You get angry through reading about air-raids, and your dog goes out and fights the next dog.

"He doesn't know what he's fighting for—his war-aims, so to speak; it is enough for him that his guv'nor is out of temper."

Lack of exercise, due to the black-out, and also to the evacuation of owners, is responsible for some of the bad temper; but most of it comes from this transmitted bellicosity. Particularly if your dog is on the lead when you are feeling wild about the Germans, your rage will travel down through the leather and make him see red.

—*Evening Standard*, London.

Beware the Enemy!

A newspaperman asked the British authorities for a copy of the leaflets distributed in Germany by British airplanes. According to the London *Daily Herald*, his request was refused with the following answer: "Copies are not given out, as they might fall into enemy hands."

—*De Groene Amsterdammer*

Genuine Substitute

The product, which is sold instead of unskimmed milk, is absolutely unchanged, only the (butter) fat has been eliminated.

—Report from Vienna to the
Schweizer Milchzeitung, Switzerland

Dismember the Reich?

No Conference with Germany, whether Hitler's Germany, the Kaiser's Germany or Bismarck's Germany, ever solved anything. This should by now be clear to anyone but a nitwit.

The only utility of a Conference at the present juncture would be to serve Hitler's purpose of gaining a respite after the rape of Poland and then smash, or attempt to smash, in his own good time, England and France *separately*.

I advise people to read carefully what has happened in Prague lately, what is happening in crucified Poland, before clamoring for a soppy Conference. Let them redigest the following:

In 1864 Germany invades Denmark.
In 1866 Germany invades Austria.
In 1870 Germany invades France.
In 1914 Germany invades France through Belgium.
In 1938 Germany invades Austria.
In 1939 Germany invades Czechoslovakia.
In 1939 Germany invades Poland.

Will it finally be clear that the Germans, whether under Bismarck, the Kaiser or Hitler, will never understand democracy, that they are constitutionally incapable of governing themselves decently?

The answer: Germany must be dismembered into 38 States under strict supervision of England and France. That was the state of Germany once upon a *happy* time.—Letter to the Editor of *News-Review*, London.

Unrefutable

Professor Joad, in his new book *Guide to Modern Wickedness*, tells at second hand of a band of refugees which wandered somewhere in China during the civil-war era. It was a time of appalling famine, and these ragged and ferocious-looking wanderers clamored for food. Joad's friend, not altogether liking their looks, entered into parley with their leader. Were they *bona fide* refugees as they professed, or were they perhaps bandits?

"You don't believe me?" said their leader,

outraged. "Look here!" and with a dramatic gesture he seized the man standing next to him, drew a short knife, tore off the man's tunic and slit his stomach from top to bottom. "Look there," he said. "There is nothing in it. How can you still doubt that we starve?"

—*Japan Chronicle, Kobe*

At Britain's Bier

Radio listeners in Australasia were treated recently to a German propaganda broadcast in somewhat lighter vein than is usual with Dr. Goebbels, to wit:

*Friends, Britons, countrymen, lend me your ears;
I come to bury Britain not to praise her,
The evil empires do lives after them;
The good is oft interred with their bones;
So let it be with Britain. The noble men
Have told you Britain was ambitious:
If it were so it was a grievous fault,
And grievously has Britain answered it.
Here, under leave of Neville and the rest—
For Neville is an honorable man;
So are they all, all honorable men—
Come I to speak of Britain's faults.
She might have been a friend, faithful and
just
But Neville said: Let us be righteous,
And Neville is an honorable man.
Should righteousness not be of sterner stuff?
Yet Neville says she is so righteous,
And Neville is an honorable man.
Yet all did see that on the threat of war
They thrice presented her a kingly offer
Which she did thrice refuse. Was this then
righteous?
Yet Neville says that she was righteous?*

Bullets Not Pounds

Councillor Lieut. Col. A. A. Soames thought the money the soldiers received was sufficient. Their aim should be to win the war. "Don't hurl money at them and make them so rich that they will be content to lie in their beds and do nothing," he said. "Don't be sorry for the soldiers. They are the lucky ones. Those of us who are too old have to sit at home, doing nothing. The soldier at the front is enjoying himself. Money is not everything. They are there to win the war."

—*English Essex Weekly News.*

New National Anthem

The Horst Wessel Song is the second national anthem of the Nazi. That a parody of it should be circulating in Germany at the moment is not without significance. The opening lines of the original may be translated as follows:

*With banners high
In serried ranks and even
The Brownshirts march
With steady stride and sure.*

The parody changes *Fahnen* into *Preise*, *Reihen* into *Grenzen*, and *S.A.* into *die Not*. The result is:

*With prices high
And frontiers closed to freedom
Ruin stalks on
With steady stride and sure.*

The subsequent lines of the parody contain a reference to "Hitler and Goebbels, noch immer nicht erschossen" (still waiting for a bullet).

—*Dispatch to the Times, London*

The Writing on the Wall

Thousands of small posters, decorated with the hammer and sickle, have appeared on walls and fences in Prague districts where most Germans live. They bore the slogan: "Clear out before Stalin comes." S.S. men were called out of barracks in the middle of the night to scrub them off.

—*British United Press*

*I wish Hitler,
The Littler,
Was like the Great Fred.
Fred's dead.*

*Mr. Chamberlain
Was the Left Wing's bane
Until he declared war:
Now they hate him more.*

*"Nous voici chez Maginot,
dit Gamelin,
"C'est pas mal, enfin?"
"Il est bon, dit Gort,
"Mais—pardon—que je ferme
la porte."*

—*The Spectator, London.*

The propaganda genius of the Reich
should blush over his export copy

Advice to Dr. Goebbels

By LAMAR MIDDLETON

RELATIVELY little German propaganda or counter-propaganda gets into type today in the United States, chiefly, but not entirely, because the majority public here is unsympathetic to the Nazi side of the war argument or, more precisely, to the method of its presentation. Most newspaper and magazine editors do not want to risk boring their readers. But this overlooks two important points. One is that the only way to combat the effect of one propagandist campaign is to hear the other side of the argument. No one will deny that Americans are subjected almost exclusively to Allied propaganda, even if it is the negative propaganda of censorship control over the cable-heads. The other point is that from a purely educational point of view, German methods of propaganda abroad are fully as interesting and as vital to understand as any other.

German propagandists of the first World War made a sorry showing in the United States. Officials in Ber-

lin, despite the explicit recommendations of Ambassador von Bernstorff, refused to believe anything more was needed than to play upon the loyalties of Americans of German antecedents. The British and French ran circles around them in this country with their visiting literary, political and military bigwigs, and one of the results was that when it came to whose atrocity stories were to be swallowed, invariably it was those launched by the Allies. Aside from possessing an audience eager to hear tales against the well-publicized "Hun," the Allies' tales—and their propaganda, generally—were much better written and conceived than their German equivalents.

On the basis of the record thus far, one may safely say that the Anglo-French product—the propaganda, that is, designed for consumption by neutrals—is still far superior. The Germans, it appears, are still writing their handouts in a style that possesses the subtlety of a calliope. It may be

instructive to look at some examples of Nazi propaganda sent to this country since the outbreak of hostilities.

News from Germany is a monthly brochure for Americans issued by one H. R. Hoffmann from Starnberg (Bavaria). It arrives here less regularly than before the war, and doubtless some missing issues are resting on the bottom of the sea. In the main, this organ is devoted to extracts from Hitler's speeches (exceedingly stale by the time they arrive here), original and reprint articles, anti-Allied opinion in neutral countries, miscellaneous items, book reviews, and letters-to-the-editor. Some of the English is literate enough, and certainly smoother than the mimeographing.

CONSIDER the issue, say, of November 23 of last year. Here is an article of a thousand words (an awkward length for republication anywhere in this country) entitled "The 'Career' of the British War Minister," with the subhead "Jewry's War Minister—War Agitator and Speculator."

Since at least one of the reasons the American public has been alienated by the Nazis lies in their attacks on Jews (who number not more than 3% of our population), it might seem elementary wisdom to avoid this tack in propaganda to be disseminated in the United States. But consider:

"Hore-Belisha may be said to be a prototype of that irresponsible type which let loose war against Germany. That a man of alien race should have attained to one of the most important offices in Britain clearly proves the incompetence of the democratic governing clique who for years have not been able to produce a single individual of

any note. . . . From the thousandfold cry for revenge from the throats of Jewish aliens in all countries, Germans have realized that when National Socialism destroyed the rich endowments of Jewry, the latter saw the only possibility of revenge in letting loose a war against Germany. With the appointment of a Jew to the position of War Minister, this aim neared its realization. And Hore-Belisha has not disappointed his fellow Jews. He has worked systematically for this war. . . . Hore-Belisha (his father was called Horeb-Elisha), like all political Jews, had a career marked by complete unscrupulousness. For Jewish world domination, and the business of Jewish plutocracy, whose distinguished representative is Hore-Belisha, Albion's sons are to be driven without reason into this war. In the end, however, Hore-Belisha will find that he has overreached himself, for the Germany against whom the Jewish parasites and war-mongers have declared war, is another Germany to that experienced by him when a student at Heidelberg before the World War, and for which he at that time expressed admiration."

By no means, however, is all German foreign propaganda so subtle. Somewhat strangely, since *News From Germany* is designed primarily to affect American opinion, it publishes excerpts from the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* that suggests to its readers that a few weeks ago the United States was on the brink of declaring war upon Germany. Thus:

"From hour to hour almost uninterrupted reports appeared in the American press regarding the sinking in American territorial waters of the *Culmore* by a German U-boat. A

regular U-boat panic set in. . . . The American press had got to the verge of declaring war when the Canadian wireless station at Camperdown sent out the message that the *Culmore* was in safety."

IT is difficult to believe that the German propaganda machine, whose efficiency at least for its home audience no one contests, hopes to be able to persuade Americans that "the American press," the dupe of British propagandists, was on "the verge of declaring war on Germany." It is more difficult to believe that there does not exist at Berlin a more realistic knowledge of the American press. Yet the chief objective of *News from Germany* is to bend American opinion away from the Allied cause. Without arguing the virtue of that objective, it should be plain to Dr. Goebbels and his staff that this is many miles removed from the way to do it. Any primer on propaganda would tell him so.

More to the point are some of the notes in a special supplement, *American Views*, now folded in with *News from Germany*. This contains denials of some obviously fabricated Allied tales. But the issue at hand also includes a letter-to-the-editor (the aforementioned Herr Hoffmann) ostensibly from an American veteran of the World War, now resident in Germany, and complaining of Anglo-French misrepresentations of the German case, to the extent of some 2,000 words—again an impractical length for propaganda reproduction anywhere.

Unfortunately, this lengthy protest is only signed "D. W. Foster," with no identification other than Editor

Hoffmann's word that he is "an American living in Germany," which is to say that Mr. Foster has all the earmarks of being a figment of Herr Hoffmann's imagination. All that the latter needed to do, to lend credibility to the existence of his correspondent (and thus increase the likelihood of getting the letter reproduced in the United States) was to name the A.E.F. company in which his Mr. Hoffmann had served, and his place of birth and former occupation in the United States.

More informative in *News from Germany* and its accompanying *American Views* are the various denials of specific news-stories and press-association reports (chiefly *Reuters* and *Havas*), comment on German books and citations of pro-isolationist speeches and articles in the United States, although precisely what use such time-worn extracts are to American editors (or lecturers or professors or other potential propagandists) is hard to see. Evidently no study of the news and publicity set-up in the United States or of its channels of public opinion and education, has been made by German propagandists in the Reich in preparing this material. Overlong and poorly translated articles on "The New Order in Eastern Europe," "Grown Up at Sixty: The Fate of English Youth," "Britain Learns Nothing From the World War" and "Impressions of Travel of a Foreigner in Germany in Time of War," most of them anonymous, are so manifestly unsuited for use in this country's daily and periodical press that their inevitable fate is the waste-paper basket.

Germans abroad are traditionally regarded as poor diplomats; as

propagandists, they are appalling. *Facts in Review*, published twice monthly by the German Library of Information in New York, which is a section of the Consulate General, is of some value to libraries and historians, since it contains a preponderant amount of documentary material. But its strictly propagandist material ("British Cost of Living Highest in Thirty Years," "Vacations for German Workers," "Totalitarianism in France," and "Lone German Sergeant Captures 24 Poilus," for example) is written in a style so vehement and shrill that its use by American newspapers and magazines—even solely as reference data—is out of the question.

The points in these articles are made with pile-driver finesse, and while such news-angling may arouse no conscious or even subconscious protest in the mind of the German reader, its immediate effect upon the American reader is to arouse all his defenses against hokum. For the latter is conditioned to a kind of news-writing, and by and large even to a magazine style, that at worst makes an effort at understatement, and at least makes no virtue of overstatement.

The reason for the blunders by the German Government, in so far as export propaganda for the United States is concerned, is not difficult to trace though it remains difficult to explain. The English-language articles, extracts, etc., in *News from Germany* and *Facts in Review* are perfectly suited to the Nazi press in this country. Their strident tone—the anti-Semitism, the "Aryan" incantations, the deifications of Adolf, and all the rest of it—are entirely suited to the

German-language *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter* of New York, the weekly of the same name in Chicago, the *Weckruf* of Los Angeles, and other official Nazi organs in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The evident and inane assumption in Berlin must be that, if such material in this form is desirable copy for these publications, in literal English translation it is equally suitable for the American press.

This is nonsense, of course, but it is no more an egregious boner than German propagandists were guilty of in 1914-18, when they paid no heed to the psychological make-up of the American reader of newspapers, nor to the editorial mechanics of those papers. The upshot was that these propagandists, who unquestionably had a case to present to American readers, got nowhere in the American press, and they are making no progress now.

Germany's best argument for export to neutrals is that based on the injustices of the Versailles Treaty, buttressed by well-reasoned discussions in print of the incontestable economic needs of a nation of eighty millions.

From the propagandist's viewpoint, a fairly effective case can be constructed along these lines, and if written with only elementary regard for the anatomy of English, a considerable part of this argument would come before American eyes. All these other briefs in execrable English, the childish vilification of Jews, the bawling against certain British officials, the racist mumbo-jumbo, only serve further to alienate this public. As a professional, Dr. Goebbels ought to be ashamed of himself.

Political Philosophy

By Y. L. CHIN

From *T'ien Hsia, Shanghai Literary Monthly*

THE TERM "body politic" in this article is used somewhat in the sense of the Greek word *polis*, without implying, however, the notion of a city. It stands for an organic whole having a government as its nucleus and all its non-nuclear parts composed of those elements which function either toward or away from or, more generally, in terms of the behavior of the whole through the instrumentality of the government. Consequently, it has no fixed agencies in a society, since some elements may function indifferently in relation to the whole at one time and in one place, and quite relevantly at other times and in other places. Thus, while in terms of the present-day ideology a given body politic may be capitalistic or proletarian, the rich and the poor have not always been, nor need always be, the integral parts of a body politic. The essence of a body politic is its supreme power; it is through the exercise of this power that some part or parts become the guiding influence of

the whole and in extreme cases identified with it.

The term "politics" denotes the interplay of the different parts of the whole toward certain ways or certain patterns in which the supreme power is to be exercised; it is therefore different from administration which is the functioning of the machinery of a body politic. That which pertains to politics is said to be political. Political thought in this article means thought on or about politics and is to be distinguished from thought on or about political thought. This distinction is fundamental whether the approach to the study of politics be economic (Marx), historical (Stubbes, Maine), legal (Austin), psychological (Wallas), or philosophical (Hegel, Green). Any of these approaches might be either thought on politics or thought on political thought. It is with the former that the present article deals. Thus, the works of Dunning, Barker, a part of the works of Laski, and most of the

writings of the political scientists do not constitute political thought in the sense here meant; Dunning, for example, must have spent the major part of his life in studying political thought, but his published works do not indicate that he did any active thinking on politics. In the works of others, for example those of Laski, the distinction herein proposed may seem somewhat obscure, but it is none the less there, and for the purpose of this article, it must be maintained.

POLITICAL thought is also to be distinguished first from political thinking, secondly from political ideas, and thirdly from political theory or philosophy. Thinking may refer merely to the actual process taking place in space-time and therefore may not result in a structure or a system of ideas which is what is here meant by thought. Anyone who has any political thought to his credit must have done political thinking, but those who have done political thinking do not *ipso facto* achieve political thought. This can be easily seen from the example of Chinese officials, English politicians or American bosses. Ideas and thought are of course closely related, but while thought here refers to a system or structure, ideas are the entities which are the elements of this system or structure. Political thought is a system of political ideas! These ideas are not limited to one system but can be organized into different systems. Since political thought is a system or structure, it is thought not so much of the way as on the pattern in which political power is to be exercised. Political theory or political philosophy may or may not be political thought, though most of the ex-

amples given are cases of political thought as well. If by political philosophy we mean that part of an entire philosophical or metaphysical system which has political ideas as its deduced element, then political philosophy may not be political thought, for in being purely deductive, it may not have the kind of relevance to actual politics which political thought in this article connotes. Thus, while the political philosophy of Plato is, that of Bradley and Bosanquet is not political thought in the sense here meant.

Political thought must always be partial to the ends which it is called upon to serve. It may be couched in formal or abstract terms, but in its historical context it can always be shown to be speaking for certain interests. Plato spoke in the interest of the intelligentsia, and Hegel tried to stem the tide of iconoclastic rationalism which might shake the foundation of the German body politic, hence he may be said to have as his interest the defence of the *status quo*. Just as saints and devils can quote the Holy Bible with equal facility, so may the same or similar ideas stand for different interests. The idea of social contract in the case of Hobbes was a defence of monarchical absolutism, while with Rousseau, it argued in favor of an absolutism of quite a different kind. Dialecticism with Hegel spoke in the interest of a given *status quo*, while in terms of the present day materialism, it is an instrument in the interest of the proletariat.

Since political thought must have a particular end in view, it is a theoretical version of something that is eminently practical. We might say that although it is formally a system of

thought, it is yet impregnated with the kind of emotion that is always accompanied by a desire to see it put into practice. What is meant here may be conveyed by the distinction between the cognitive and the conative. These terms refer to human activities, and while the activity behind mathematics and physics, for example, may be purely cognitive, that behind political thought is in addition conative. Political thought embodies some kind of will, whether it be a general or group will, or the will of recognized political leaders. It either carries with it, or can be transformed into a program which when carried out would realize partially certain principles. It is therefore quite distinct from pure philosophy or mathematics or logic on the one hand, and from the natural sciences on the other.

THE KIND of political thought with which this article deals, may be divided roughly into two main classes: that which seeks to maintain a *status quo*, and that which attempts to overthrow it. To put the idea in more general terms, political thought is either in favor of something or opposed to something, and with regard to it there is always a pro and con. The activity behind political thought being partly conative, the opposition between rival schools is different on the one hand from the opposition between, let us say, Euclidean and Riemannian geometries or between Newtonian and wave mechanics, for in these the divergencies may always be said to be due to the different spheres of applicability. Nor, on the other hand, is this opposition logical contradiction, since the realization of one school of political thought does not en-

tail the falsity of its rivals; at most, it merely means their failure. The opposition involved is neither a material difference nor a formal contradiction: it is always reducible to an antagonism of wills and a clash of interests.

It is the purpose here to show in the following sections that, taken in the sense outlined above, political thought is a special kind of facade under the cover of which active, capable, and ruthless men lead people to accomplish what they individually or as a group desire.

POLITICAL thought arises when a body politic runs out of gear in the sense that external conditions become such that the political center of gravity no longer oscillates in the beaten path. By external conditions we mean any state of affairs accruing to a period which is not due to any explicit political thought. These conditions are bound to be many and various in terms of events. It may be true that economic factors have always been prominent, it may even be true that from now on economics is going to be the exclusive underlying factor. If so, we may say that for every political change there are always underlying economic causes. But economic determinism, if true, only explains political changes, it does not by any means imply that economic factors constitute political changes. In other words, economic determinism may be a form of political thought, yet economic enterprises may not be political activities. The body politic may be included in the body economic, but they do not coincide: politics may be economics, but not necessarily *vice versa*. The body politic has always

its own excuse for existence and political thought its own excuse for being.

For those students of politics who are not economic determinists, it may be necessary to study history in order to ascertain the specific factors that lead to the rise and fall of a given body politic. Interesting facts may be excavated from dusty volumes and workable generalizations arrived at; but these are not what the present article intends to bring forth. Like economics, history is relevant to, but not identifiable with politics. We are not here interested in the specific factors that lead to the specific rise and fall of given bodies politic. What is aimed at in this section is merely to state that a body politic is never permanent, that like any other individual, it has its period of growth, of maturity and of decay. If we analyse it in terms of politics, and do not attempt to explain it in terms of economics or history, we shall find that each of these periods is identified with certain states of a body politic describable in terms of the behavior of the politically active, capable, and ruthless politicians.

The period of growth of a body politic is a period of political creativity. It is a period preceded by destruction and through which political unity is either about to be achieved, or else an accomplished fact. The new order in its process of becoming requires creative ingenuity and the politically inventive, capable and ruthless men are attracted toward it, accept it as an outlet of their energy and adopt it as the vehicle for realizing their ambitions. In other words, these men function through the emerging order. Their role, however, has both a positive and negative aspect. Being creative and capable, they function

toward the political creativeness required of them, but if they, or some of them—more specifically, their leaders—are in addition ruthless, no obstacle is allowed through sentimentality or other forms of tender-mindedness to impede the political momentum already initiated. Thus, positively, in functioning through the emerging order, these men achieve political construction. But ruthless men are ruthless in constructive as well as in destructive ways, in initiating the new as well as in defending the old; the absorption of these men in constructive work decreases the supply of formidable enemies in destruction. Hence, negatively, in functioning through the new order these men are no longer possible defenders of the old.

The period of maturity is not generally a period of political creativity, but one of political conservation or preservation. The creative work having been done, it remains for the body politic to conserve it, and what is accomplished is an order which becomes a *status quo* and which gradually gets to be more or less refined, more or less imposing, and so full of checks and balances and delicate adjustments of one kind or another, that functioning through it requires a set of persons endowed with what might be called a legal turn of mind and judicious temperament. These persons may be capable and ruthless, but they are not likely to be politically creative, being possessed by too lively a sense of attachment to the then existing institutions. Both the institutions and the persons running them have a tendency toward conservativeness quite irrespective of their nature; even organizations for revolution are con-

servative in terms of their own institutions. Conservatism is not politically injurious, if the men at the helm of affairs are capable, fair and alert. When such is the case, and the objective state of affairs is not pressing for drastic changes, the potential revolutionaries, even though they are kept out of the government, can always spend their energy elsewhere and seek other spheres to conquer. Civilization in general flourishes when creative human energy is no longer monopolized, and the body politic is in a state of stable equilibrium which is its period of maturity.

But a body politic does not remain perpetually stable. There will be a time when both the powers-that-be and the institutions become equally incapable of absorbing alert and capable men whether of the creative or of the conservative type. A decaying body politic does not mean a corrupt or inefficient government. A government may be corrupt or inefficient or both and yet the body politic may be otherwise healthy enough to attract capable men to institute reforms. Reformation means that on the one hand part of the existing political institutions can be used as instruments for political changes of one kind or another indicating a healthy body politic, and, on the other, capable men are still willing to accept the existing machinery as an outlet of their energy and as the playground of their ambitions. Reformation becomes impossible only when the political center of gravity is no longer housed in the formal institutions which become thus empty shells incapable of being used as the vehicles through which the ambitions of the active, capable and ruthless men could be realized. When

such is the case, we have a period of decay.

Each of these periods has its peculiarity so far as political thought is concerned. During periods of growth, the struggle is mainly concerned with practical measures or programs intended to substantiate certain principles which have become more or less accepted. These principles may be more or less emotionally moving to the masses, but are generally no longer intellectually intriguing to the élite.

In periods of maturity, there usually isn't much active political thought, though there may be scholarly expositions. It should be the kind of period in which textbooks on politics would flourish, and whatever is not a defence of the *status quo* is likely to be either ignored or benevolently tolerated, or else mere echoes in the political wilderness. But during periods of decay, political thought is more likely than not to be on fundamental principles. The initial step is to dress up in attractive and easily understood forms, and then to pass them as items of mental currency, until some of these ideas emerge through struggle into prominence, partly because of the cogency of their pattern, but chiefly because of the backing they receive from people who have since become powerful politically. When no political thought different from the predominant one remains in political rivalry, a period of growth of another body politic begins.

In a society or a nation of long history such as China, there may be a succession of different bodies politic, and hence also a cycle of the different periods of growth, maturity and decay. As has been mentioned, we are

not interested in the causes that led to the rise or fall of bodies politic. We merely state that there are such periods and that upon analysis they may be seen to have certain bearings on political thought. On the whole, political thought in the sense here meant, flourishes during periods of growth and decay, while during periods of maturity, it is quiescent, not in the sense of the absence of political theories, but in the sense that these theories, if any, are not engaged in a struggle to master practical politics.

But why political thought at all? It may be argued that among ani-

mals there are numerous examples of instinctive leadership; packs and herds achieve collective action without any articulate thought. School children exemplify the same phenomenon when they play in groups. History abounds in evidences for the transference of political power without any articulation in the form of a structure of political ideas. Why, again, political thought at all? Following, attempts will be made to show that for the kind of animals that human beings are, political thought is needed, even though collective action can be achieved without articulate thought.

(This is the first part of an article by Mr. Chin. The second installment will appear in March.)

THE SHIFTING "PARTY LINE"

A Soviet Book—1937



Daily Worker—1940



A mountain climber finds an analogy with war in their manner on the Alps

Germans on the Rocks

By GEORGIA ENGELHARD

NAZI Germany is going to lose the war to England and her allies. Some people fear so, some hope so, but I know so. I have the advantage of being a mountain-climber. That may not sound like the equivalent of a seventh daughter of a seventh daughter, but in this instance it is even better. I have watched the way the two sides climb, and there's no doubt left in my mind who will win.

Manners in mountain-climbing may not seem much more indicative of the outcome of war than fashions of using tableware, or preferred designs in crockery, but they are. Mountain-climbing is a matter of campaign and assault. The climber opposes his wits and his strength to the resistance of the mountain, which may commit belligerent acts as firing rocks and avalanches at him, if not bullets. On the way they fight mountains, I pick the English to win and the Germans to lose. My certainty is all the greater since, in the four months of the war,

both sides have fought after the method that might be expected from their respective styles of climbing.

The English have settled down to a long job, losing as few men as possible, being slow but sure over each step, ready to take risks if the probable profit seems great enough, but preferring to avoid them.

The Nazis, on the other hand, gave a pyrotechnic display of *Blitzkrieg* in Poland. That's the way they climb, too. An objector rises to point out that they were successful in their *Blitzkrieg* campaign. And I admit it, and add that their *Blitzkrieg* way of climbing is usually successful in the Kaisergebirge Mountains, pretty little hills not far from Munich. That's where they train themselves in *Blitzkrieg* climbing. And then they try it out on a fair-sized Alp, and it doesn't work so well. On a short climb, or in a small war, *Blitzkrieg* may be successful. But to go up a real mountain, or to win a world war, the British method—plodding though it may ap-

pear at times—gets results where the flashy, dashing, devil-take-the-hindmost Nazi style is only momentarily spectacular.

The way of climbing to which I'm referring developed after the last World War, and therefore description of its style as "Nazi" is correct. It had its origins at Munich, as did the National Socialist Party. It seems to have its base in the fatalistic post-War spirit of, "What's the use, why take care, why heed maxims, what's life worth, who's afraid?" The answer to the last part of that question is that the climber seems to be afraid of everything, but most of all of showing that he is, and so starts up an unscalable rock face as though the Big Bad Wolf were at his heels. Sometimes, to the surprise of everyone, the climber gets to the top; but more often, to the surprise of nobody, though to the distress of those who like to consider climbing a sport, and not a short cut to suicide, he fails to accomplish the impossible, and drops several thousand feet.

There are other elements in this Nazi school of climbing. One is worship of the group (the party in climbing, the State in national affairs). Example:

A party started up the Zmuttgrat face of the Matterhorn, including one man who had talked a better climb than he could do. They came to the great ice ridge, and by then it was apparent that this man wasn't able to keep up with the rest. The way an English leader would have dealt with that situation would be to have said, "I am feeling rather too tired for this, by Jove." Then he would have turned back, cursing the laggard sulphureously but under his breath,

and seen them all to the hut. The German fashion is basically different. The man who was a hindrance was unroped, and told that the rest would go on, that he was to return by himself. He was by then in the position of Macbeth in the pool of blood. He would certainly have killed himself attempting the return. He chose, rather, to try to keep up with the others, though he was no longer on the rope. Like a dog ordered, "Go home! Go home, now!" he did his best to tag along until, inevitably, he slipped, fell and died. The rest of the party made the top, and added another triumph to the records of Nazi mountaineering. If enough German soldiers get the idea that their leaders feel toward them as the leader of that climb did toward the others in the party, they're not going to fight so well. The British have, in mountaineering and in war, the trick of making the followers feel that their commander will never ask them to do something he would not himself, set no task beyond their power, never send them to destruction unless he goes there first.

There are, or were, certain climbs



which had or have not been made because they were manifestly impossible. Climbers of the English school—that means all sound climbers, since the English started mountaineering as a sport, and their rules held until the Nazis came along—looked at these sheer faces, and said "No." They discovered that rocks rained down them, calculated how long it would take to make the traverse, with step-cutting



or piton-placing, and decided that the chances of being in the way of one of those boulders were far too great, and went the other way. That's the kind of suicidal climb the Germans now like to attempt. Some of them sometimes succeed. The Schmid brothers went up the Matterhorn by the one route which had not before been climbed. They had luck. It didn't hold, for the next year Toni was killed trying a far more easy ascent.

THERE are young fools in every land, of course, who haven't lived long enough to know the value of life, or who are just show-offs. But the Germans who climb in this way aren't the nation's flower of folly, and no more. They have the official encouragement of their Government.

A waitress remarked on a pleasant

Sunday in the German mountains not long ago, "Well, only thirteen were killed this week on the Eigerwand." That's too many for any mountain, and there was more than a mountain killing them. The German Government had offered a reward for "the most difficult climb." It was a medal, and one climber got it, while others at the rate of thirteen or less a week got their necks permanently broken. Other governments conduct safety campaigns; here's one that runs a "danger campaign" because risks are an intrinsic part of Nazi philosophy.

Granted that war is one unavoidable method of sending men to death, it still isn't wisdom to speed them into a situation where every likelihood argues that they will be extinguished. English mountaineers run risks, sometimes laugh in the whiskers of Death—it's good form to laugh then. But they don't tug on them until he says, "This is too much." The Germans do, their leaders make them, their Government encourages them all. And they've got away with a good deal in the short scales, but not in the long runs. I don't see how they can in the present long run. Especially since they're up against the fellows who just about invented the game, call it modern war or mountain-climbing.

That's why as a mountain climber I feel I'm not taking a risk, like a Nazi dodging an avalanche, but putting my foot on a firm rock when I say that the Germans are going to lose the war, the British and their Allies are going to win.

The Kremlin's propagandist weapon
for imperialism is pan-proletarianism

Soviet Imperialism Submerges Ukraine

By S. DAVIDOVICH

From the *Nineteenth Century and After*, London Independent Monthly

RUSSIA'S aim is expansion. Whether it is achieved by exploiting Pan-Slavism or pan-proletarianism makes little difference. As early as 1919 Lenin said that the return of Poland, Finland and the Baltic States to Russia could be only a matter of time. In 1921 Bolshevik ideologists referred to Western Ukraine as the bridge to World Revolution; subsequently the Fifth Congress of the Third International adopted a resolution which read: "The Ukrainian problem is one of the most important problems of Central Europe—a solution of which is necessary in the interest of proletarian revolutions in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and all the neighboring countries."

Thereupon the Bolsheviks set to work to insure that the solution of the Ukrainian problem should be accomplished in their own particular way. The Ukrainianization of Soviet Ukraine, started in 1923, was dictated as much by the needs of World Revolu-

tion as it was by the internal discontent in Ukraine. By this means the Central Government in Moscow hoped to gain approval and win sympathy in Western Ukraine. Communist agitators in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia spoke of Soviet Ukraine as an independent State which freely joined the Soviet Union. Knowing that national feeling ran high in Western Ukraine, they tried to exploit it to extend Soviet dominion toward the west. As late as the spring of this year the Bolsheviks organized numerous joyful processions along the Polish-Soviet frontier to show the "bliss and contentment" of the Ukrainians on the other side of the River Zbruch.

A most significant incident during the crisis of 1938 received little attention in Western Europe. When Poland put in her claim to the Polish minority under Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Government immediately dispatched a note to Warsaw threatening to advance a similar claim to White Rus-

sians and Ukrainians under Poland even though Moscow was fully aware that incorporation into the Soviet Union was the last thing that these peoples wanted.

Modern Russian imperialism has a much more powerful propaganda weapon in its hands than was at the disposal of pre-war Russian imperialists. This new weapon is pan-proletarianism and it is directed chiefly against the two largest imperial Powers of Europe, Great Britain and France.

For different reasons, Germany, too, is a candidate for the spoils of these two empires. In this respect her aims and those of the Soviet Union coincide. It is probable that Germany and Russia have decided that they would both benefit through coöperation.

This understanding may also be prompted by mutual knowledge that the antithesis between their systems is not so marked as between their systems and the democracies. Economically the two countries are complementary, since one has a highly developed industry and the other abounds in untapped supplies of raw materials. As long as they were at loggerheads a territorial barrier between them was useful; once they decided to coöperate such a barrier became a nuisance.

When the French delegates to the Peace Conference insisted that Poland must be made big and strong, they contemplated the creation of a formidable buffer between Russia and Germany. But they overlooked one thing; no amount of "padding" could increase Poland's inherent strength which depended upon her Polish population, her geographical position,

her economy and her social system.

The Polish ethnic element made up roughly 65 per cent. of the population of the new Polish State. To this were added some 6,000,000 Ukrainians, 1,000,000 White Russians and 750,000 Germans, none of whom made for any increase in the strength of the Polish State. The Government, therefore, had to spend much energy in striving to bring about consolidation. With internal friction and a comparatively small population, Poland could not withstand the pressure of two neighboring giants with a combined population of 240,000,000.

Her economy suffered from two defects: she lacked natural resources and she was industrially immature. Her geographical position was also weak. Squeezed in between her two neighbors, with no frontier which could afford her safe contact with the outside world in case of need, she was easily cut off at the crucial moment. Finally, the remains of a feudal social order caused resentment among the masses and hindered complete internal consolidation.

THE inability of the Czech and Polish States to withstand aggression has been demonstrated. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that a just order in Eastern and Central Europe cannot be insured by the reconstruction of those two States alone. This becomes more evident when we consider that Russia is now following closely in the imperial footsteps of Germany. A lasting and just reorganization of Europe must presuppose, therefore, that the victims of Russian aggression of twenty years ago will be placed on an equal

footing with the victims of German aggression during the last two years.

From among the ninety-odd million victims of twentieth-century Russian imperialism, the Ukrainians are the most important. Together with those who were under Poland, Russia has 42,000,000 Ukrainians under her rule. Morally, Russian aggression against Ukraine is as much a disregard of human rights as is German aggression against Czechoslovakia and Poland. From a political point of view, the liberation of Ukraine is of first-rate importance if Europe is to save itself from the menace of militant pseudo-philosophies known as ideologies. The truth of this statement can be substantiated in one sentence: Ukraine possesses all the prerequisites to become a formidable bulwark to Western ideals on the eastern flank of Europe.

Within her ethnographic borders she has a population of 52,000,000, of which 75 per cent. are Ukrainians, 9 per cent. are Russians, 6.6 per cent. are Jews, 5 per cent. are Poles and 4.4 per cent. are Germans, Rumanians, Tartars, etc. In addition there are over 3,000,000 Ukrainians scattered throughout European and Asiatic Russia with a large colony in the Amur valley. It is important to note that nowhere upon this compact ethnographic Ukrainian territory of 760,000 square kilometres do any of the non-Ukrainian elements form what might be called a territorial national minority. Generally speaking, the non-Ukrainian population is concentrated in the cities. Thus, according to Dr. V. Kubovich, who is a distinguished demographer and ethnologist, for every 1,000 urban dwellers in Ukraine, 409 are Ukrainians,

207 are Russians, 253 are Jews, 68 are Poles, and 63 are of other nationalities, while for every 1,000 rural dwellers there are 818 Ukrainians, 75 Russians, 22 Jews, 44 Poles and 41 others. Here is the first element of national strength: a large population and no territorial minority problems.

IN economic strength, and especially in natural resources, Ukraine compares favorably with any country in the world. She produces annually 60 million tons of coal, 13.8 million tons of iron ore, 1.5 million tons of petroleum, 6 million tons of pig iron, 5.3 million tons of steel, and 1.1 million tons of manganese ore. She is the world's fifth largest producer of hydro-electric energy and the fourth largest producer of sugar. She also produces a surplus of almost every food commodity. During the years 1929 to 1933 Ukraine produced annually 10.8 million tons of wheat or 7.8 per cent. of the world total, 3.5 million tons of maize or 3.2 per cent. of the world total, 19.1 million tons of potatoes or 9.7 per cent. of the world total, 7.8 million tons of rye or 16.6 per cent. of the world total, 4.8 million tons of barley or 11.7 per cent. of the world total and 3.6 million tons of oats or 5.6 per cent. of the world total.

Ukraine's geographical position, too, is much better than that of Poland. She has a coastline on the Black Sea of 1,800 kilometres—that is, 27 per cent. of her total frontier. Her frontier with Rumania is 900 kilometres in extent, with Hungary 100 kilometres, with Slovakia 200 kilometres, with Poland 650 kilometres, with White Russia 1,100

kilometres, with Russia 700 kilometres, with the Don Cossacks 1,100 kilometres and with the Caucasians and the Kalmuks 450 kilometres. Thus, only 10 per cent. of her 6,800-kilometre frontier is with a country territorially larger than she is.

If all the peoples subjugated by Russia were to gain independence, Ukraine would naturally become the leader of a powerful East European *bloc*. In that event Russia would again become Muscovia, as she was up to the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Ukraine's ancient rural culture has preserved her national identity in the face of several centuries of intensive attempts at Russification and Polanization. Certain misconceptions on this subject exist abroad and a word of explanation is in order. These misconceptions are a product of pre-war Russian information about the racial and political problems of Eastern Europe. This information was embodied in the so-called unity theory of the Russian nation according to which the Russians, the Ukrainians and the White Russians are but tribes of the Russian people. Later it was extended to include all Slav-speaking peoples, and we knew it under the name of Pan-Slavism. Thus the Russians, it seems, were the forerunners of present-day racialists in Germany. The propagation of this theory in the West has done untold harm to Ukrainian aspirations. Although scientific research during the last forty years has effectively refuted most of this Great Russian misrepresentation —so that even the Bolsheviks have now discarded it—it still persists in Western Europe, usually in the form

of journalistic philology and ethnography.

Extensive anthropometric research, carried on in Ukraine by F. K. Volkov of St. Petersburg University between 1903 and 1914 and later by several of his students, has served to define the Ukrainian racial type. Russian racial types were studied by Hrinewich, Chepurkovski, Anuchin, Erckert and others. They have shown that the Russians belong to the northern group, together with the Poles and White Russians, wherein the Eastern European racial element is dominant with a strong Nordic influence in the Northwest and an Ugro-Finnic influence in the East. Concerning the Ukrainians Volkov wrote:

The Ukrainians are a fairly uniform type; dark haired, dark eyed, taller than average or even tall, with a round skull, a round head, a narrow face, a straight and fairly narrow nose, and shorter than average upper limbs and longer than average lower limbs. If we compare Ukrainian anthropological peculiarities with those of other Slavonic peoples, we find that the Ukrainians are, undoubtedly, closely related to the Southern and Western Slavs, excluding the Poles, and they should be regarded as the so-called Dinaric type.

The same confusion was spread about the Ukrainian language until distinguished Slavonic philologists and the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences gave it as their authoritative opinion that no less than the Serbian, the Polish or the Czech language, it is an independent language.

BUT apart from anthropological characteristics, language, compact territory, common historical traditions and culture, the decisive factor which

marks one nation from another is the spiritual bond which provides a people with a common political ideal and common aspirations for the future. In the case of the Ukrainians the existence of this bond was amply demonstrated after the World War when they sacrificed everything within their means in a struggle against more formidable opponents to realize their common ideal in the form of an independent and united Ukraine.

Then, as now, aggressive mechanized force won. If present abuses of power are an unendurable travesty on the rights of man, then it logically follows that identical abuses, only slightly removed in time, fall within

the same category, morally speaking.

For various reasons Ukraine was not considered in the last post-War settlement. As a result the reconstructed Central European States were not in a position to resist German and Russian pressure. Had Ukraine been independent the *bloc* of new States—Czechoslovakia, Poland and Ukraine—would have consisted of about 90,000,000 people. Assuming there were no outstanding differences among them they would have been able to safeguard themselves against Germany and Russia.

This point should be borne in mind when Europe is ready for another peace conference.

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BOREDOM

By NALAN HSINTEH (1655-1685)

We can sing a different tune from the
"Song of Desolation"?
The wind is sighing!
The rain is sighing!
The roseate flower of the candle is
wearing itself out for another night!

I know not what is tangling up the
skein of my thought.
Sober, I am bored!
Drunk, I am bored!
Even dreams refuse to carry me
to the neighborhood of my love!

—From *T'ien Hsia*, Shanghai

Japanese manners as well as the war
anger natives and foreigners in China

Japan in China

By CHARLES NELSON SPINKS

From *Contemporary Japan*, Tokyo Political and Economic Monthly

INTELLIGENT Japanese from the late Prince Ito downward have frequently expressed apprehension over the undesirable characteristics of many Japanese who have been drawn to the Asiatic Continent. Since the beginning of Japan's modern contacts with the mainland, this problem, in one form or another, has plagued the most well-intended efforts to formulate and execute a constructive continental program that will insure the Island Empire's own security and at the same time preserve the goodwill of the mainland populations.

And herein seems to lie the very key to Japan's relations with her Western neighbors. In recent times, whether for good or for ill, the well-being of the Japanese islands has become dependent upon the Asiatic Continent, and this dependency has in turn given rise to a positive policy toward the mainland. The precise execution of such a positive policy has differed with time and place. In the case of Korea, outright annexation

was the formula, while the creation of a new state was undertaken in the case of Manchuria. The New Order for China is still in too nebulous a state to warrant definition, but it will presumably differ from the policy pursued in either Korea or Manchuria. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of all methods has been the enhancement of Japan's own insular security. The natural corollary to such an aim—in fact, an indispensable prerequisite to its attainment—is the preservation of the goodwill of the vast populations with which Japan must deal.

Various factors have combined to make this goodwill difficult to attain, and one of the more important obstacles in the way of its cultivation is the unsuitable character of too many of the Japanese with whom the mainland populations are brought into contact.

In modern times this problem first presented itself when Japan and Russia commenced their titanic duel for the mastery of Eastern Asia. When

the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 had temporarily assured Japan's paramountcy in Korea, a considerable number of Japanese moved into the peninsula. Most of them were industrious, hard-working individuals seeking to begin legitimate business enterprises which the obstructionist policies of Korea, fortified by Li Hung-chang's malignant influence at the Court of Seoul, had made impossible. But along with these worthy settlers there also moved a stream of less desirable migrants, those unscrupulous adventurers bent upon exploiting the Korean populace and determined to pursue an unwholesome role in the political affairs of the country. As a result, Japan's best intentions to improve the decadent kingdom were sadly compromised.

THE Japanese *soshi*, or ruffian, was one of those unfortunate by-products from the sudden collapse of a stratified feudal society in the middle of the last century. The unprincipled activities of these individuals in Japan had frequently given the more enlightened leaders of the country cause for alarm. They managed, however, to achieve a definite place in the rough-and-tumble of Japanese domestic politics in the closing decades of the century and were sometimes engaged by unscrupulous politicians as irregular "storm troopers" during the frequent political affrays which accompanied the attempt to adopt a parliamentary form of government. Japanese expansion into Korea unfortunately provided these *soshi* and their kindred spirits with a new field in which to exercise their peculiar talents. In 1896 a group of them was responsible for the assault upon the palace in Seoul,

and the King immediately fled for his life to the welcome doors of the Russian Legation where he remained a political refugee in his own country. While thus enjoying his hosts' carefully devised hospitality during this period of veiled detention, he was prevailed upon to grant a number of important concessions to Russian interests of such a political nature that they constituted a far more serious threat to Japan's position than the former machinations of Li Hung-chang. And for this compromising affair, Japan could only thank her own truculent adventurers. It was such incidents as this which later led Prince Ito to remark that the *soshi* gave him more cause for concern than the Koreans themselves. In fact, one of the forces contributing to Japan's decision to annex the peninsula in 1910 was the necessity to bring these troublesome adventurers under control.

Happily, the nineteenth-century *soshi* have disappeared from the Japanese scene, but the heirs of these political incendiaries are to be found today on the Continent of Asia still pursuing their deplorable calling. They and their activities now constitute the most serious threat to the successful establishment of any kind of new order in China. Their presence and depredations keep alive memories of the destruction and bloodshed invariably occasioned with armed conflict of any kind, thereby instilling into the Chinese mind a lasting conviction that all Japanese are as arrogant as these misrepresentatives.

Visitors to the occupied areas of China, Japanese and foreigners alike, bring back discouraging reports of these irresponsible trouble-makers.

There is no need to recount the sordid details of their activities here, for they need no further publicity, but it might be in order to examine the causes of this unpleasant phenomenon and see if there are any opportunities for its correction.

At home in Japan, the Japanese people have acquired a world-wide and well-earned reputation for politeness, congeniality, kindness, honesty and hospitality. Even in most of the countries of the West to which Japanese of all classes have emigrated, their good-mannered, law-abiding qualities have survived the most vigorous campaigns of vilification on the part of Asiatic exclusionists. But if we turn to Japanese-occupied China, the region with which Japan's future is most intimately associated, we find that these admirable people have undergone a sad transformation. Many representatives of the same racial stock which display such worthy qualities in Japan and elsewhere have undergone a deplorable retrogression, and with these newly acquired characteristics so conspicuously absent in Japan, there must be some factor operating in the continental environment that is responsible for this undesirable mutation.

In present-day China, Japan faces a vast population which no amount of immigration from the islands will ever submerge. This population will survive the present vicissitudes and also remember the lamentable features of this initial contact. Moreover, there are in China today a large number of other peoples who in witnessing the less favorable aspects of Japanese penetration will carry away a damaging impression of Japan. Thus, for every foreigner who has experienced

the favorable aspects of the Japanese in Japan, there will be a dozen or more who are learning only of the unfavorable aspects of the Japanese in China and thereby reaching the conclusion that the people of the homeland are as undesirable as the specimens they have come to know and to dislike on the Continent.

There are, to be sure, many Japanese on the Continent who do not conform to this disfiguring pattern. For some, the continental environment has produced beneficial changes, lifting the individual from a narrow provincialism and broadening his outlook generally. He finds in the Chinese a fellow Asiatic who is nevertheless different from himself and this difference does not necessarily denote inferior qualities. There are many Japanese both in official and unofficial capacities who show such reactions and their activity tends to mitigate the follies of their less worthy countrymen. And as far as the material trappings of modern imperialism go, Japan's record can stand favorable comparison with other countries. But the success of any ambitious program like the one now being formulated toward the Continent, depends less upon the efficiency of administrative planning in the higher brackets and the construction of material accessories than upon the everyday associations which the people experience with the Japanese with whom they come into contact. Herein lies Japan's great handicap at the present moment. From the petty official to the ordinary civilian, these everyday contacts are too apt to be marred by that unreasoned display of arrogance that has possessed not a few of Japan's migrants to the mainland.

WASHINGTON LETTER

By RAY TUCKER

THE Republican Presidential campaign has now arrived at the stage akin to the post-midnight hour when the sweaty hands begin to unload the circus trains in a new town. The sleepy-eyed boys—candidates, to the uninitiated—are staring at the dignified debarking of the elephants, and wishing out their hearts that they could ride 'em in the June parade. Meanwhile, they scheme to sneak beneath the big tent or to snake a free pass by carrying water for the lumbering and coquettish animal which is supposed to symbolize the so-called Grand Old Party.

The reasons for this animal-act so far in advance of the scheduled billing of the Big Show are obvious. For the first time since 1924 the Republican Convention will not be a cut-and-dried affair; there are no men of destiny this year, as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover and Alf Landon were months before the assemblage of the delegates. Almost everybody has a chance at an appearance in the main ring, or thinks he has. Therefore the pre-Convention campaign has begun both earlier and more evangelistically than in many years. It presents a fascinating, close-up spectacle of how ambitious men—and their clamorous, climbing associates—set out to become President of the United States.

The three avowed and announced candidates—Messrs. Dewey, Taft and Bridges—have already set up

their tents on the political lot. They have chosen their campaign managers, publicized their Presidential platforms, hired a field force to talk them up among the politicos throughout the country, engaged publicity men and set staffs of researchers to work. They are issuing statements and soapboxing the countryside. They have made contacts with influential politicians in various States, and are trying actively to line up delegates. Their technique—the men and the methods which they employ—is worthy of detailed study for the light it throws on the great American game of being nominated and elected the head man of the land.

Although Senator Taft, Senator Bridges and Prosecutor Dewey monopolize the three biggest rings for the moment, there is a sideshow of fellow-performers who, for reasons of their own, prefer to conceal their real intentions. In this category fall such men as Herbert Hoover, Alf Landon, Senator "Charley" McNary, Republican House Leader "Joe" Martin, Governors James of Pennsylvania and Bricker of Ohio. All of them would like the nomination—who wouldn't?—but they think it wiser to adopt the coy rule that the office should seek the man which, of course, it never does. Their Presidential efforts, since they represent a more or less conventional class of candidates, are also deserving of discussion.

First, in this laboratory examina-

tion of how possible Presidents are created, let us consider Senator Taft. Why did he get the Presidential bug, and what means is he taking to satisfy the itch? Well, "Bob" carried the key State of Ohio, and his father was a President. He is the most reactionary Republican in the race, and, in view of political indications that the populace is shifting rightward, he believes that he is the man of the hour. But his problem is to convince the politicians and the people. It should be noted here that all his rivals are motivated by the same ambitions, and are resorting to the same technique.

Mr. Taft's campaign manager is David S. Ingalls, a wealthy, likable chap who served as Assistant Secretary of Navy under Mr. Hoover. He has headquarters at Cleveland but, if his man wins, "Dave" expects to move to Washington and become Secretary of the Navy. For the extremely practical assignment of rounding up Southern delegates, Mr. Taft has engaged John Marshall of West Virginia, former Assistant Attorney General in the Hoover regime. A personable, politically astute fellow, John knows all the tricks and wiles of collecting careless nominators from below the Mason and Dixon Line. To reinforce John's efforts, the Taft people have established contact with the bulky, good-natured Perry Howard, the colored National Committeeman from Mississippi. What delegates John misses, Perry will pick up.

Mr. Taft—it's the usual pattern—also has a journalistic establishment and a field force. His publicity and research agent is Kendall King Hoyt, ex-engineer and Washington correspondent for numerous financial and industrial magazines and newspapers.

The association probably explains why the Senator's first attack on the New Deal was devoted to the unbalanced budget. Like his candidate, Mr. Hoyt is a solemn and serious fellow, which probably explains why Mr. Taft's speeches make dull reading.

On the road, dropping into the political clubhouses and "gassing" with the politicians wherever he can meet up with them, the Taft people have the great-bodied and genial A. K. Barta. "Bart," as he is known on Capitol Hill and in the tap-room of the National Press Club, was for years associated with the House Appropriations Committee. He has also served as inside political man for the Republican National Committee, and is therefore widely acquainted with the political crowd. So he is roaming the hinterland, and telling the boys and girls that Senator Robert A. Taft—no other—will make the greatest of all Presidents.

She doesn't travel, but she does write letters and talk to Capitol Hill visitors, and she is, perhaps, Mr. Taft's finest political asset—namely. Mildred Reeves, for years secretary to "Nick" Longworth and the smartest unofficial politician on Capitol Hill.

Now—though it's a sordid subject—let's consider the matter of money. Surprising as it may seem, a man who wants to become President doesn't need a lot of cash. Mr. Taft relies on the fortune that was left to him, on the millionairish "Dave" Ingalls and ex-Representative John Hollister of Cincinnati, who would become Postmaster-General or National Chairman if Mr. Taft were really elected. When Jim Farley started out to sell Franklin D. Roosevelt to the American people in early 1932,

he had only \$30,000 in his wallet—composed of equal parts and contributions by Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, Jesse Straus and Henry Morgenthau Sr. Believe it or not, Presidential nominations—and Presidents—come relatively cheap.

MR. DEWEY has an even more elaborate establishment than Senator Taft. Tom's financial and political backers include Ruth Hanna Simms McCormick and A. T. Vanderbilt, former president of the American Bar Association. Certain Wall Street gentry who don't think he is as radical as he paints himself to be are also putting up some coin. For an economic and publicity adviser he has hired Elliott V. Bell of the *New York Times*—as quiet and as established a newspaper as, in essence, Mr. Dewey is a candidate. Tom has also assembled a "brains trust" including ex-Diplomat John Foster Dulles, Mrs. McCormick, Col. Theodore Roosevelt and ex-Assistant U. S. Attorney General Charles P. Sisson, which makes FDR's 1932 intellectual family look like an assortment of amoebas.

Tom's actual campaign manager is J. Russel Sprague, Republican leader of Nassau County in Long Island. But Tom is going to make a great play for the ladies' vote. Mrs. McCormick, for instance, almost fell into hysterics after her first conference with the young prosecutor. "You know," she said, "he didn't ask me to become head of his woman's committee. He asked me to be a co-manager of his whole campaign." And co-manager, with her well-lined wallet wide open, she has become.

Now, though he has no chance for the nomination—and privately admits

it—let us consider H. Styles Bridges' political ménage. For a man going nowhere, it is rather extensive. His campaign manager is the brilliant and popular Congressman Charles Hawks of Wisconsin. His financial backers, besides a few close friends who like his frontal assault on the New Deal, are Edmund Converse of the Bankers Trust Converses and Palmer Beaudette of the Michigan automobile-makers' dynasty. Both "Ed" and "Palmer," as youngsters disgusted with business and the law, seek to establish themselves in politics, and Mr. Bridges impresses them as a good, solid foundation on which to build.

Mr. Bridges also has a secretarial, research and journalistic staff—perhaps the best of all. His researchers are the comely Miss Mollie Clinton, a former teacher at Barnard College, and a smart New Hampshire lawyer named Richard Auerbach. They dig up at the Senate or the Congressional libraries the stuff for his speeches. His ace publicist is a handsome, mustachioed Georgian named Carlisle Bergeron, whose racy, caustic style explains why Styles hogs the headlines beyond his fundamental deserts.

The other candidates — Messrs. Hoover, Martin, McNary, Bricker and James—have not erected such extensive and expansive ménages as the trio aforementioned. For one thing, they think it more discreet to play a coy and waiting game.

Although it isn't a betting proposition yet, the men who are hanging back, politically, financially and journalistically, seem to have a better chance for the nomination than the youngsters who got up before midnight to help the Republican circus unload.

Many vestiges of Eastern invaders
remain among Magyars after 1500 years

Legacies of Asia

By ÁKOS SZENDREY

From the *Hungarian Quarterly*

THE name "Hungarus" as a designation for the Magyar people reaches back about fifteen hundred years. The western branch of the Turkish race, which advanced first to the slopes of the Ural Mountains and later to the banks of the Volga, was known to its neighbors under the name of Ogur; later on, ten Ogur tribes united to form a people which lived by hunting wild animals for their fur and which in the fifth century B. C. came to be known as Onogurs. But Ibn Dasta and Constantinus Porphyrogenetos write of them under the name of Magyar, which was that of one of the ten tribes. More than one eastern stream and hill bears to this day the name of Madzar, thus preserving the memory of our people's sojourn in its vicinity; and the Karacaj Turks who live in the Valley of the Elburz still cherish a tradition that they are the descendants of a powerful people named Magyar which once used to rule there. The Central Asiatic origin of our

people is thus historically attested; and it is hardly surprising that we should find many traces of this origin in our folk-lore and in popular usage.

There is, for one thing, the richness of our food; the abundance of fat, cream and strong spices and seasonings such as paprika, pepper, onions, saffron, tarragon, caraway seed, dill and ginger. Soup to our people is not so much the preliminary to a meal as an important course in itself. There is no repast without it, and at country weddings four or five different kinds are served. A typical soup is a meat and vegetable broth in which small squares of nouilles paste filled with minced meat have been cooked. Our way of preparing vegetables with paprika and cream to a thick and musky liquid enriched by pieces of boiled meat also derives from the east. Millet, prepared with chunks of beef or mutton and seasoned with paprika and cream is a highly prized dish reminiscent of the ancestral *pilaf*. The same meat pre-

pared with onions and much fat but without the millet or rice is called *tokány*—the Turks call it *tokan*: it is an indispensable adjunct to funeral wakes, harvest and vintage feasts, or the ceremonious sealing of a contract of sale. The *gulyás*, or goulash, as it is called abroad, is also an eastern reminiscence; it consists of little lumps of meat cooked with paprika and, latterly, with potatoes. Its Central Asiatic equivalent is the *torama*. Slices of bacon roasted at an open fire and allowed to drip onto a piece of bread covered with onions is a reminder of the ancient nomadic life of the steppe. Slices of meat are often roasted in the same way, after being larded with strips of bacon. Then there is the highly seasoned fish soup, very hot and pink with paprika, generally followed by the fisherman's favorite *turós-csusza*, a dish of very fine nouilles mixed with cottage cheese and thickly sprinkled with bits of fried bacon. A dish which is a combined soup, meat and vegetable course is made of stuffed cabbage—the Turks call it *sarma*. The pickled cabbage leaves are filled with minced pork and rice and cooked in their own liquid, with an abundant admixture of sour cream.

IT IS not possible, of course, to trace such Asiatic memories in every aspect of Hungarian life; a thousand years of Christianity and the influence of western neighbors have obliterated many oriental traits. In the days before the Magyars left Asia Turkish women were not as secluded as they became later under Mohammedanism. The nomadic, pastoral tent-dweller cannot keep his women-folk shut up in harems. Among the

Bashkirs and Chavasses the women participate in all social functions, and feasts and reunions are as unthinkable without them as they are without the Magyar women. Like the Magyar villages, they have their games and pastimes, and their spinning-bees combined with dancing, at which the young folk meet each other. Even the contests between the young men are the same among these Asiatic people as among present-day Magyar country folk. Here, as there, there are horse races, on horses bred and trained by the youths themselves, which decide who is to be the first in the village for the next twelve months. Another such contest is the Whitsuntide bull drive; the youth who can grasp the horns of a rushing bull and pin him down so that he cannot move, carries off the palm. Even the "girl markets" we meet with in certain regions of Hungary have their parallel on the borders of the Volga, in the Turkish *Djüyün*. On a certain holiday of the summer working season, all the girls of the neighboring countryside flock to the market-place of one of the bigger villages, already set with booths in which ginger-bread, honey-cakes, ribbons and cooling drinks are sold. In this way the young folk meet, walk about and dance together, and the outcome, more often than not, is a crop of weddings. The same thing happens in Central Asia, among those tribes in which the young are free to choose their own mates, untrammeled by the will of their elders.

Not everywhere in Hungary are the young accorded this freedom, even though child betrothals and marriages have gone out of fashion among the Magyar peasantry. Often the parents, led by material considera-

tions, arrange marriages over the heads of their children. In such cases the go-between is generally an old woman designated as the "whisperer"—among the Turks she is called "envoy of love."

TODAY there are only vestiges left of the ancient custom of abduction which is still practised in Central Asia and which prevailed in Hungary up to a few centuries ago. The Crimean Tartars put up barriers in the road to obstruct the passage of those who come to fetch the bride; in Hungary, a cord of straw is hung across the gate and only after lengthy bargaining are the bridegroom's people allowed to enter the house. The wedding procession is accompanied by young men on horseback, who try to seize the bride, while the "bridesmen" cluster round her to prevent it. The bride, on leaving the church, starts to run, but is brought back by the groom's men, and so forth.

But the abduction of the bride was only one form, and a sporadic one, of the current forms of marriage. The loss of a girl meant a worker less in the family, a circumstance which naturally led to the custom of compensating the parents. In Central Asia this custom, named *kalim*, still prevails; it became obsolete in Hungary after the introduction of Christianity; it is, on the contrary, the bride who takes with her to her husband's house such property as is hers by right.

The wedding customs are either ceremonies emblematic of the fact of union, or symbolic gestures signifying the reception of the bride into the new family communion. Some, like the taking of a joint repast, recur several times during the various phases of the

marriage ceremony. In some districts, acceptance of a young man's suit is signified by the girl's repairing, armed with a bottle of wine and some poppy-seed cake, to the stable where he has his berth and eating and drinking with him in amicable converse. Later, at the plighting of the troth, as well as at the wedding supper, they eat out of the same plate and drink from the same glass. The idea of union is further symbolized by the surreptitious sewing together of their clothes, or by tying them arm to arm as they sit side by side. The same idea finds expression when the young couple, having arrived at the husband's house, are made to sit at a table while the members of his family link hands and dance around them three times.

Many of the wedding customs aim at keeping evil spirits away. Already during the plighting of the troth the house is filled with the boy and girl friends of the young couple and with half-grown youngsters who crack whips, ring cow-bells, and make as great a din as they can with old saucepans and saucepan lids. In some regions this is repeated when the bride and bridegroom go to the church, and again when the bride's bed is being carried to her new home and when she herself enters her husband's house, but by then the noise is modified to singing, recitation and dancing. A device for misleading evil spirits and thus rendering them harmless is a frequent change of apparel on the part of the bride; on the day of the wedding she changes her dress before each of her acts; indeed, during the after-supper dance she sometimes changes five times in succession. Nowadays there may be something of ostentation in this; but if we remember

that in the east this change is sometimes effected by a mere substitution of one set of ribbons or necklace for another, and that in the case of a change of dress that dress is not always particularly fine or showy, it will become evident that the custom is simply a survival of the ancient belief that a frequent change of attire will prevent evil spirits from recognizing the new member of the family.

There is a strong similarity also in the customs surrounding child-birth. In Hungary, as in the east, a pregnant woman seeks to guard herself against evil influences by wearing amulets attached round her neck by a red string. Another custom we have in common is that of putting a coin in the bath of the new-born child and then throwing it at the father's feet, who by lifting it up acknowledges the child as his own. In some Hungarian districts the father snatches the new-born child from its cradle and hurrying to the stable places it on the back of a horse. Among the nomadic Turks the ceremony of the first horse-ride takes place when the child is three years old. With us, the baby's name is only kept secret until its baptism, contemptuous epithets being applied to it meanwhile such as little no-account, little bit of refuse, insect, vermin or such, in order to avoid awakening the jealousy of the evil one. Our Asiatic cousins, on the other hand, sometimes defer the name-giving festival until the child is a year old. Here, as there, the festival held on the day of the child's birth is attended exclusively by women. In Hungary it is enlivened by the midwife, who, sitting astride on a broomstick, dances the Witch's Dance with mincing, affected movements, to the delectation of the company. At

the real christening, the nomadic peoples' name-giving festival, the male relatives are also present. On this occasion Central Asiatic women stick a sword into the ground by the side of the bed; with us, a knife and fork replace the sword.

For the rest, in this field, more than in any other, Christianity has largely obliterated the resemblances; on the other hand, there is a quite extraordinary similarity in the field of funeral rites and customs, although, with us, it is restricted to the more primitive shepherd folk and such of the peasantry as live removed from urban influences.

This similarity of customs and beliefs can also be traced in the agricultural and religious life of the two peoples. The agricultural feasts are survivals of the ancient sacrifices, the Christian and Mohammedan priests filling the role of the old Shamans. Such a festival is that of the renewal of produce. Our Asiatic kinsfolk have three kinds of this—the festival of the new bread, that of the new beer, and that of the slaughtering of the full-grown oxen. Magyar parallels are the harvest and vintage festivals and the pig-slaughtering feast. The procedure is more or less the same at each: eating and drinking, dancing and games; and the Hungarian priest or clergyman is sent a portion of the slaughtered pig "for tasting," much as the Turkish mullah is offered some of the beef before it is stored for winter use.

IN THE supernatural world we find the Turkish peris paralleled by the Magyar fairies. Both peris and fairies are beneficent spirits ruled by a Queen and carrying on a blissful existence on the back of a hen or, in our case, in

a palace revolving on duck's feet. Their opposites are the Turkish djinns, our evil spirits. These are of various sorts, with different functions and different powers. They dwell, for the most part, in old ruins, wooded hills, rocky caves, streams, lakes and wells, and their activities include frightening travellers, drawing them down into the water's depths, saddling men with physical and mental ills, sitting on the chests of sleepers, or changing infants in their cradles. By way of guarding against this latter danger, mothers tie red ribbons on their children's cradles, place brooms by their beds or hang thorny branches over their doorways; other devices for keeping the evil one away and warding off disaster are to stick horses' skulls on the gate-post or fence, toll cow-bells, beat drums and fire shots in the air. If disaster nevertheless occurs, the smoke of strong-smelling herbs is held to be efficacious in remedying matters and driving the evil spirit away. The nomadic Turks symbolize the spirit of the house by a thick pole, strangely wrought or carved in human shape, which they set up in front of their tent in order to pray there; the richly carved and painted gate-posts of Hungarian peasant homesteads are a survival of this ancient idol worship; a similar survival was the carved pillar which not so long ago was to be found, in certain districts, in the center of each room, supporting the middle rafter of the ceiling. It went by the name of "Blessed Mother"; family prayers were said in its shade, and also well-earned castigation meted out to the young.

The old Shaman method of healing with fife and drum is no more

than a memory with us; but the nomadic Turks still use music, singing and the rattle of drums to exorcise the spirit of sickness. Healing by breathing on the sick person is now no more than a ritual accompaniment of spell-casting with us; but among the inscriptions on the talismans and amulets which are worn in little bags to guard against sickness or to cure it, there are some which still bear the traces of the ancient ancestral faith. These witching-women are, as a rule, soothsayers as well. With us, as with our Asiatic cousins, the practice prevails of pouring molten lead into water above the patient's head in order to discover, from the pattern it forms, the identity of the person who has cast the evil spell; this done, he or she can be compelled by various charms such as stealing some piece of his clothing and then beating it, or letting smoke blow over his footprints, to lift the spell.

There are many common survivals of the fire-worship of the ancients. The fire is fed with pinches of salt and handfuls of flour, while at the beginning of every feast a morsel of food is flung into it. It is an offence to spit or throw refuse into it, or even to turn one's back on it. It is supposed to drive away evil; consequently, on the days when evil spirits are supposed to be about, bonfires are lit in the yards. Mountain shepherds still keep the snake and bear festivals in the spring and the wolf festivals in winter, when they light huge bonfires in order that their cattle may be exempt from harm. Great faith is placed in the purifying power of fire.

There are also traces, here and there, of the old water worship. No fisherman will ever spit or throw litter

into the water. No oath must escape him while he is in a boat on river or lake; should he forget himself so far as to swear or, worse still, abuse the water, his companions throw him face downward and trounce him soundly with their oars. When water is drawn, a little is always poured back; just as a few drops are spilt on the ground before anyone drinks from a jug. And in early spring the water, like the fire, is fed with a pinch of salt and a handful of flour.

There is hardly any trace left of the ancient sun-worship; but the moon is still the center of a superstitious reverence. Spells and incantations are generally addressed to it, for it is still held to be the bringer as well as the remover of sickness. The Sunday and Friday of the new moon are thought to be particularly propitious for prayer and healing. We learn from old records that in the sixteenth century, at the beginning of the Turkish domination, the villagers would repair, on the Sunday of the new moon, to an old lime tree outside the village and pray there, and that the Turkish soldiers would join in this prayer. In the *Alföld*, the Great Plain, it was no rare thing even as late as the first decades of the present century to see a father and his children kneeling and praying with their faces turned toward the new moon, like the Central Asiatic nomads.

IT MIGHT be thought that these common characteristics are survivals of the hundred and fifty years of Turkish rule rather than fragmentary reminiscences of a common Asi-

atic past 800 years ago. But undeniable as it is that the long Turkish domination must have revived many old memories and customs, there are reasons against attaching too great importance to this. A considerable portion of the Turkish army consisted of renegades collected from various quarters of the empire, adventurers without any traditions behind them. The rest were recruited from remote regions with which the ancient Magyars had never been in touch. Only an infinitesimal proportion of the invaders could have established contact with the Magyar inhabitants on the strength of a common fund of ancestral traditions.

Linguistic difficulties, no less than the transitory character imposed on all contacts by the frequent changing of the investing troops and the chances of warfare, precluded any deep-going influence of the Turks on the Magyar population. The Turkish officials quartered on the Hungarian village lived so secluded a domestic life, and their numbers were comparatively so few, that their effect on the life of the rural population was of the slightest. Only in the towns and among the petty nobility was there a faint trace of Turkish influence discernible, in apparel and the ceremonial of the table, but it was so fleeting that no vestiges of it have survived. Thus it is safe to say that the customs and usages which distinguish the life of the Magyar peasantry from that of other European countries and which accord with those of the present-day Turks, are all survivals of a common Asiatic past.

Letters and the Arts

By CHARLES ANGOFF

CHINESE literature, it seems, in modern times has run a course parallel to the political evolution of the country, and during the past two decades, according to Cicio Mar, it has been enormously more colorful than in "the whole of the past three thousand years." Almost up to the beginning of the present century, Chinese society was largely feudal, which resulted in a literary culture that in the main was the plaything of the aristocratic classes, far removed from the travails and yearnings of the common man. Even its *Wen Yan* language remained almost completely unknown to the man in the street. "China has never produced a James Watt and consequently no Charles Dickens."

The founding of the Republic, however, wrought a momentous change. The common people, almost overnight, became important as literary material, and for the first time their everyday speech assumed the dignity of respectable print. Other changes followed rapidly thereafter. As Mr. Mar says in his article on the subject in *Literature*: "A democracy best suited the needs of the newly risen middle class, and so democracy became the main subject of polemics. Science and reason were subjects of daily discussion. Young people began to talk of love and marriage—a thing which for centuries had been ordered by their parents. And intellectuals began to doubt filial piety as laid down by Confucius. Ibsen was a favorite author."

The writings of Europe at long last began to take hold of the Chinese, who naturally found the occidental literature of "tears and blood" most to their liking at first. They tried to imitate Chekoff, Dostoevsky, Andreyev, Flaubert, de Maupassant,

Stendahl, Strindberg, Hamsun and the Hungarian Mor Jokai. As a result of the inroads of Russian communism, "Plekhanov became the most influential foreign critic." A League of Left-Wing Writers, apparently similar to the League of American Writers, sprang up in 1930. The League laid down three principles:

1. Vigorous attack upon the old politico-economic order;
2. Spreading of the ideology of "the new society"; and
3. The setting up of a "new criticism."

This did not mean that only "proletarian" writings won respect. The Chinese tried hard to bring the ancient lyricism of their literary culture up-to-date, but their efforts met a severe shock in the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in 1932. It became plain that "the never satiable Japanese militarists . . . wanted to convert the whole of China into a second Korea," and the Chinese writers therefore decided that their most important immediate task was to produce a "national defense literature." In Hankow, on April 27, 1937, a mass meeting of novelists, essayists, playwrights, poets and village story-tellers was held, at which it was resolved to pool efforts to fight in behalf of "the common cause," the freedom of the nation from Japanese and all other aggression. Thus came into being the Federation of Chinese Writers, "the greatest organization China has ever had in the whole of her literary history." Its headquarters are in Chungking, and it has branches in every major city of the country.

THE poet Wordsworth was long in finding favor in the United States. His insistence upon common speech in

verse did not rest pleasantly upon Brahmin ears in the first two decades of the last century, though shortly afterward his theory of diction won the approval even of the *North American Review*. It was maintained, however—as it still is, in many quarters—that for thirty years after 1820 his poetry “dwindled into a harmless metrical diversion.” In *The Nineteenth Century*, Mr. Benjamin Gilbert Brooks offers a vigorous and persuasive rebuttal to this conventional point of view. He attempts to show this “harmless metrical diversion” as “revealing poetic power at least as great as that of Thomson, Cowper, Tennyson or Browning.”

The present World War, like the preceding one, has already brought forth a reappraisal of Heinrich Heine, with a view to showing that a nation which can produce so magnificent a lyricist and democratic journalist can be trusted in the long run to clear itself of Hitlers and Görings. An able appreciation of the author of *The Lorelei*, from the pen of Walter A. Berendsohn, appears in the *Contemporary Review*. “Wherever the most elementary rights of humanity are threatened,” says Mr. Berendsohn, “his words resume their old militant ring, their warning, inspiring power. His political poetry proves as imperishable as his love lyrics.” Heine was not merely a supreme propagandist for German culture. He outgrew “Judaism and Teutonism and became a good European and world-citizen.”

IN England the censorship is not yet working too stringently, but a well-recognized form of anti-German propaganda seems to be in full force. An editorial in *The Listener*, organ of Broadcasting House, argues that to say that the Germans are “as pacific as ourselves . . . is a little too naïve.” The truth about the Germans is this: “There is a virile longing to dominate others and an unvirile longing to be severely ruled oneself; there is a profound love of abstractness and the metaphysical, coupled with extraordinary

precision and power of organization in practical matters; . . . and side by side with this ‘mania for greatness,’ this spiritual elephantiasis, there is a strange tendency to hysteria.” Wagner “sublimated” both the hysteria and the mania for greatness. Hitler likes Wagner. Now you know why.

D. M. Garman, of the English publishing firm of Lawrence and Wishart, reports that the war has already done considerable damage to the stability and integrity of the French book-trade. The number of titles has been cut by about a third, and, in addition the censorship has struck heavily in the direction of the writings of Thorez, Stalin, Lenin, Sholokov, Gorki, Jack London and Michael Gold. Gorki’s *The Mother* and Gold’s *Jews Without Money* apparently injure the morale of the French people.

The first major casualty of the Second World War in the English magazine field was the suspension, with the December 1939 issue, of *The Cornhill Magazine*. Founded in 1860 by George Smith with Thackeray as its first editor, it wielded great influence in English literary life, leaving behind now no magazine of quite the same distinction. Among its contributors during the past eighty years were Tennyson, Browning, Matthew Arnold, Trollope, Meredith, Hardy, Henry James, Blackmore, R. L. Stevenson, Lever and W. E. Henley. Rudyard Kipling once called it the best magazine in the world.

In the last issue, unfortunately not a very bright one, the proprietors ascribe the suspension to “rises in the cost of production and paper, increased difficulty in maintaining advertisement revenue, and improved facilities for reading in club and public library (with perhaps the additional glow of legitimate economy in thus avoiding the call to buy).” In an afterword, the present editor, Lord Gorell, successor in the same office to Leslie Stephen and James Payn, takes polite leave of his public, and in passing delivers a scorching onslaught upon the Chamberlain Government’s “wild-

er curiosities of bureaucracy," apparently referring to the wartime restrictions. "At times, contemplating our governors," he says, "we do not seem far removed from the day when, with a cynicism that perhaps has now proved abundantly justified, Lord Milner remarked to me shortly after the close of hostilities in 1918, that he thought the time had gone by for appointing people to jobs because they had any special qualifications for them."

The excellent English music critic, W. J. Turner, writing in *The New Statesman and Nation*, bemoans the sterility of contemporary Russian music. Commenting upon the latest symphony of Shostakovitch, he finds it thin, sentimental, poor Tschaikowski and feeble Richard Strauss. "If this symphony had been composed by William Walton, I should have said that this composer had gone completely to seed."

Mr. Turner wonders why so much state subsidy of music in Russia has produced so little of quality. He approves state aid to musicians and thinks that the so-called democracies will have to do likewise.

"If Russia, however, is not fulfilling hopes founded upon its more enlightened attitude in this respect, I suggest that possibly it may be due to its self-imposed iso-

lation. The great periods of artistic creativeness have usually followed an interchange between different cultures."

THE United States can hardly boast greater creativeness in music than Russia, and most American interpreters betray either a strange narrowness of appreciation of the literature of their art, or sheer ignorance. Arthur Loesser, the Middle-Western pianist and critic, forms a pleasant exception to this generalization. At a recent piano recital in Town Hall, in New York, he surprised his audience by his refusal to play a single piece by Chopin. Not that Chopin made inferior music. But he had predecessors and contemporaries of equal and higher achievements—Scarlatti, Haydn and Schumann, to mention only three. Mr. Loesser played three sonatas of Scarlatti (in Alessandro Longo's edition) with rare understanding. He also performed a grand gigue by J. W. Haessler, a contemporary of Mozart and Beethoven, whose memory deserves greater recognition from our interpreters than he has hitherto enjoyed. For an encore Mr. Loesser played Nahant Waltz, a charming trifle by James Hewitt, an early-American composer.

Speaking of Books

By LEON BRYCE BLOCH

THE disintegration of political and social systems throughout the world today is brought home forcibly in Mr. T. S. Eliot's book, *The Idea of a Christian Society*. This opus does not deal with that disintegration directly, as did Dr. Beard in his article which appeared in the January issue of *The Living Age*, but rather by inference.

Mr. Eliot is concerned with what is to replace nineteenth-century liberalism and democracy which are falling apart at the seams. He sees the world faced by only three alternatives at this crossroads: a further disintegration into complete negativism, totalitarianism, or a Christian social system. And he does not mean by Christian social system anything we now know or have known in the past. This system is not churchism, it is not individual Christian morality nor is it an artificially imposed ideology—nothing of the sort.

What Mr. Eliot projects is a political system based on a Christian mores. In America, he says, the Christian mores has survived in spite of all of the practical difficulties created by economic, political and social structures that are anything from pagan to neo-Christian. The worst enemy of a Christian society, he says, is not an anti-Christian attitude but rather an attitude of tolerance toward Christianity. In this regard read Mr. Eliot:

"When a Christian is treated as an

enemy of the State, his course is very much harder, but it is simpler. I am concerned with the dangers to the tolerated minority; and in the modern world, it may turn out that the most intolerable thing for a Christian is to be tolerated. And for the Christian who is not conscious of this dilemma—and he is in the majority—he is becoming more and more de-Christianized by all sorts of unconscious pressure: paganism holds all the most valuable advertising space."

Mr. Eliot sees in our negative democracy the danger of sinking into a "totalitarian democracy," which will be different in form but not in substance from the governments of Germany and Russia. Italy is a special case, he thinks, a kind of bastard totalitarianism. But the form is not important to Mr. Eliot; what is important is the effect of a society on the cultural, spiritual and social fibre of a people.

SPAKING of the "Western Democracies" he says:

"We might of course sink into an apathetic decline; without faith in ourselves; without a philosophy of life, either Christian or pagan; and without art. Or we might get a 'totalitarian democracy' . . . a state of affairs in which we shall have regimentation and conformity, without respect for the needs of the individual soul; the puritanism of a hygienic morality in the interests of efficiency . . ." The

converse "involves at least discipline, inconvenience and discomfort: but here as hereafter the alternative to hell is purgatory."

Although Dr. Beard approaches the same problem from a different quarter, these two men seem to me to be in agreement on the nature of the problem. Mr. Eliot, like Dr. Beard, expects the appearance of a great human being who will vitalize his principles.

But Mr. Eliot goes further than Dr. Beard in that he has provided, in *The Idea of a Christian Society* the foundations of a new system, foundations ready and waiting for the man of affairs, a politician no doubt, to set up the machinery for the new society.

Mr. Eliot speaks kindly of politicians, too, but assures us that in a Christian society even an unscrupulous politician need not be feared. Since the ethos by which the State operated would be Christian, even an evil man, or a stupid one, would be bound by the Christian social pattern to administer affairs in a Christian (therefore a good) spirit. There would be room in the officialdom of this State for all kinds of men, Christian as well as non-Christian and anti-Christian; in fact Mr. Eliot sees in such a polyglot administration the cultural and artistic solution to the problem created by totalitarianism.

The rulers in the Christian Society would not need to have before them always the precepts of Christian doctrine, but the mass of the people would be so trained and so educated that the State would perforce operate in accordance with Christian categories. This book deals with many problems in a Christian society, such

as the Church, economics, education (as opposed to present "instruction") and the various entities of which the State is to be composed. The whole would be so organized as to make Christian living possible. Under the current order, "a great deal of the machinery of life is merely a sanction for un-Christian aims," says Mr. Eliot. He sums up his position as follows:

"We must abandon the notion that the Christian should be content with freedom of cultus, and with suffering no worldly disabilities on account of his faith. However bigoted the announcement may sound, the Christian can be satisfied with nothing less than a Christian organization of society."

And Mr. Eliot is speaking not only of the totalitarian States, but of the so-called democracies as well. For he repeatedly asserts that Christianity is as bad if not worse off in the very democracies which give greatest lip-service in its defence.

This book offers the first real solution to humanity's social perplexities since Plato's *Republic* described the way out of its politico-intellectual ones.

IN *The Danger of Being a Gentleman*, in the book by the same name, Harold J. Laski deals with a problem that, for all his intellectual equipment, he is not prepared to handle. Nevertheless the essay is well worth reading, if for no other purpose than to see clearly exposed the errors of logic and the blurred design for living that have come to afflict the Gentlemen of the Left. If one were to write them into a melodrama it might be called "No Mother to Guide Them." In a word, those intellectuals

who have decided to live by their intellects alone seem to deny that good manners and good sense may reside in the same cranium. Mr. Laski's contempt for what he calls "a gentleman" blinds him to the qualities which go to make a gentleman.

It is too bad that this one essay, *The Danger of Being a Gentleman*, should have been the first of a series, and the title-piece of an otherwise solid volume.

FOR pure beauty of exposition, mastery of political philosophy and appreciation of a great legal philosopher, Dr. Moses J. Aronson's thin pamphlet, *The Juristic Thought Of Mr. Justice Frankfurter*, is pre-eminent. Its one disappointment is that it is too short. Dr. Aronson is assistant professor of philosophy at the College of The City of New York, and editor of the *Journal of Social Philosophy*.

MAN OF GLORY—SIMON BOLIVAR.
By Thomas Rourke. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1939. 365 pages. \$3.50.

ALTHOUGH there is already an impressive list of books about Simon Bolivar, Thomas Rourke's able and graphic interpretation of the Liberator's life comes at a propitious time. For many years persistent efforts to bring the Americas closer together have been painfully slow in results. Now the War, by forcing a more realistic basis for friendship upon our two continents, promises sharply to accelerate their material interdependence.

Introducing Simon Bolivar at the time of his birth in 1783, Mr. Rourke quickly sketches the development of the young aristocrat from the arms of his mother in Venezuela to those of his mistress in Paris. In fact—and it is one of the many reasons why this book about the father of five

countries is so readable—few of his mistresses are left out. Concurrently, the author shows how the ideas of Rousseau, Thomas Paine, and of the French and American revolutions ferment in the mind of Bolivar until, at the age of twenty-two, he rebels.

The body of the book is given over to the warfare which Bolivar led until the last Spanish armies were defeated and driven out. True to the title, Bolivar is pictured as a man in search of glory, an abstract glory that would endure beyond the grave.

As Mr. Rourke intimates, he has not been able to see Bolivar entirely apart from the legends woven about him. At the end of the book Bolivar has grown to heroic proportions, a man whose very presence silences dissension and draws the people together in a unity he wished them always to preserve. A plot against his life which he barely escaped, and the circumstance of his dying penniless and broken in 1830, fail to reduce his legendary stature.

The personality of Bolivar, appropriately enough, dominates this book which is vivid with sketches of other revolutionaries, notably General Sucre and that other South American liberator, San Martin. But it is as a symbol—a symbol of the struggling aspirations of a people—that Bolivar is really important in our time. The inhabitants of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia were mainly of Spanish and Indian origin. They were isolated by rugged mountains, jungles and lack of roads. Most of them were ignorant and their local leaders were often selfishly ambitious. That Bolivar was able to unite them and lead them to victory against their Spanish oppressors was evidence not only of the genius of the Liberator, but of their deep love of liberty and their dream of unity as well.

Mr. Rourke writes a clear and colorful prose. In the broader reaches of his story he depicts Spain's blundering and brutal policy which in some fifteen years of war exacted a toll that mounted into the hundreds of thousands. There are many stirring descriptions of battle, many vignettes of horror and heroism. Hardly less interesting is the broad historical delineation which ably shows the interest of the outside world, particularly of the United States. For years Henry Clay labored for recognition of the South American

republics. And, after the triumph of South American independence, Bolivar received a gold medallion bearing a lock of George Washington's hair together with a letter from Lafayette. *Man of Glory* deserves a wide reading, because such a book cannot help but lead to a more sympathetic and intelligent understanding of Latin America.

—FREER STALNAKER

is the emotion of politics as the demand for power is its active principle." Shying at blood and sceptical of power, he symbolizes the dilemma of most of the progressives of his generation.

—ROGER PIPPETT

POETS

AND POETRY

By ALFRED KREYMBORG

THE STORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS. By George Catlin. New York: Whittlesey House. 1939. 802 pages. \$5.00.

Littered with marble debris and mantraps, the Hall of Sociological Fame is one of the most dangerous buildings in the world for anyone to enter. Still, if you are willing to keep quiet while he is talking and to watch carefully when he flashes his lamp, you will find Professor Catlin a stimulating, if not always a safe, guide.

In some 300,000 words, ranging from the Ancients to Hitler and Stalin, from Confucius to confusion, he has "endeavored to provide an introduction to political theory intelligible to the common reader, with quotations from the original source sufficiently extensive to enable him to sample for himself the 'taste' and 'color' of these writings."

He has a nice turn of phrase. Confucius, for instance, is "the pilgrim salesman of political wisdom." Spinoza essays "the famous *pons asinorum*—the bridge in politics which leads across from Might to Right." Herbert Spencer was "a self-educated man. In his case, indeed, the Almighty was relieved of a great responsibility."

And, unlike most guides, the Professor can speak his mind. "Plato is not only an exponent of the Fascist closed economy, but also the complete moral jingo." And he accuses Marx, "by dialectical reaction, of being the father of fascism and of conflict, cause of so many bitter miseries in this twentieth century." But his running criticism of current ideologies is often shrewd and enlightening.

At the end of the tour, the Professor turns his lamp on himself as a latter-day humanist. "Much learning is small power, and unarmed prophets seem ever to be conquered. The enthusiast demands: Show me the enemy. Whom shall I kill? The demand for blood

WHILE other people are busy shooting or being shot or waiting to shoot or be shot, the world of poetry moves on and far from escaping reality, faces its deepest problems. In the fall and winter of 1939, a number of books revealed the fighting spirit of poetry in behalf of world peace or in behalf of more peace in our hemisphere. The leading events in this field rose from a well-known poet, a lesser-known and an unknown: Archibald MacLeish, Kenneth Patchen, Louise McNeill. In *America Was Promises* and *Gauley Mountain*, MacLeish and Miss McNeill, without running pessimistic, challenge our faith in democracy, the one in a dynamic chant extending his eloquence in "public speech," and the other by showing Spoon River at home in West Virginia. *Gauley Mountain* is a robust book, incisive and firmly



modelled. Through various rhymed biographies and autobiographies, it traces the generations of a remote town from pioneer days, through the Civil War, Reconstruction, the World War, prosperity and the depression. The ghost of the Indian steals through the dust of automobiles and the lyric history closes on a song to the flower of the Indian pipe.

Kenneth Patchen's second book, *First Will & Testament*, is the event of the season and an event in any season. There is no transcribing in a mere review the power and impact of the lines, the impassioned drive, the adoration of life, the forthright nudity of body and spirit, the furious hatred of war and destruction. Here is no average pacifist reasoning his way to a softer world. Patchen deals out hammer-blows, takes to the sword of satire, the steel of Goya, the human scalpel of Daumier, the torrents of Melville—and all in the American language. He's as hardboiled and tender as Cummings and Dos Passos, Hemingway and Caldwell, and while the Rabelaisian gusto will bar this book from the Puritans, and the four-letter words, it must be confessed, may lead the wrong people to some of its pages, the thing has the feel of a man who is clean to the heart and bone. Patchen calls his work "the legacy of a poet who speaks for the generation which was born in one war and seems destined to perish in another." But he also speaks for an older generation that reviles bloodshed as much as he does, and for generations beyond his own. This book is an absolute "must" at a time when powers abroad are cleverly lurking us overseas, cleverly aided by quite a few powers at home.

BOOKS ABROAD

BONAPARTE IN ITALY

THE GAMBLE. By Guglielmo Ferrero. Translated by Bertha Pritchard and Lily Freeman. London: Bell. 1939.

(E. E. Kellett in the *New Statesman and Nation*, London)

WHEN people talk of the "benefits" which despotism has conferred upon Italy, I often silently reckon to the debit account the loss of the greatest of living Italian historians. A lover of truth like Guglielmo Ferrero could not breathe the atmosphere of falsehood. Fortunately, there was a country which was able and willing to provide him a refuge; and in Switzerland he has been permitted to continue his work—which has indeed gained in power by a certain tacit reference, in its accounts of the past, to the events of the present.

Exile is not Ferrero's only grief. His son Leo was "destined to take part in the great struggle against the barbarians who beset civilization." *Dis aliter visum*; and Leo was attended to the grave by his friend, his father's best disciple, Pierre Jeanneret. These two have helped in the making of the present volume.

No more revolutionary book has been written for many years: it will compel historians to revise their opinions wholesale. Who does not recall the picture of the young general, at the head of a starving and ragged army, who, sundering the Piedmontese and the Austrians by miraculous marches, defeated each in turn, and then presented Sardinia at Cherasco with his ultimatum: "I may often lose a battle but shall never lose two minutes"? This, alas, is a myth. The allies, as Ferrero shows, were not sundered; but Sardinia was weary of the war—a party had long been anxious to find an excuse for terminating it—and leapt at the opportunity provided by Dego and Montenotte, indecisive as in themselves those battles were.

Who, again, does not know how, as victory succeeded victory, Bonaparte assumed more and more audaciously the role of a master, ignored the Directory and settled the affairs of Italy as if he had been an Alexander after Arbela? This, too, is entirely imaginary. Bonaparte was the most obedient of generals.

Almost every step he took, in his dealings with the duchies, with the Pope, with the owners of picture-galleries, was in accord with the instructions of the Directory; and even some of the details of his military operations were dictated from Paris. He was ordered to take the fortress of Ceva without using siege-artillery; and this great commander, primarily an artillery officer, tried to do so, and suffered a bloody repulse. Fortunately, for a reason which can only be guessed, Colli evacuated Ceva during the night, and the Napoleonic legend started on its widening way. As a matter of fact, in the whole campaign down to the Preliminaries of Léoben, Napoleon "knew his place" and did what he was told. This is established by Ferrero from the archives, and cannot, it appears, be denied.

We next turn to what Ferrero calls the "spirit of adventure"—the application of the principle that war must be totalitarian, and must be made to support itself. This, as all know, was a result of the French Revolution, a reversion to the methods of Attila and Alboin. Gone were the days of warfare as regulated by Vattel. No longer would an army surrender because it had no money with which to hire boats in order to cross a river. A school of tacticians had arisen which studied Guibert's *Essai Général*—a work whose importance has been revealed by our own military expert, Captain Liddell Hart. It was the Bible of Frederick the Great, "a book," said Napoleon, "that should make great men." Mobility was to be everything; all the traditions were to be violated; December was to be regarded as no less favorable a campaigning-month than June.

It is usual to despise the old system; and to this day wars are carried on in accordance with Guibertian principles, adapted to modern conditions. But there is much to be said on the other side; and few pages, even in this epoch-making work, are more instructive than those in which Ferrero, with a sidelong glance at modern war, shows the defects of totalitarian militarism. "The Revolution and the world, dazzled by early successes, forgot the profound and obscure truth from which the warfare of the eighteenth century deduced its principles and rules—that the supremacy of spirit over matter is complicated by dependence." The old methods may well return, as totalitarian war overreaches

itself. "Who overcomes by force," says Milton's Satan, "hath overcome but half his foe"; and Satan is here putting his case mildly. Even Napoleon's Italian campaign illustrates this truth. Advancing far into Austria, the conqueror found himself at a deadlock, in which returning was as tedious as going o'er; and he was constrained to sue for a peace which he endeavored (with success) to seem to be imposing. With plundered Italy behind him, and incalculable dangers before him, he had no choice. At Campo Formio, which his histrionic genius proclaimed as a dazzling triumph, "vanquished" Austria received more than the victor gained. Yet the phantom of glory has deluded even students ever since.

Professor Ferrero rightly called his book *The Gamble*; for the whole Italian campaign was a mere throw of the dice, which, by a combination of circumstances, appeared to turn out fortunately, and which, in the manner of adventurers, Napoleon himself regarded as decided by skill. It led him on to further adventures, successively more and more reckless. From the Peace of Campo Formio sprang not only the later Austrian and Russian wars and the Spanish imbroglio, but some of the gambles of our own times. Though, in lucid moments, Napoleon recognized that the "imponderables," in the long run, weigh most heavily in war, he yet trusted in force, and, even when force utterly failed, dwelt with a strange pleasure on the excitement of the *grand jeu*, the fascination of staking one's all on a single cast. The catastrophe of 1814 was but the natural, if belated, sequel of 1796. The story of that sequel Professor Ferrero hopes to tell in a subsequent volume, to the appearance of which we shall eagerly look forward.

THE PAN-GERMAN PERIL

MUNICH: BEFORE AND AFTER. By Hubert Ripka. London: Gollancz. 1939.

(Elizabeth Wiskemann in the *Spectator*, London)

IT IS unfortunate that an important piece of work, like this book of Dr. Ripka's, is presented as it is. For it is too long and ponderous, and therefore repetitive; there is little chance that the British public will do justice to something so akin to the German type of textbook. The translators are partly to

blame, for by using an inordinate number of definite articles—we have had to read about "the German propaganda," "the orientation of the Russian foreign policy," etc.—and by using synthetic words like "exclusivity" and "power-political" they have helped to deepen the gloom.

Apart from this and an occasional lapse into too special pleading, Dr. Ripka's book deserves little but praise, and it provides a most valuable handbook to Europe between Munich and the outbreak of war. Among its contributions to contemporary history, an explanation is given of the story circulated in Paris that Dr. Beneš asked France to betray him because he wished to yield but was afraid of Czech public opinion. It seems that M. de Lacroix, the French Minister in Prague, wired to Paris in response to a demand from Dr. Hodza for a definite statement of French intentions, and that the telegram was used, by those who had an interest in doing so, to assert that the Czech Government was as treacherous as they themselves were. Dr. Ripka accounts for the German occupation of Prague last March by attributing to Hitler designs against the West at that time; "for any action against the West it was not possible to rely on half-measures in Czechoslovakia." To anyone who has studied the question of Bohemia in detail the consequence of separating the mainly Sudeten German districts from the rest was so striking that Hitler's subsequent advance into the Czechs' "living space" seemed a perfectly natural thing.

Among the documents published and emphasized by Dr. Ripka the Soviet reply of March 19, 1939 to Germany's establishment of the Protectorate is particularly interesting; in spite of their collaboration with Germany in the matter of Poland six months later, the Russians then declared the occupation of the Czech provinces by German troops to be "arbitrary, violent and aggressive." Recent acrobatics in Soviet diplomacy, while invalidating Dr. Ripka's claim that the U.S.S.R. has always contributed to a general "respect for other nations and for the independence of their Governments," have not, however, diminished the interest of what he has to say about East-European affairs. And if he could not foresee the transfer of the South Tyrolese and Baltic Germans, he presents nothing like the disconcerted article on *Coming Home*

from the Baltic which Herr Alfred Rosenberg has just published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* of October 20.

Dr. Ripka's book is a defence of the policy of Masaryk and Beneš in the past and of their general ideas for the future. It insists upon a fact which has never been sufficiently appreciated abroad. These two men, and especially Dr. Beneš, were condemned as chauvinistically anti-German, not only by the Nazis, but also by their political opponents in the Czech Agrarian Party. At the very time when they made these accusations the Agrarians also told Dr. Beneš after 1934, and particularly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, that he should imitate Colonel Beck's policy and come to a bilateral agreement with Germany. The annihilation of Poland this September provides only too grim a confirmation of Dr. Beneš's reply, and sympathy for Poland should not be allowed to obscure Colonel Beck's responsibility for strengthening that very Germany which has so mercilessly destroyed Warsaw and the Warsaw regime.

Dr. Ripka concludes with an analysis of National Socialism and its methods, and a statement of his aims as a Czechoslovak and a European. He describes the Nazi technique of stirring up the small nations against one another and of exploiting the presence of minorities in order to disintegrate any State which obstructed the path of German expansion; he is even able to quote a Nazi leader who assured him (in 1932) that France had a minority population fourteen millions strong. His quotations from Masaryk show how far the world lagged behind that remarkable man. Dr. Ripka himself desires a revolution which shall "re-convert the Germans to Europeanism," and thereafter the establishment of a peace-free federation of independent nations throughout Europe at least. He believes that salvation depends upon resistance to Hitler. What has happened since he finished writing his book adds to the poignancy of the two lines from Schiller with which he concludes:

*Und setzt Ihr nicht das Leben Ein,
Wie wird Euch das Leben gewonnen sein.*

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THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

GEORGIA ENGELHARD, who believes mountain-climbing is an index of national character—see *Germans on the Rocks* [p. 570]—is herself a well-known American mountain-climber, having made many notable ascents in the Rockies as well as the Alps.

S. DAVIDOVICH is a young Ukrainian-Canadian who was educated at Columbia University and in London, where he has also contributed to the *Ukrainian Bulletin*, publication of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. *Soviet Imperialism Submerges Ukraine* [p. 573] is from the *Nineteenth Century and After*.

CHARLES NELSON SPINKS, Ph. D., who writes of *Japan in China* [p. 578], is an American resident of Japan where he teaches at the Tokyo University of Commerce and edits the *Japan News-Week*.

AKOS SZENDREY, who describes *Legacies of Asia to Hungary* [p. 584], is ethnographer at the Hungarian Ethnographical Museum.

ALFRED KREYMBORG, who in this issue makes his debut as conductor of a department, *Poets and Poetry*; for THE LIVING AGE, is a veteran in the literary world. He has issued more than thirty volumes of poetry, plays, fiction and criticism. His most recent book, *Four Apes and Other Fables of Our Day*, is composed of ten radio plays. His outstanding critical work is *Our Singing Strength*.

THE regular Index to the contents of THE LIVING AGE for the preceding six months will appear in the March issue.

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